General View of Positivism — Chapter 4 The Influence Of Positivism Upon Women Part 3

Such is the Positivist theory on the subject of Women.

It marks out for them a noble field of social usefulness.

It extends the scope of their influence to public as well as private life, and yet in a way thoroughly in harmony with their nature.

Without leaving the family, they will participate in the controlling power exercised by philosophers and workmen, seeking even in their own domestic sphere rather to modify than to govern.

In a word, as I shall show more fully in the last chapter of this introductory work, Woman is the spontaneous priestess of Humanity.

She personifies in the purest form the principle of Love upon which the unity of our nature depends; and the culture of that principle in others is her special function.

[Women’s influence over the working classes and their teachers] All classes, therefore, must be brought under women’s influence; for all require to be reminded constantly of the great truth that Reason and Activity are subordinate to Feeling.

Of their influence upon philosophers I have spoken.

If they are men worthy of their mission, they will be conscious of the tendency which their life has to harden them and lead them into useless speculation; and they will feel the need of renewing the ardour of their social sympathy at its native source.

Feeling, when it is pure and deep, corrects its own errors, because they clash with the good to which it is ever tending.

But erroneous use of the intellectual or practical faculties, cannot be even recognized, much less corrected, without the aid of Affection, which is the only part of our nature that suffers directly from such errors.

Therefore whenever either the philosopher or the people deviate from duty, it will be the part of women to remonstrate with them gently, and recall them to the true social principles which are entrusted to their special charge.

With the working classes, the special danger to be contended against is their tendency to abuse their strength, and to resort to force for the attainment of their objects, instead of persuasion.

But this danger is after all less than that of the misuse of intellectual power to which philosophers are so liable.

Thinkers who try to make reasoning do the work of feeling can very seldom be convinced of their error.

Popular excitement, on the contrary, has often yielded to feminine influence, exerted though it has been hitherto without any systematic guidance.

The difference is no doubt partly owing to the fact that there are now few or none who deserve the name of philosophers.

For we cannot give that name to the superficial sophists and rhetoricians of our time, whether psychologists or ideologists, men wholly incapable of deep thought on any subject.

Independently of this, however, the difference is explained by the character of the two classes.

Women will always find it harder to deal with intellectual pride than with popular violence.

Appeals to social feeling are their only weapons;

and the social feelings of the workman are stronger than those of the philosopher.

Sophistry is far more formidable to them than passion.

In fact, were it not that the working classes are even now so amenable to female influence, society would be in extreme danger from the disorder caused by intellectual anarchy.

There are many sophisms which maintain themselves in spite of scientific refutation, and which would be destructive of all order, were it not for our moral instincts.

Of this the Communists offer a striking example, in avoiding, with that admirable inconsistency to which I have already called attention, the extension of their principle to the Family.

Surrounded by the wildest theories, such as, if they were put in practice, would utterly destroy or paralyse society, we see large numbers of working men showing in their daily life a degree of affection and respect for women, which is unequalled by any other class.

It is well to reflect on facts like these, not only because they lead us to judge the Communist school with more justice, but because, occurring as they do in the midst of social anarchy, they show what powerful agencies for good will be at our disposal in more settled times.

Certainly they cannot be attributed to theological teaching, which has rather had the effect of strengthening the errors which it attacks by the absurdity of its refutations.

They are simply the result of the influence which women have spontaneously exercised on the nobler feelings of the people.

In Protestant countries where their influence is less, the mischievous effects of Communistic theories have been far greater.

We owe it to women that the Family has been so little injured by the retrograde spirit of those republican reformers, whose ideal of modern society is to absorb the Family into the State, as was done by a few small tribes in ancient Greece.

The readiness shown by women in applying practical remedies to erroneous theories of morality is shown in other cases where the attractiveness of the error would seem irresistible to the coarser nature of men.

The evils consequent on divorce, which has been authorized in Germany for three centuries, have been much lessened by women’s instinctive repugnance to it.

The same may be said of recent attacks upon marriage, which are still more serious because the anarchy of modern life revives all the extravagances of the metaphysical spirit in ancient times.

In no one case has a scheme of society hostile to marriage met with any real favour from women, plausible as many of them seemed.

Unable in their ignorance of social science to see the fallacy of such schemes themselves, our revolutionary writers cannot conceive that women will not be convinced by them.

But happily women, like the people, judge in these matters by the heart rather than by the head.

In the absence of any guiding principle to direct the understanding and prevent the deviations to which it is always exposed, the heart is a far safer guide.

There is no need at present of pursuing these remarks farther.

It is abundantly clear that women are in every respect adapted for rectifying the moral deviations to which every element in the social organism is liable.

And if we already feel the value of their influence, springing as it does from the unaided inspirations of the heart, we may be sure it will become far more consolidated and will be far more widely felt, when it rests on the basis of a sound philosophical system, capable of refuting sophisms and exposing fallacies from which their unassisted instinct is insufficient to preserve us.

[Their social influence in the _salon_] Thus the part to be played by women in public life is not merely passive.

Not only will they give their sanction individually and collectively to the verdicts of public opinion as formed by philosophers and by the people; but they will themselves interfere actively in moral questions.

It will be their part to maintain the primary principle of Positivism, which originated with themselves, and of which they will always be the most natural representatives.

But, how, it may be asked, can this be reconciled with my previous remark that women’s life should still be essentially domestic?

For the ancients, and for the greater part of the human race at the present time, it would be irreconcilable.

But in Western Europe the solution has long ago been found.

From the time when women acquired, as they did in the Middle Ages, a fair measure of domestic freedom, opportunities for social intercourse arose, which combined most happily the advantages of private and of public life, and in these women presided.

The practice afterwards extended, especially in France, and these meetings became the laboratories of public opinion.

It seems now as if they had died out, or had lost their character.

The intellectual and moral anarchy of our times is most unfavourable to free interchange of thoughts and feelings.

But a custom so social, and which did such good service in the philosophical movement preceding the Revolution, is assuredly not destined to perish.

In the more perfect social state to which we are tending, it will be developed more fully than ever, when men’s minds and hearts have accepted the rallying point offered by the new philosophy.

This is, then, the mode in which women can with propriety participate in public life.

Here all classes will recognize their authority as paramount.

Under the new system these meetings will entirely lose their old aristocratic character, which is now simply obstructive.

The Positivist salon will complete the series of social meetings, in which the three elements of the spiritual power will be able to act in concert.

First, there is the religious assemblage in the Temple of Humanity.

Here the philosopher will naturally preside, the other two classes taking on a secondary part.

In the Club again it is the people who will take the active part; women and philosophers would support them by their presence, but without joining in the debate.

Lastly, women in their salons will promote active and friendly intercourse between all three classes; and here all who may be qualified to take a leading part will find their influence cordially accepted.

Gently and without effort a moral control will thus be established, by which acts of violence or folly may be checked in their source.

Kind advice, given indirectly but earnestly, will often save the philosopher from being blinded by ambition, or from deviating, through intellectual pride, into useless digressions.

Working men at these meetings will learn to repress the spirit of violence or envy that frequently arises in them, recognizing the sacredness of the care thus manifested for their interests.

And the great and the wealthy will be taught from the manner in which praise and blame is given by those whose opinion is most valued, that the only justifiable use of power or talent is to devote it to the service of the weak.

[But the Family is their principal sphere of action] But, however important the public duties that women will ultimately be called upon to perform, the Family is after all their highest and most distinctive sphere of work.

It was in allusion to their domestic influence that I spoke of them as the originators of spiritual power.

Now the Family, although it is the basis of all human society, has never been satisfactorily defended by any received system of society.

All the corrosive power of metaphysical analysis has been employed upon it; and of many of the sophisms put forward no rational refutation has been given.

On the other hand, the protection of the theologians is no less injurious.

For they still persist in connecting the institutions of the Family with their obsolete dogmas, which, however useful they may have been formerly, are now simply dangerous.

From the close of the Middle Ages the priesthood has been powerless, as the licentious songs of the troubadours prove, to protect the sanctity of marriage against the shallow but mischievous attacks which even then were made against it.

And afterwards, when these false principles became more generally prevalent, and even royal courts disgraced themselves by giving public approval to them, the weakness of the priests became still more manifest.

Thus nothing can be more monstrous than these ignorant assertions that theological doctrines have been the safeguard of the Family.

They have done nothing to preserve it from the most subversive attacks, under which it must have succumbed, but for the better instincts of society, especially of the female portion of it.

With the exception of a foolish fiction about the origin of Woman, theology has put forward no systematic defence of marriage; and as soon as theological authority itself fell into discredit, the feeble sanction which it gave to domestic morality became utterly powerless against sophistical attacks.

But now that the Family can be shown on Positive principles to rest on scientific laws of human nature or of society, the danger of metaphysical controversy and theological feebleness is past.

These principles will be discussed systematically in the second volume of the larger Treatise to which this work is the Introduction.

But the few remarks to which I must at present limit myself, will, I hope, at least satisfy the reader as to the capability of Positivism to re-establish morality upon a firm basis.

[Woman’s mission as a wife.

Conjugal love an education for universal sympathy] According to the lower views of the subject, such as those coarsely expressed by the great hero of reaction, Napoleon, procreation and maternity are the only social functions of Woman.

Indeed many theorists object even to her rearing her children, and think it preferable to leave them to the abstract benevolence of the State.

But in the Positivist theory of marriage, the principal function of Woman is one quite unconnected with procreation.

It is a function dependent on the highest attributes of our nature.

Vast as is the moral importance of maternity, yet the position of wife has always been considered even more characteristic of woman’s nature; as shown by the fact that the words woman and wife are in many languages synonymous.

Marriage is not always followed by children; and besides this, a bad wife is very seldom indeed a good mother.

The first aspect then, under which Positivism considers Woman, is simply as the companion of Man, irrespective of her maternal duties.

Viewed thus, Marriage is the most elementary and yet the most perfect mode of social life.

It is the only association in which entire identity of interests is possible.

In this union, to the moral completeness of which the language of all civilized nations bears testimony, the noblest aim of human life is realized, as far as it ever can be.

For the object of human existence, as shown in the second chapter, is progress of every kind; progress in morality, that is to say in the subjection of Self-interest to Social Feeling, holding the first rank.

Now this unquestionable principle leads us by a very sure and direct path to the true theory of marriage.

Different as the two sexes are by nature, and increased as that difference is by the diversity which happily exists in their social position, each is consequently necessary to the moral development of the other.

In practical energy and in the mental capacity which usually accompanies it, Man is evidently superior to Woman.

Woman’s strength, on the other hand, lies in Feeling.

She excels Man in love, as Man excels her in force.

It is impossible to conceive of a closer union than that which binds these two beings to the mutual service and perfection of each other, saving them from all danger of rivalry.

The voluntary character too of this union gives it a still further charm, when the choice has been on both sides a happy one.

In the Positive theory, then, of marriage, its principal object is considered to be that of completing and confirming the education of the heart by calling out the purest and strongest of human sympathies.

It is true that sexual instinct, which, in man’s case at all events, was the origin of conjugal attachment, is a feeling purely selfish.

It is also true that its absence would in the majority of cases, diminish the energy of affection.

But woman with her more loving heart, has usually far less need of this coarse stimulus than man.

The influence of her purity reacts on man, and ennobles his affection.

And affection is in itself so sweet, that when once it has been aroused by whatever agency, its own charm is sufficient to maintain it in activity.

When this is the case, conjugal union becomes a perfect ideal of friendship;

yet still more beautiful than friendship, because each possesses and is possessed by the other.

For perfect friendship, difference of sex is essential, as excluding the possibility of rivalry.

No other voluntary tie can admit of such full and unrestrained confidence.

It is the source of the most unalloyed happiness that man can enjoy; for there can be no greater happiness than to live for another.

But independently of the intrinsic value of this sacred union, we have to consider its importance from the social point of view.

It is the first stage in our progress towards that which is the final object of moral education, namely, universal love.

Many writers of the so-called socialist school, look upon conjugal love and universal benevolence, the two extreme terms in the scale of affections, as opposed to each other.

In the second chapter, I pointed out the falseness and danger of this view.

The man who is incapable of deep affection for one whom he has chosen as his partner in the most intimate relations of life, can hardly expect to be believed when he professes devotion to a mass of human beings of whom he knows nothing.

The heart cannot throw off its original selfishness, without the aid of some complete and enduring affection.

And conjugal love, concentrated as it is upon one object exclusively, is more enduring and complete than any other.

From personal experience of strong love we rise by degrees to sincere affection for all mankind; although, as the scope of feeling widens, its energy must decrease.

The connexion of these two states of feeling is instinctively recognized by all; and it is clearly indicated by the Positive theory of human nature, which has now placed it beyond the reach of metaphysical attacks.

When the moral empire of Woman has been more firmly established by the diffusion of Positivist principles, men will see that the common practice of looking to the private life of a statesman as the best guarantee of his public conduct had deep wisdom in it.

One of the strongest symptoms of the general laxity of morals to which mental anarchy has brought us, is that disgraceful law passed in France thirty years ago, and not yet repealed; the avowed object of which was to surround men’s lives with a ‘wall’ of privacy; a law introduced by psychologist politicians who no doubt needed such a wall.

[8] [Conditions of marriage.

Indissoluble monogamy] The purpose of marriage once clearly understood, it becomes easy to define its conditions.

The intervention of society is necessary; but its only object is to confirm and to develop the order of things which exists naturally.

It is essential in the first place to the high purposes for which marriage has been instituted, that the union shall be both exclusive and indissoluble.

So essential indeed are both conditions, that we frequently find them even when the connexion is illegal.

That any one should have ventured to propound the doctrine that human happiness is to be secured by levity and inconsistency in love, is a fact which nothing but the utter deficiency of social and moral principles can explain.

Love cannot be deep unless it remains constant to a fixed object.

The very possibility of change is a temptation to it.

So differently constituted as man and woman are, is their short life too much for perfect knowledge and love of one another?

Yet the versatility to which most human affection is liable makes the intervention of society necessary.

Without some check upon indecision and caprice, life might degenerate into a miserable series of experiments, each ending in failure and degradation.

Sexual love may become a powerful engine for good: but only on the condition of placing it under rigorous and permanent discipline.

Those who doubt the necessity for this, have only to cast a glance beyond Western Europe at the countries where no such discipline has been established.

It has been said that the adoption or rejection of monogamy is a simple question of climate.

But for this hypothesis there is no ground whatever.

It is as contrary to common observation as to philosophic theory.

Marriage, like every other human institution, has always been improving.

Beginning in all countries with unrestricted polygamy, it tends in all to the purest monogamy.

Tracing back the history of Northern Europe, we find polygamy there as well as in the South; and Southern nations, like Northern, adopt polygamy as their social life advances.

We see the tendency to it in those parts of the East which come into contact with Western civilization.

Monogamy, then, is one of the most precious gifts which the Middle Ages have bequeathed to Western Europe.

The striking superiority of social life in the West is probably due to it more than to any other cause.

Protestant countries have seriously impaired its value by their laws of divorce.

But this aberration will hardly be permanent.

It is alien to the purer feelings of women and of the people, and the mischief done by it is limited to the privileged classes.

France is now threatened with a revival of the metaphysical delusions of the Revolution, and it is feared by some that the disastrous example of Germany in this respect will be imitated.

But all such tendencies, being utterly inconsistent with the habits of modern life, will soon be checked by the sounder philosophical principles which have now arisen.

The mode of resistance to these errors which Positivism adopts will render the struggle most useful in hastening the adoption of the true theory of marriage.

The spirit of Positivism being always relative, concessions may be made to meet exceptional cases, without weakening or contradicting the principle; whereas the absolute character of theological doctrine was incompatible with concession.

The rules of morality should be general and comprehensive; but in their practical application exceptions have often to be made.

By no philosophy but the Positive can these two conditions be reconciled.

[Perpetual widowhood] To the spirit of anarchy, however, Positivism yields nothing.

The unity essential to marriage, it renders more complete than ever.

It develops the principle of monogamy, by inculcating, not as a legal institution, but as moral duty, the perpetuity of widowhood.

Affection so firmly concentrated has always been regarded with respect even on man’s side.

But hitherto no religion has had sufficient purity or influence to secure its adoption.

Positivism, however, from the completeness of its synthesis, and from the fact that its rules are invariably based on the laws of nature, will gain such influence, and we find little difficulty in inducing all natures of delicate feeling to accept this additional obligation.

It follows from the very principle which to the Positivist is the object of all marriage, the raising and purifying of the heart.

Unity of the tie which is already recognized as necessary in life, is not less so in death.

Constancy in widowhood was once common among women; and if its moral beauty is less appreciated now, it is because all systematic morality has been forgotten.

But it is none the less, as careful study of human nature will show, a most precious source of moral good, and one which is not beyond the reach of nobler natures, even in their youth.

Voluntary widowhood, while it offers all the advantages which chastity can confer on the intellectual and physical as well as on the moral nature, is yet free from the moral dangers of celibacy.

Constant adoration of one whom Death has implanted more visibly and deeply on the memory, leads all high natures, and especially philosophers, to give themselves more unreservedly to the service of Humanity; and thus their public life is animated by the ennobling influence of their innermost feelings.

Alike from a sense of their own truest happiness and from devotion to public duty, they will be led to this result.

Deep as is the satisfaction in this prolongation of the sacredness of marriage, it may be carried by those who recognize its value yet further.

As the death of one did not destroy the bond, so neither should the death of both.

Let, then, those whom death could not divide be laid in the same grave together.

A promise of this solemn act of perpetuation might be given beforehand, when the organs of public opinion judged it merited.

A man would find a new motive for public exertion, if it were felt to be a pledge that the memory of her whom he loved should be for ever coupled with his own.

We have a few instances where this union of memories has taken place spontaneously, as in the case of Laura and Petrarch, and of Dante and Beatrice.

Yet these instances are so exceptional, that they hardly help us to realize the full value of the institution proposed.

There is no reason for limiting it to cases of extraordinary genius.

In the more healthy state of society to which we are tending, where private and public life will be far more closely connected than they have been hitherto, this recompense of service may be given to all who have deserved it, by those who have come within their circle of influence.

Such, then, are the consolations which Positivist sympathy can give.

They leave no cause to regret the visionary hopes held out by Christianity, hopes which now are as enfeebling to the heart as to the intellect.

Here, as in all other respects, the moral superiority of Positivism is shown, for the comfort which it gives to the bereaved implies a strengthening of the tie.

Christian consolation, of which so much has been said, rather encourages a second union.

By so doing it seriously impairs the value of the institution; for a division of affection arises, which indeed seems hardly compatible with the vague utopia of a future life.

The institutions of perpetual widowhood and of union in the tomb have found no place in any previous system, though both were wanting to make monogamy complete.

Here, as elsewhere, the best reply which the new philosophy can give to ignorant prejudice or malignant calumny, is to take new steps forward in the moral advancement of Man.