General View of Positivism — Chapter 1 The Intellectual Character Of Positivism Part 2

To give such paramount importance to this portion of the subject may seem at first sight inconsistent with the proposition just laid down, that the strength of the intellectual faculties is far inferior to that of the other elements of our nature.

It is quite certain that Feeling and Activity have much more to do with any practical step that we take than pure Reason.

In attempting to explain this paradox, we come at last to the peculiar difficulty of this great problem of human Unity.

The first condition of unity is a subjective principle; and this principle in the Positive system is the subordination of the intellect to the heart: Without this the unity that we seek can never be placed on a permanent basis, whether individually or collectively.

It is essential to have some influence sufficiently powerful to produce convergence amid the heterogeneous and often antagonistic tendencies of so complex an organism as ours.

But this first condition, indispensable as it is, would be quite insufficient for the purpose, without some objective basis, existing independently of ourselves in the external world.

That basis consists for us in the laws or Order of the phenomena by which Humanity is regulated.

The subjection of human life to this order is incontestable; and as soon as the intellect has enabled us to comprehend it, it becomes possible for the feeling of love to exercise a controlling influence over our discordant tendencies.

This, then, is the mission allotted to the intellect in the Positive synthesis; in this sense it is that it should be consecrated to the service of the heart.

I have said that our conception of human unity must be totally inadequate, and, indeed, cannot deserve the name, so long as it does not embrace every element of our nature.

But it would be equally fatal to the completeness of this great conception to think of human nature irrespectively of what lies outside it.

A purely subjective unity, without any objective basis, would be simply impossible.

In the first place any attempt to co-ordinate man’s moral nature, without regard to the external world, supposing the attempt feasible, would have very little permanent influence on our happiness, whether collectively or individually; since happiness depends so largely upon our relations to all that exists around us.

Besides this, we have to consider the exceeding imperfection of our nature.

Self-love is deeply implanted in it, and when left to itself is far stronger than Social Sympathy.

The social instincts would never gain the mastery were they not sustained and called into constant exercise by the economy of the external world, an influence which at the same time checks the power of the selfish instincts.

[By it the selfish affections are controlled;

the unselfish strengthened] To understand this economy aright; we must remember that it embraces not merely the inorganic world, but also the phenomena of our own existence.

The phenomena of human life, though more modifiable than any others, are yet equally subject to invariable laws; laws which form the principal objects of Positive speculation.

Now the benevolent affections, which themselves act in harmony with the laws of social development, incline us to submit to all other laws, as soon as the intellect has discovered their existence.

The possibility of moral unity depends, therefore, even in the case of the individual, but still more in that of society, upon the necessity of recognizing our subjection to an external power.

By this means our self-regarding instincts are rendered susceptible of discipline.

In themselves they are strong enough to neutralize all sympathetic tendencies, were it not for the support that the latter find in this External Order.

Its discovery is due to the intellect; which is thus enlisted in the service of feeling, with the ultimate purpose of regulating action.

Thus it is that an intellectual synthesis, or systematic study of the laws of nature, is needed on far higher grounds than those of satisfying our theoretical faculties, which are, for the most part, very feeble, even in men who devote themselves to a life of thought.

It is needed, because it solves at once the most difficult problem of the moral synthesis.

The higher impulses within us are brought under the influence of a powerful stimulus from without.

By its means they are enabled to control our discordant impulses, and to maintain a state of harmony towards which they have always tended, but which, without such aid, could never be realized.

Moreover, this conception of the order of nature evidently supplies the basis for a synthesis of human action;

for the efficacy of our action depends entirely upon their conformity to this order.

But this part of the subject has been fully explained in my previous work, and I need not enlarge upon it further.

As soon as the synthesis of mental conceptions enables us to form a synthesis of feelings, it is clear that there will be no very serious difficulties in constructing a synthesis of actions.

Unity of action depends upon unity of impulse, and unity of design; and thus we find that the co-ordination of human nature, as a whole, depends ultimately upon the co-ordination of mental conceptions, a subject which seemed at first of comparatively slight importance.

The subjective principle of Positivism, that is, the subordination of the intellect to the heart is thus fortified by an objective basis, the immutable Necessity of the external world; and by this means it becomes possible to bring human life within the influence of social sympathy.

The superiority of the new synthesis to the old is even more evident under this second aspect than under the first.

In theological systems the objective basis was supplied by spontaneous belief in a supernatural Will.

Now, whatever the degree of reality attributed to these fictions, they all proceeded from a subjective source; and therefore their influence in most cases must have been very confused and fluctuating.

In respect of moral discipline they cannot be compared either for precision, for force, or for stability, to the conception of an invariable Order, actually existing without us, and attested, whether we will or no, by every act of our existence.

[Our conception of this External Order has been gradually growing from the earliest times, and is but just complete] This fundamental doctrine of Positivism is not to be attributed in the full breadth of its meanings to any single thinker.

It is the slow result of a vast process carried out in separate departments, which began with the first use of our intellectual powers, and which is only just completed in those who exhibit those powers in their highest form.

During the long period of her infancy Humanity has been preparing this the most precious of her intellectual attainments, as the basis for the only system of life which is permanently adapted to our nature.

The doctrine has to be demonstrated in all the more essential cases from observation only, except so far as we admit argument from analogy.

Deductive argument is not admissible, except in such cases as are evidently compounded of others in which the proof given has been sufficient.

Thus, for instance, we are authorized by sound logic to assert the existence of laws of weather; though most of these are still, and, perhaps, always will be, unknown.

For it is clear that meteorological phenomena result from a combination of astronomical, physical and chemical influences, each of which has been proved to be subject to invariable laws.

But in all phenomena which are not thus reducible, we must have recourse to inductive reasoning; for a principle which is the basis of all deduction cannot be itself deduced.

Hence it is that the doctrine, being so entirely foreign as it is to our primitive mental state, requires such a long course of preparation.

Without such preparation even the greatest thinkers could not anticipate it.

It is true that in some cases metaphysical conceptions of a law have been formed before the proof really required had been furnished.

But they were never of much service, except so far as they generalized in a more or less confused way the analogies naturally suggested by the laws which had actually been discovered in simpler phenomena.

Besides, such assertions always remained very doubtful and very barren in result, until they were based upon some outline of a really Positive theory.

Thus, in spite of the apparent potency of this metaphysical method, to which modern intellects are so addicted, the conception of an External Order is still extremely imperfect in many of the most cultivated minds, because they have not verified it sufficiently in the most intricate and important class of phenomena, the phenomena of society.

I am not, of course, speaking of the few thinkers who accept my discovery of the principal laws of Sociology.

Such uncertainty in a subject so closely related to all others, produces great confusion in men’s minds, and affects their perception of an invariable order, even in the simplest subjects.

A proof of this is the utter delusion into which most geometricians of the present day have fallen with respect to what they call the Calculus of Chances;

a conception which presupposes that the phenomena considered are not subject to law.

The doctrine, therefore, cannot be considered as firmly established in any one case, until it has been verified specially in every one of the primary categories in which phenomena may be classed.

But now that this difficult condition has really been fulfilled by the few thinkers who have risen to the level of their age, we have at last a firm objective basis on which to establish the harmony of our moral nature.

That basis is, that all events whatever, the events of our own personal and social life included, are always subject to natural relations of sequence and similitude, which in all essential respects lie beyond the reach of our interference.

[Even where not modifiable, its influence on the character is of the greatest value] This, then, is the external basis of our synthesis, which includes the moral and practical faculties, as well as the speculative.

It rests at every point upon the unchangeable Order of the world.

The right understanding of this order is the principal subject of our thoughts; its preponderating influence determines the general course of our feelings; its gradual improvement is the constant object of our actions.

To form a more precise notion of its influence, let us imagine that for a moment it were really to cease.

The result would be that our intellectual faculties, after wasting themselves in wild extravagancies, would sink rapidly into incurable sloth; our nobler feelings would be unable to prevent the ascendancy of the lower instincts; and our active powers would abandon themselves to purposeless agitation.

Men have, it is true, been for a long time ignorant of this Order.

Nevertheless we have been always subject to it; and its influence has always tended, though without our knowledge, to control our whole being; our actions first, and subsequently our thoughts, and even our affections.

As we have advanced in our knowledge of it, our thoughts have become less vague, our desires less capricious, our conduct less arbitrary.

And now that we are able to grasp the full meaning of the conception, its influence extends to every part of our conduct.

For it teaches us that the object to be aimed at in the economy devised by man, is wise development of the irresistible economy of nature, which cannot be amended till it is first studied and obeyed.

In some departments it has the character of fate; that is, it admits of no modification.

But even here, in spite of the superficial objections to it which have arisen from intellectual pride, it is necessary for the proper regulation of human life.

Suppose, for instance, that man were exempt from the necessity of living on the earth, and were free to pass at will from one planet to another, the very notion of society would be rendered impossible by the licence which each individual would have to give way to whatever unsettling and distracting impulses his nature might incline him.

Our propensities are so heterogeneous and so deficient in elevation, that there would be no fixity or consistency in our conduct, but for these insurmountable conditions.

Our feeble reason may fret at such restrictions, but without them all its deliberations would be confused and purposeless.

We are powerless to create: all that we can do in bettering our condition is to modify an order in which we can produce no radical change.

Supposing us in possession of that absolute independence to which metaphysical pride aspires, it is certain that so far from improving our condition, it would be a bar to all development, whether social or individual.

The true path of human progress lies in the opposite direction; in diminishing the vacillation, inconsistency, and discordance of our designs by furnishing external motives for those operations of our intellectual, moral and practical powers, of which the original source was purely internal.

The ties by which our various diverging tendencies are held together would be quite inadequate for their purpose, without a basis of support in the external world, which is unaffected by the spontaneous variations of our nature.

But, however great the value of Positive doctrine in pointing out the unchangeable aspects of the universal Order, what we have principally to consider are the numerous departments in which that order admits of artificial modifications.

Here lies the most important sphere of human activity.

The only phenomena, indeed, which we are wholly unable to modify are the simplest of all, the phenomena of the Solar System which we inhabit.

It is true that now that we know its laws we can easily conceive them improved in certain respects; but to whatever degree our power over nature may extend, we shall never be able to produce the slightest change in them.

What we have to do is so to dispose our life as to submit to these resistless fatalities in the best way we can; and this is comparatively easy, because their greater simplicity enables us to foresee them with more precision and in a more distinct future.

Their interpretation by Positive science has had a most important influence on the gradual education of the human intellect: and it will always continue to be the source from which we obtain the clearest and most impressive sense of Immutability.

Too exclusively studied they might even now lead to fatalism; but controlled as their influence will be henceforward by a more philosophic education, they may well become a means of moral improvement, by disposing us to submit with resignation to all evils which are absolutely insurmountable.

[But in most cases we can modify it; and in these the knowledge of it forms the systematic basis of human action] In other parts of the external economy, invariability in all primary aspects is found compatible with modifications in points of secondary importance.

These modifications become more numerous and extensive as the phenomena are more complex.

The reason of this is that the causes from a combination of which the effects proceed being more varied and more accessible, offer greater facilities to our feeble powers to interfere with advantage.

But all this has been fully explained in my _System of Positive Philosophy_.

The tendency of that work was to show that our intervention became more efficacious in proportion as the phenomena upon which we acted had a closer relation to the life of man or society.

Indeed the extensive modifications of which society admits, go far to keep up the common mistake that social phenomena are not subject to any constant law.

At the same time we have to remember that this increased possibility of human intervention in certain parts of the External Order necessarily coexists with increased imperfection, for which it is a valuable but very inadequate compensation.

Both features alike result from the increase of complexity.

Even the laws of the Solar System are very far from perfect, notwithstanding their greater simplicity, which indeed makes their defects more perceptible.

The existence of these defects should be taken into careful consideration; not indeed with the hope of amending them, but as a check upon unreasoning admiration.

Besides, they lead us to a clearer conception of the true position of Humanity, a position of which the most striking feature is the necessity of struggling against difficulties of every kind.

Lastly, by observing these defects we are less likely to waste our time in seeking for absolute perfection, and so neglecting the wiser course of looking for such improvements as are really possible.

In all other phenomena, the increasing imperfection of the economy of nature becomes a powerful stimulus to all our faculties, whether moral, intellectual or practical.

Here we find sufferings which can really be alleviated to a large extent by wise and well-sustained combination of efforts.

This consideration should give a firmness and dignity of bearing, to which Humanity could never attain during her period of infancy.

Those who look wisely into the future of society will feel that the conception of man becoming, without fear or boast, the arbiter, within certain limits, of his own destiny, has in it something far more satisfying than the old belief in Providence, which implied our remaining passive.

Social union will be strengthened by the conception, because every one will see that union forms our principal resource against the miseries of human life.

And while it calls out our noblest sympathies, it impresses us more strongly with the importance of high intellectual culture, being itself the object for which such culture is required.

These important results have been ever on the increase in modern times; yet hitherto they have been too limited and casual to be appreciated rightly, except so far as we could anticipate the future of society by the light of sound historical principles.

Art, so far as it is yet organized, does not include that part of the economy of nature which, being the most modifiable, the most imperfect, and the most important of all, ought on every ground to be regarded as the principal object of human exertions.

Even Medical Art, specially so called, is only just beginning to free itself from its primitive routine.

And Social Art, whether moral or political, is plunged in routine so deeply that few statesmen admit the possibility of shaking it off.

Yet of all the arts, it is the one which best admits of being reduced to a system; and until this is done it will be impossible to place on a rational basis all the rest of our practical life.

All these narrow views are due simply to insufficient recognition of the fact, that the highest phenomena are as much subject to laws as others.

When the conception of the Order of Nature has become generally accepted in its full extent, the ordinary definition of Art will become as comprehensive and as homogeneous as that of Science; and it will then become obvious to all sound thinkers that the principal sphere of both Art and Science is the social life of man.

Thus the social services of the Intellect are not limited to revealing the existence of an external Economy, and the necessity of submission to its sway.

If the theory is to have any influence upon our active powers, it should include an exact estimate of the imperfections of this economy and of the limits within which it varies, so as to indicate and define the boundaries of human intervention.

Thus it will always be an important function of philosophy to criticize nature in a Positive spirit, although the antipathy to theology by which such criticism was formerly animated has ceased to have much interest, from the very fact of having done its work so effectually.

The object of Positive criticism is not controversial.

It aims simply at putting the great question of human life in a clearer light.

It bears closely on what Positivism teaches to be the great end of life, namely, the struggle to become more perfect; which implies previous imperfection.

This truth is strikingly apparent when applied to the case of our own nature, for true morality requires a deep and habitual consciousness of our natural defects.