General View of Positivism — Chapter 2 The Social Aspect Of Positivism, As Shown By Its Connexion With The General Revolutionary Movement Of Western Europe Part 3

[Relation of Positivism to the mediaeval system, to which we owe the first attempt to separate spiritual from temporal power] By extending the social movement to its proper limits, we thus exhibit on a larger scale the same features that were noticed when France alone was being considered.

Abroad or at home, every great social problem that arises proves that the object of the second revolutionary phase is a reorganization of principles and of life.

By this means a body of public opinion will be formed of sufficient force to lead gradually to the growth of new political institutions.

These will be adapted to the special requirements of each nation, under the general superintendence of the spiritual power, from whom our fundamental principles will have proceeded.

The general spirit of these principles is essentially historical, whereas the tendency of the negative phase of the revolution was anti-historical.

Without blind hatred of the past, men would never have had sufficient energy to abandon the old system.

But henceforth the best evidence of having attained complete emancipation will be the rendering full justice to the past in all its phases.

This is the most characteristic feature of that relative spirit which distinguishes Positivism.

The surest sign of superiority, whether in persons or systems, is fair appreciation of opponents.

And this must always be the tendency of social science when rightly understood, since its prevision of the future is avowedly based upon systematic examination of the past.

It is the only way in which the free and yet universal adoption of general principles of social reconstruction can ever be possible.

Such reconstruction, viewed by the light of Sociology, will be regarded as a necessary link in the series of human development; and thus many confused and incoherent notions suggested by the arbitrary beliefs hitherto prevalent will finally disappear.

The growth of public opinion in this respect is aided by the increasing strength of social feeling.

Both combine to encourage the historical spirit which distinguishes the second period of the Revolution, as we see indicated already in so many of the popular sympathies of the day.

Acting on this principle, Positivists will always acknowledge the close relation between their own system and the memorable effort of mediaeval Catholicism.

In offering for the acceptance of Humanity a new organization of life, we would not dissociate it with all that has gone before.

On the contrary, it is our boast that we are but proposing for her maturity the accomplishment of the noble effort of her youth, an effort made when intellectual and social conditions precluded the possibility of success.

We are too full of the future to fear any serious charge of retrogression towards the past.

It would be strange were such a charge to proceed from those of our opponents whose political ideal is that amalgamation of temporal and spiritual power which was adopted by the theocratic or military systems of antiquity.

The separation of these powers in the Middle Ages is the greatest advance ever yet made in the theory of social Order.

It was imperfectly effected, because the time was not ripe for it; but enough was done to show the object of the separation, and some of its principal results were partially arrived at.

It originated the fundamental doctrine of modern social life, the subordination of Politics to Morals; a doctrine which in spite of the most obstinate resistance has survived the decline of the religion which first proclaimed it.

We see it now sanctioned by a republican government which has shaken off the fetters of that religion more completely than any other.

A

further result of the separation is the keen sense of personal honour, combined with general fraternity, which distinguishes Western nations, especially those who have been preserved from Protestantism.

To the same source is due the general feeling that men should be judged by their intellectual and moral worth, irrespectively of social position, yet without upsetting that subordination of classes which is rendered necessary by the requirements of practical life.

And this has accustomed all classes to free discussion of moral and even of political questions; since every one feels it a right and a duty to judge actions and persons by the general principles which a common system of education has inculcated alike on all.

I need not enlarge on the value of the mediaeval church in organizing the political system of Western Europe, in which there was no other recognized principle of union.

All these social results are usually attributed to the excellence of the Christian doctrine; but history when fairly examined shows that the source from which they are principally derived is the Catholic principle of separating the two powers.

For these effects are nowhere visible except in the countries where this separation has been effected, although a similar code of morals and indeed a faith identically the same have been received elsewhere.

Besides, although sanctioned by the general tone of modern life, they have been neutralized to a considerable extent by the decline of the Catholic organization, and this especially in the countries where the greatest efforts have been made to restore the doctrine to its original purity and power.

In these respects Positivism has already appreciated Catholicism more fully than any of its own defenders, not even excepting De Maistre himself, as indeed some of the more candid organs of the retrograde school have allowed.

But the merit of Catholicism does not merely depend on the fact that it forms a most important link in the series of human development.

What adds to the glory of its efforts is that, as history clearly proves, they were in advance of their time.

The political failure of Catholicism resulted from the imperfection of its doctrines, and the resistance of the social medium in which it worked.

It is true that Monotheism is far more compatible with the separation of powers than Polytheism.

But from the absolute character of every kind of theology, there was always a tendency in the mediaeval system to degenerate into mere theocracy.

In fact, the proximate cause of its decline was the increased development of this tendency in the fourteenth century, and the resistance which it provoked among the kings, who stood forward to represent the general voice of condemnation.

Again, though separation of powers was less difficult in the defensive system of mediaeval warfare than in the aggressive system of antiquity, yet it is thoroughly repugnant to the military spirit in all its phases, because adverse to that concentration of authority which is requisite in war.

And thus it was never thoroughly realized, except in the conceptions of a few leading men among both the spiritual and temporal class.

Its brief success was principally caused by a temporary combination of circumstances.

It was for the most part a condition of very unstable equilibrium, oscillating between theocracy and empire.

[But the mediaeval attempt was premature; and Positivism will renew and complete it] But Positive civilization will accomplish what in the Middle Ages could only be attempted.

We are aided, not merely by the example of the Middle Ages, but by the preparatory labours of the last five centuries.

New modes of thought have arisen, and practical life has assumed new phases; and all are alike tending towards the separation of powers.

What in the Middle Ages was but dimly foreseen by a few ardent and aspiring minds, becomes now an inevitable and obvious result, instinctively felt and formally recognized by all.

From the intellectual point of view it is nothing more than the distinction between theory and practice; a distinction which is already admitted more or less formally throughout civilized Europe in subjects of less importance; which therefore it would be unreasonable to abandon in the most difficult of all arts and sciences.

Viewed socially, it implies the separation of education from action; or of morals from politics;

and few would deny that the maintenance of this separation is one of the greatest blessings of our progressive civilization.

The distinction is of equal importance to morality and to liberty.

It is the only way of bringing opinion and conduct under the control of principle; for the most obvious application of a principle has little weight when it is merely an act of obedience to a special command.

Taking the more general question of bringing our political forces into harmony, it seems clear that theoretical and practical power are so totally distinct in origin and operation, whether in relation to the heart, or intellect, or character, that the functions of counsel and of command ought never to belong to the same organs.

All attempts to unite them are at once retrograde and visionary, and if successful would lead to the intolerable government of mediocrities equally unfit for either kind of power.

But as I shall show in the following chapters this principle of separation will soon find increasing support among women and the working classes; the two elements of society in which we find the greatest amount of good sense and right feeling.

Modern society is, in fact, already ripe for the adoption of this fundamental principle of polity; and the opposition to it proceeds almost entirely from its connexion with the doctrines of the mediaeval church which have now become deservedly obsolete.

But there will be an end of these revolutionary prejudices among all impartial observers as soon as the principle is seen embodied in Positivism, the only doctrine which is wholly disconnected with Theology.

All human conceptions, all social improvements originated under theological influence, as we see proved clearly in many of the humblest details of life.

But this has never prevented Humanity from finally appropriating to herself the results of the creeds which she has outgrown.

And so it will be with this great political principle; it has already become obsolete except for the Positive school, which has verified inductively all the minor truths implied in it.

The only direct attacks against it come from the metaphysicians, whose ambitious aspirations for absolute authority would be thwarted by it.

It is they who attempt to fasten on Positivism the stigma of theocracy: a strange and in most cases disingenuous reproach, seeing that Positivists are distinguished from their opponents by discarding all beliefs which supersede the necessity for discussion.

The fact is that serious disturbances will soon be caused by the pertinacious efforts of these adherents of pedantocracy to regulate by law what ought to be left to moral influences; and then the public will become more alive to the necessity of the Positivist doctrine of systematically separating political from moral government.

The latter should be understood to rely exclusively on the forces of conviction and persuasion; its influence on action being simply that of counsel; whereas the former employs direct compulsion, based upon superiority of physical force.

We now understand what is meant by the constructive character of the second revolutionary phase.

It implies a union of the social aspirations of the Middle Ages with the wise political instincts of the Convention.

In the interval of these two periods the more advanced nations were without any systematic organization, and were abandoned to the two-fold process of transition, which was decomposing the old order and preparing the new.

Both these preliminary steps are now sufficiently accomplished.

The desire for social regeneration has become too strong to be resisted, and a philosophical system capable of directing it has already arisen.

We may, therefore, recommence on a better intellectual and social basis the great effort of Catholicism, to bring Western Europe to a social system of peaceful activity and intellectual culture, in which Thought and Action should be subordinated to universal Love.

Reconstruction will begin at the points where demolition began previously.

The dissolution of the old organism began in the fourteenth century by the destruction of its international character.

Conversely, reorganization begins by satisfying the intellectual and mental wants common to the five Western nations.

[The Ethical system of Positivism] And here, since the object of this character is to explain the social value of Positivism, I may show briefly that it leads necessarily to the formation of a definite system of universal Morality; this being the ultimate object of all Philosophy, and the starting-point of all Polity.

Since it is by its moral code that every spiritual power must be principally tested, this will be the best mode of judging of the relative merits of Positivism and Catholicism.

[Subjection of Self-love to Social love is the great ethical problem.

The Social state of itself favours this result; but it may be hastened by organized and conscious effort] To the Positivist the object of Morals is to make our sympathetic instincts preponderate as far as possible over the selfish instincts;

social feelings over personal feelings.

This way of viewing the subject is peculiar to the new philosophy, for no other system has included the more recent additions to the theory of human nature, of which Catholicism gave so imperfect a representation.

It is one of the first principles of Biology that organic life always preponderates over animal life.

By this principle the Sociologist explains the superior strength of the self-regarding instincts, since these are all connected more or less closely with the instinct of self-preservation.

But although there is no evading this fact, Sociology shows that it is compatible with the existence of benevolent affections, affections which Catholicism had asserted to be altogether alien to our nature, and to be entirely dependent on superhuman Grace derived from a sphere beyond the reach of Law.

The great problem, then, is to raise social feeling by artificial effort to the position which, in the natural condition, is held by selfish feeling.

The solution is to be found in another biological principle, namely, that functions and organs are developed by constant exercise, and atrophied by prolonged inaction.

Now the effect of the Social state is, that while our sympathetic instincts are constantly stimulated, the selfish propensities are restricted; since, if free play were given to them, human intercourse would very shortly become impossible.

Thus it compensates to some extent the natural weakness of the Sympathies that they are capable of almost indefinite extension, while Self-love meets inevitably with a more or less efficient check.

Both these tendencies naturally increase with the progress of Humanity, and their increase is the best measure of the degree of perfection that we have attained.

Their growth, though spontaneous, may be materially hastened by organized intervention, both of individuals and of society, the object being to increase all favourable influences and diminish the unfavourable.

This is the object of the art of Morals.

Like every other art, it is restricted within certain limits.

But in this case the limits are less narrow, because the phenomena, being more complex, are also more modifiable.

Positive morality differs therefore from that of theological as well as of metaphysical systems.

Its primary principle is the preponderance of Social Sympathy.

Full and free expansion of the benevolent emotions is made the first condition of individual and social well-being, since these emotions are at once the sweetest to experience, and are the only feelings which can find expression simultaneously in all.

The doctrine is as deep and pure as it is simple and true.

It is eminently characteristic of a philosophy which, by virtue of its attribute of reality, subordinates all scientific conceptions to the social point of view, as the sole point from which they can be co-ordinated into a whole.

The intuitive methods of metaphysics could never advance with any consistency beyond the sphere of the individual.

Theology, especially Christian theology, could only rise to social conceptions by an indirect process, forced upon it, not by its principles, but by its practical functions.

Intrinsically, its spirit was altogether personal;

the highest object placed before each individual was the attainment of his own salvation, and all human affections were made subordinate to the love of God.

It is true that the first training of our higher feelings is due to theological systems; but their moral value depended mainly on the wisdom of the priesthood.

They compensated the defects of their doctrine, and at that time no better doctrine was available, by taking advantage of the antagonism which naturally presented itself between the interests of the imaginary and those of the real world.

The moral value of Positivism on the contrary, is inherent in its doctrine, and can be largely developed, independently of any spiritual discipline, though not so far as to dispense with the necessity for such discipline.

Thus, while Morality as a science is made far more consistent by being placed in its true connexion with the rest of our knowledge, the sphere of natural morality is widened by bringing human life, individually and collectively, under the direct and continuous influence of Social Feeling.

[Intermediate between self-love and universal benevolence are the domestic affections: filial, fraternal, conjugal, paternal] I have stated that Positive morality is brought into a coherent and systematic form by its principle of universal love.

This principle must now be examined first in its application to the separate aspects of the subject, and subsequently as the means by which the various parts may be co-ordinated.

There are three successive states of morality answering to the three principal stages of human life; the personal, the domestic, and the social stage.

The succession represents the gradual training of the sympathetic principle; it is drawn out step by step by a series of affections which, as it diminishes in intensity, increases in dignity.

This series forms our best resource in attempting as far as possible to reach the normal state; subordination of self-love to social feeling.

These are the two extremes in the scale of human affections; but between them there is an intermediate degree, namely, domestic attachment, and it is on this that the solution of the great moral problem depends.

The love of his family leads Man out of his original state of Self-love and enables him to attain finally a sufficient measure of Social love.

Every attempt on the part of the moral educator to call this last into immediate action, regardless of the intermediate stage, is to be condemned as utterly chimerical and profoundly injurious.

Such attempts are regarded in the present day with far too favourable an eye.

Far from being a sign of social progress, they would, if successful, be an immense step backwards;

since the feeling which inspires them is one of perverted admiration for antiquity.

Since the importance of domestic life is so great as a transition from selfish to social feeling, a systematic view of its relations will be the best mode of explaining the spirit of Positive morality, which is in every respect based upon the order found in nature.

The first germ of social feeling is seen in the affection of the child for its parents.

Filial love is the starting-point of our moral education: from it springs the instinct of Continuity, and consequently of reverence for our ancestors.

It is the first tie by which the new being feels himself bound to the whole past history of Man.

Brotherly love comes next, implanting the instinct of Solidarity, that is to say of union with our contemporaries; and thus we have already a sort of outline of social existence.

With maturity new phases of feeling are developed.

Relationships are formed of an entirely voluntary nature;

which have therefore a still more social character than the involuntary ties of earlier years.

This second stage in moral education begins with conjugal affection, the most important of all, in which perfect fullness of devotion is secured by the reciprocity and indissolubility of the bond.

It is the highest type of all sympathetic instincts, and has appropriated to itself in a special sense the name of Love.

From this most perfect of unions proceeds the last in the series of domestic sympathies, parental love.

It completes the training by which Nature prepares us for universal sympathy: for it teaches us to care for our successors; and thus it binds us to the Future, as filial love had bound us to the Past.

I placed the voluntary class of domestic sympathies after the involuntary, because it was the natural order of individual development, and it thus bore out my statement of the necessity of family life as an intermediate stage between personal and social life.

But in treating more directly of the theory of the Family as the constituent element of the body politic, the inverse order should be followed.

In that case conjugal attachment would come first, as being the feeling through which the family comes into existence as a new social unit, which in many cases consists simply of the original pair.

Domestic sympathy, when once formed by marriage, is perpetuated first by parental then by filial affection; it may afterwards be developed by the tie of brotherhood, the only relation by which different families can be brought into direct contact.

The order followed here is that of decrease in intensity, and increase in extension.

The feeling of fraternity, which I place last, because it is usually least powerful, will be seen to be of primary importance when regarded as the transition from domestic to social affections; it is, indeed, the natural type to which all social sympathies conform.

But there is yet another intermediate relation, without which this brief exposition of the theory of the family would be incomplete; I mean the relation of household servitude, which may be called indifferently domestic or social.

It is a relation which at the present time is not properly appreciated on account of our dislike to all subjection; and yet the word _domestic_ is enough to remind us that in every normal state of Humanity, it supplies what would otherwise be a want in household relations.

Its value lies in completing the education of the social instinct, by a special apprenticeship in obedience and command, both being subordinated to the universal principle of mutual sympathy.

The object of the preceding remarks was to show the efficacy of the Positive method in moral questions by applying it to the most important of all moral theories, the theory of the Family.

For more detailed proof, I must refer to my treatise on _Positive Polity_, to which this work is introductory.

I would call attention, however, to the beneficial influence of Positivism on personal morality.

Actions which hitherto had always been referred even by Catholic philosophers to personal interests, are now brought under the great principle of Love on which the whole Positive doctrine is based.

[Personal virtues placed upon a social basis] Feelings are only to be developed by constant exercise; and exercise is most necessary when the intrinsic energy of the feeling is least.

It is therefore quite contrary to the true spirit of moral education to degrade duty in questions of personal morality to a mere calculation of self-interest.

Of course, in this elementary part of Ethics, it is easier to estimate the consequences of actions, and to show the personal utility of the rules enjoined.

But this method of procedure inevitably stimulates the self-regarding propensities, which are already too preponderant, and the exercise of which ought as far as possible to be discouraged.

Besides, it often results in practical failure.

To leave the decision of such questions to the judgment of the individual, is to give a formal sanction to all the natural difference in men’s inclinations.

When the only motive urged is consideration for personal consequences, every one feels himself to be the best judge of these, and modifies the rule at his pleasure.

Positivism, guided by a truer estimate of the facts, entirely remodels this elementary part of Ethics.

Its appeal is to social feeling, and not to personal, since the actions in question are of a kind in which the individual is far from being the only person interested.

For example, such virtues as temperance and chastity are inculcated by the Positivist on other grounds than those of their personal advantages.

He will not of course be blind to their individual value; but this is an aspect on which he will not dwell too much, for fear of concentrating attention on self-interest.

At all events, he will never make it the basis of his precepts, but will invariably rest them upon their social value.

There are cases in which men are preserved by an unusually strong constitution from the injurious effects of intemperance or libertinage;

but such men are bound to sobriety and continence as vigorously as the rest, because without these virtues they cannot perform their social duties rightly.

Even in the commonest of personal virtues, cleanliness, this alteration in the point of view may be made with advantage.

A

simple sanitary regulation is thus ennobled by knowing that the object of it is to make each one of us more fit for the service of others.

In this way and in no other, can moral education assume its true character at the very outset.

We shall become habituated to the feeling of subordination to Humanity, even in our smallest actions.

It is in these that we should be trained to gain the mastery over the lower propensities; and the more so that, in these simple cases, it is less difficult to appreciate their consequences.

The influence of Positivism on personal morality is in itself a proof of its superiority to other systems.

Its superiority in domestic morality we have already seen, and yet this was the best aspect of Catholicism, forming indeed the principal basis of its admirable moral code.

On social morality strictly so called, I need not dwell at length.

Here the value of the new philosophy will be more direct and obvious, the fact of its standing at the social point of view being the very feature which distinguishes it from all other systems.

In defining the mutual duties arising from the various relations of life, or again in giving solidity and extension to the instinct of our common fraternity, neither theological nor metaphysical morality can bear comparison with Positivism.

Its precepts are adapted without difficulty to the special requirements of each case, because they are ever in harmony with the general laws of society and of human nature.

But on these obvious characteristics of Positivism I need not further enlarge, as I shall have other occasions for referring to them.