Beacon Lights of History, Volume 10: European Leaders — Louis Napoleon, Part 2

Louis Napoleon was too thoughtful and observant a man not to know all this.

His residence in England and intercourse with so many distinguished politicians and philosophers had taught him something.

He feared that with all his successes his throne would be overturned unless he could amuse the people and find work for turbulent spirits.

Consequently he concluded on the one hand to make a change in the foreign policy of France, and on the other to embellish his capital and undertake great public works, at any expense, both to find work for artisans and to develop the resources of the country.

When Louis Napoleon made his first attack on the strong government of Louis Philippe, at Strasburg, he was regarded as a madman; when he escaped from Ham, after his failure at Boulogne, he was looked upon by all Europe as a mere adventurer; and when he finally left England, which had sheltered him, to claim his seat in the National Assembly of republican France, and even when made President of the republic by the suffrages of the nation, he was regarded as an enigma.

Some thought him dull though bold, and others looked upon him as astute and long-headed.

His heavy look, his leaden eye, his reserved and taciturn ways, with no marked power but that of silence and secrecy, disarmed fear.

Neither from his conversations nor his writings had anybody drawn the inference that he was anything remarkable in genius or character.

His executive abilities were entirely unknown.

He was generally regarded as simply fortunate from the name he bore and the power he usurped, but with no striking intellectual gifts,--nothing that would warrant his supreme audacity.

He had never distinguished himself in anything; but was admitted to be a thoughtful man, who had written treatises of respectable literary merit.

His social position as the heir and nephew of the great Napoleon of course secured him many friends and followers, who were attracted to him by the prestige of his name, and who saw in him the means of making their own fortune; but he was always, except in a select and chosen circle, silent, non-committal, heavy, reserved, and uninteresting.

But the President--the Emperor--had been a profound student of the history of the first Napoleon and his government.

He understood the French people, too, and had learned to make short speeches with great effect, in which adroitness in selecting watchwords--especially such as captivated the common people--was quite remarkable.

He professed liberal sentiments, sympathy with the people in their privations and labors, and affected beyond everything a love of peace.

In his manifestoes of a policy of universal peace, few saw that love of war by which he intended to rivet the chains of despotism.

He was courteous and urbane in his manners, probably kind in disposition, not bloodthirsty nor cruel, supremely politic and conciliating in his intercourse with statesmen and diplomatists, and generally simple and unstilted in his manners.

He was also capable of friendship, and never forgot those who had rendered him services or kindness in his wanderings.

Nor was he greedy of money like Louis Philippe, but freely lavished it on his generals.

Like his uncle, he had an antipathy to literary men when they would not condescend to flatter him, which was repaid by uncompromising hostility on their part.

How savage and unrelenting was the hatred of Victor Hugo!

How unsparing his ridicule and abuse!

He called the usurper "Napoleon the Little," notwithstanding he had outwitted the leading men of the nation and succeeded in establishing himself on an absolute throne.

A small man could not have shown so much patience, wisdom, and prudence as Louis Napoleon showed when President, or fought so successfully the legislative body when it was arrayed against him.

If the poet had called him "Napoleon the Wicked" it would have been more to the point, for only a supremely unscrupulous and dishonest man could have meditated and executed the _coup d'état_.

His usurpation and treachery were gigantic crimes, accompanied with violence and murder.

Even his crimes, however, were condoned in view of the good government which he enforced and the services he rendered; showing that, if he was dishonest and treacherous, he was also able and enlightened.

But it is not his usurpation of supreme power for which Louis Napoleon will be most severely judged by his country and by posterity.

Cromwell was a usurper, and yet he is regarded as a great benefactor.

It was the policy which Napoleon III.

pursued as a supreme ruler for which he will be condemned, and which was totally unlike that of Cromwell or Augustus.

It was his policy to embroil nations in war and play the _rôle_ of a conqueror.

The policy of the restored Bourbons and of Louis Philippe was undeniably that of peace with other nations, and the relinquishment of that aggrandizement which is gained by successful war.

It was this policy,--upheld by such great statesmen as Guizot and Thiers,--conflicting with the warlike instincts of the French people, which made those monarchs unpopular more than their attempts to suppress the liberty of the Press and the license of popular leaders; and it was the appeal to the military vanity of the people which made Napoleon III.

popular, and secured his political ascendency.

The quarrel which was then going on between the Greek and Latin monks for the possession of the sacred shrines at Jerusalem furnished both the occasion and the pretence for interrupting the peace of Europe, as has been already stated in the Lecture on the Crimean war.

The French usurper determined to take the side of the Latin monks, which would necessarily embroil him with the great protector of the Greek faith, even the Emperor Nicholas, who was a bigot in all matters pertaining to his religion.

He would rally the French nation in a crusade, not merely to get possession of a sacred key and a silver star, but to come to the assistance of a power no longer dangerous,--the "sick man," whom Nicholas had resolved to crush.

Louis Napoleon cared but little for Turkey; but he did not want Constantinople to fall into the hands of the Russians, and thus make them the masters of the Black Sea.

France, it is true, had but little to gain whoever possessed Constantinople; she had no possessions or colonies in the East to protect.

But in the eye of her emperor it was necessary to amuse her by a war; and what war would be more popular than this,--to head off Russia and avenge the march to Moscow?

Russia, moreover, was the one power which all western Europe had cause to dread.

Ever since the Empress Catherine II.

, the encroachments and territorial aggrandizement of this great military empire had been going on.

The Emperor Nicholas was the most powerful sovereign of the world, having a million of men under arms, ready to obey his nod, with no check whatever on his imperial will.

He had many fine qualities, which commanded esteem; but he was fitful, uncertain, ambitious, and warlike.

If an aggressive war to secure the "balance of power" could ever be justified, it would seem to have been necessary in this case.

It was an aggressive war on the part of France, since the four great Powers--Austria, Prussia, France, and England--were already united to keep the Czar in check, and demanded his evacuation of the Danubian provinces which he had invaded.

Nicholas, seeing this powerful combination against him, was ready to yield, and peace might have been easily secured, and thus the Crimean war been avoided; but Louis Napoleon did not want peace, and intrigued against it.

Resolved then on war, the real disturber of the peace of Europe, and goaded on by his councillors,--the conspirators of the 2d of December, Morny, Fleury, Maupas, etc. ,--Louis Napoleon turned around to seek an ally; for France alone was not strong enough to cope with Russia.

Austria having so much to lose, did not want war, and was afraid of Nicholas.

So was Prussia.

It was the policy of both these Powers to keep on good terms with Nicholas.

It always will be the policy of Germany to avoid a war with Russia, unless supported by England and France.

The great military organization which Bismarck and Moltke effected, the immense standing army which Germany groans under, arises not from anticipated dangers on the part of France so much as from fear of Russia, although it is not the policy of German statesmen to confess it openly.

If France should unite with Russia in a relentless war, Germany would probably be crushed, unless England came to the rescue.

Germany, placed between two powerful military monarchies, is obliged to keep up its immense standing army, against its will, as a dire necessity.

It is Russia she is most anxious to conciliate.

All the speeches of Bismarck show this.

In view of this policy, Louis Napoleon turned his eyes to England as his ally in the meditated war with Russia, notwithstanding the secret hostilities and jealousies between these nations for five hundred years.

Moreover, the countries were entirely dissimilar: England was governed by Parliament, based on free institutions; France was a military despotism, and all who sought to establish parliamentary liberties and government were banished when their efforts became dangerous or revolutionary.

Louis Napoleon showed great ability for intrigue in forcing the English cabinet to adopt his warlike policy, when its own policy was pacific.

It was a great triumph to the usurper to see England drifting into war against the combined influence of the premier, of Gladstone, of the Quakers, and of the whole Manchester school of political economists; and, as stated in the Lecture on the Crimean war, it was an astounding surprise to Nicholas.

But this misfortune would not have happened had it not been for the genius and intrigues of a statesman who exercised a commanding influence over English politics; and this was Lord Palmerston, who had spent his life in the foreign office, although at that time home secretary.

But he was the ruling spirit of the cabinet,--a man versatile, practical, amiable, witty, and intensely English in all his prejudices.

Whatever office he held, he was always in harmony with public opinion.

He was not a man of great ideas or original genius, but was a ready debater, understood the temper of the English people, and led them by adopting their cause, whatever it was.

Hence he was the most popular statesman of the day, but according to Cobden the worst prime minister that England ever had, since he was always keeping England in hot water and stirring up strife on the Continent.

His supreme policy, with an eye to English interests on the Mediterranean and in Asia, was to cripple Russia.

Such a man, warlike, restless, and interfering in his foreign policy, having in view the military aggrandizement of his country, eagerly adopted the schemes of the French emperor; and little by little these two men brought the English cabinet into a warlike attitude with Russia, in spite of all that Lord Aberdeen could do.

Slight concessions would have led to peace; but neither Louis Napoleon nor Palmerston would allow concessions, since both were resolved on war.

Never was a war more popular in England than that which Louis Napoleon and Palmerston resolved to have.

This explains the leniency of public opinion in England toward a man who had stolen a sceptre.

He was united with Great Britain in a popular war.

The French emperor, however, had other reasons for seeking the alliance of England in his war with Russia.

It would give him a social prestige;

he would enter more easily into the family of European sovereigns; he would be called _mon frère_ by the Queen of England, which royal name Nicholas in his disdain refused to give him.

If the Queen of England was his friend and ally, all other sovereigns must welcome him into their royal fraternity in spite of his political crimes, which were universally detested.

It is singular that England, after exhausting her resources by a war of twenty years to dethrone Napoleon I. , should become the firmest ally and friend of Napoleon III.

, who trampled on all constitutional liberty.

But mutual interests brought them together; for when has England turned her back on her interests, or what she supposed to be her interests?

So war became inevitable.

Napoleon III.

triumphed.

His co-operation with England was sincere and hearty.

Yea, so gratified and elated was he at this stroke of good fortune, that he was ready to promise anything to his ally, even to the taking a subordinate part in the war.

He would follow the dictation of the English ministers and the English generals.

It was the general opinion that the war would be short and glorious.

At first it was contemplated only to fight the Russians in Bulgaria, and prevent their march across the Balkans, and thence to Constantinople.

The war was undertaken to assist the Turks in the defence of their capital and territories.

For this a large army was not indispensable;

hence the forces which were sent to Bulgaria were comparatively small.

When Nicholas discovered that he could not force his way to Constantinople over the Balkans, and had withdrawn his forces from the Danubian principalities, peace then might have been honorably declared by all parties.

France perhaps might have withdrawn from the contest, which had effected the end at first proposed.

But England not only had been entangled in the war by the French alliance, but now was resolved on taking Sebastopol, to destroy the power of Russia on the Euxine; and France was compelled to complete what she had undertaken, although she had nothing to gain beyond what she had already secured.

To the credit of Louis Napoleon, he proved a chivalrous and faithful ally, in continuing a disastrous and expensive war for the glory of France and the interests of England alone, although he made a separate peace as soon as he could do so with honor.

It is not my purpose to repeat what I have already written on the Crimean war, although the more I read and think about it the stronger is my disapproval, on both moral and political grounds, of that needless and unfortunate conflict,--unfortunate alike to all parties concerned.

It is a marvel that it did not in the end weaken the power and prestige of both Palmerston and Napoleon III.

It strengthened the hands of both, as was foreseen by these astute statesmen.

Napoleon III.

after the war was regarded as a far-seeing statesman, as well as an able administrator.

People no longer regarded him as a fool, or even a knave.

Success had shut the mouths of his enemies, except of a few obdurate ones like Thiers and Victor Hugo,--the latter of whom in his voluntary exile in Guernsey and Jersey still persisted in calling him "Napoleon the Little."

Thiers generally called him _Celui-ci,_--"That fellow."

This illustrious statesman, in his restless ambition and desire of power, probably would have taken office under the man whom he both despised and hated; but he dared not go against his antecedents, and was unwilling to be a mere clerk, as all Louis Napoleon's ministers were, whatever their abilities.

He was supported by the army and the people, and therefore was master of the situation.

This was a fact which everybody was compelled to acknowledge.

It was easy to call him usurper, tyrant, and fool,--anything; but he both "reigned and governed."

"When peace was finally restored, the empire presented the aspect of a stable government, resting solidly upon the approval of a contented and thriving people."

This was the general opinion of those who were well acquainted with French affairs, and of those who visited Paris, which was then exceedingly prosperous.

The city was filled with travellers, who came to see the glory of success.

Great architectural improvements were then in progress, which gave employment to a vast number of men theretofore leading a precarious life.

The chief of these were the new boulevards, constructed with immense expense,--those magnificent but gloomy streets, which, lined with palaces and hotels, excited universal admiration,--a wise expenditure on the whole, which promoted both beauty and convenience, although to construct them a quarter of the city was demolished.

The Grand Opera-House arose over the _débris_ of the demolished houses,--the most magnificent theatre erected in modern times.

Paris presented a spectacle of perpetual fêtes, reviews of troops, and illuminations, which both amused and distracted the people.

The Louvre was joined to the Tuileries by a grand gallery devoted chiefly to works of art.

The Champs Elysées and the Bois de Boulogne were ornamented with new avenues, fountains, gardens, flowers, and trees, where the people could pursue their pleasure unobstructed.

The number of beautiful equipages was vastly increased, and everything indicated wealth and prosperity.

The military was wisely kept out of sight, except on great occasions, so that the people should not be reminded of their loss of liberties; the police were courteous and obliging, and interfered with no pleasures and no ordinary pursuits; the shops blazed with every conceivable attraction; the fashionable churches were crowded with worshippers and strangers to hear music which rivalled that of the opera; the priests, in their ecclesiastical uniform, were seen in every street with cheerful and beaming faces, for the government sought their support and influence; the papers were filled with the movements of the imperial court at races, in hunting-parties, and visits to the _châteaux_ of the great.

The whole city seemed to be absorbed in pleasure or gain, and crowds swarmed at all places of amusement with contented faces: there was no outward sign of despotism or unhappiness, since everybody found employment.

Even the idlers who frequented the crowded cafés of the boulevards seemed to take unusual pleasure at their games of dominoes and at their tables of beer and wine.

Visitors wondered at the apparent absence of all restraint from government and at the personal liberty which everybody seemed practically to enjoy.

For ten years after the _coup d'état_ it was the general impression that the government of Louis Napoleon was a success.

In spite of the predictions and hostile criticisms of famous statesmen, it was, to all appearance at least, stable, and the nation was prosperous.

The enemies that the emperor had the most cause to dread were these famous statesmen themselves.

Thiers, Guizot, Broglie, Odillon Barrot, had all been prime ministers, and most of the rest had won their laurels under Louis Philippe.

They either declined to serve under Napoleon III.

or had been neglected by him; their political power had passed away.

They gave vent, whenever they could with personal safety, to their spleen, to their disappointment, to their secret hostility; they all alike prophesied evil; they all professed to believe that the emperor could not maintain his position two years,--that he would be carried off by assassination or revolution.

And joined with them in bitter hatred was the whole literary class,--like Victor Hugo, Lamartine, and Cousin,--who hurled curses and defiance from their retreats, or from the fashionable _salons_ and clubs which they frequented.

The old noblesse stood aloof.

St. Germain was like a foreign city rather than a part of Paris.

All the traders among the Legitimists and Orléanists continued in a state of secret hostility, and threw all the impediments they could against the government.