Mind and the Brain — Book 1 The Definition of Matter - Chapter 1 - Introduction

Edited by F. Legge THE MIND AND THE BRAIN

by ALFRED BINET

Directeur du Laboratoire de Psychologie à la Sorbonne Being the Authorised Translation of _L'Âme et le Corps_ London Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd Dryden House, Gerrard Street, W. 1907 CONTENTS

BOOK I THE DEFINITION OF MATTER

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

The distinction between mind and matter--Knowable not homogeneous--Criterion employed, enumeration not concepts CHAPTER II OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS ONLY SENSATION

Modern theories of matter--Outer world only known to us by our sensations--Instances--Mill's approval of proposition, and its defects--Nervous system only intermediary between self and outer world--The great X of Matter--Nervous system does not give us true image--Müller's law of specificity of the nerves--The nervous system itself a sensation--Relations of sensation with the unknowable the affair of metaphysics CHAPTER III THE MECHANICAL THEORIES OF MATTER ARE ONLY SYMBOLS

Physicists vainly endeavour to reduce the rôle of sensation--Mathematical, energetical, and mechanical theories of universe--Mechanical model formed from sensation--Instance of tuning-fork--No one sensation any right to hegemony over others CHAPTER IV ANSWERS TO SOME OBJECTIONS, AND SUMMARY

Objections of spiritualists--Of German authors who contend that nervous system does give true image--Of metaphysicians--Common ground of objection that nervous system not intermediary--Answer to this--Summary of preceding chapters BOOK II THE DEFINITION OF MIND

CHAPTER I THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COGNITION AND ITS OBJECT

Necessity for inventory of mental phenomena--Objects of cognition and acts of cognition--Definition of consciousness CHAPTER II DEFINITION OF SENSATION

Sensation defined by experimental psychology--A state of consciousness--Considered self-evident by Mill, Renouvier, and Hume--Psycho-physical according to Reid and Hamilton--Reasons in favour of last definition--Other opinions examined and refuted CHAPTER III DEFINITION OF THE IMAGE

Perception and ideation cannot be separated--Perception constituted by addition of image to sensation--Hallucinations--Objections anticipated and answered CHAPTER IV DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS

Contrary opinions as to nature of emotions--Emotion a phenomenon _sui generis_--Intellectualist theory of emotion supported by Lange and James--Is emotion only a perception?

Is effort?

--Question left unanswered CHAPTER V DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE RELATION SUBJECT-OBJECT

Can thoughts be divided into subject and object?

--This division cannot apply to the consciousness--Subject of cognition itself an object--James' opinion examined--Opinion that subject is spiritual substance and consciousness its faculty refuted CHAPTER VI

DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--CATEGORIES OF THE UNDERSTANDING Principle of relativity doubted--Tables of categories: Aristotle, Kant, and Renouvier--Kantian idealism--Phenomenism of Berkeley examined and rejected--Argument of _a priorists_--The intelligence only an inactive consciousness--Huxley's epiphenomenal consciousness--Is the consciousness necessary?

--Impossibility of answering this question CHAPTER VII

DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE SEPARABILITY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS FROM ITS OBJECT--DISCUSSION OF IDEALISM

Can the consciousness be separated from its object?

--Idealists consider the object a modality of the consciousness and thus inseparable, from it--Futility of this doctrine--Object can exist without consciousness CHAPTER VIII

DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE SEPARATION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS FROM ITS OBJECT--THE UNCONSCIOUS

Can ideas exist without consciousness?

--No consciousness without an object--Can the consciousness die?

--Enfeeblement of consciousness how accounted for--Doubling of consciousness in hysterics--Relations of physiological phenomena to consciousness--Consciousness cannot become unconscious and yet exist CHAPTER IX DEFINITIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY

Difficulty of defining psychology--Definition by substance--Psychology not the science of the soul--Definition by enumeration: its error--Definition by method contradicts idea of consciousness--Externospection and introspection sometimes confused--Definition by content--Facts cannot be divided into those of consciousness and of unconsciousness--Descartes' definition of psychology insufficient--"Within and without" simile unanalogous--Definition by point of view--Inconsistencies of Ebbinghaus' contention--W. James' teleological theory--Definition by the peculiar nature of mental laws only one possible: why?

BOOK III THE UNION OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY

CHAPTER I THE MIND HAS AN INCOMPLETE LIFE

Problem of union of mind and body stated--Axiom of heterogeneity must be rejected--Phenomena of consciousness incomplete--Aristotle's _relatum_ and _correlatum_ applied to the terms mind and matter CHAPTER II SPIRITUALISM AND IDEALISM

Spiritualist view that death cuts link between soul and body--Explanation of link fatal to system--Consciousness cannot exercise functions without objects of cognition--Idealism a kaleidoscopic system--Four affirmations of idealism: their inconsistency--Advantages of historical method CHAPTER III MATERIALISM AND PARALLELISM

Materialism oldest doctrine of all: many patristic authors lean towards it--Modern form of, receives impulse from advance of physical science--Karl Vogt's comparison of secretions of brain with that of kidneys--All materialist doctrines opposed to principle of heterogeneity--Modern materialism would make object generate consciousness--Materialists cannot demonstrate how molecular vibrations can be transformed into objects--Parallelism avoids issue by declaring mind to be function of brain--Parallelists declare physical and psychical life to be two parallel currents--Bain's support of this--Objections to: most important that it postulates consciousness as a complete whole CHAPTER IV MODERN THEORIES

Berkeley's idealism revived by Bergson, though with different standpoint--Admirable nature of Bergson's exposition--Fallacy of, part assigned to sensory nerves--Conscious sensations must be subsequent to excitement of sensory nerves and dependent on their integrity CHAPTER V CONCLUSION

Author's own theory only a hypothesis--Important conditions for solution of problem--Manifestations of consciousness conditioned by brain, but this last unconscious--Consciousness perceives only external object--Specificity of nerves not absolute--Why repeated excitements of nerve tend to become unconscious--Formation of habit and "instinct"--Resemblance to and distinction of this from parallelism--Advantages of new theory CHAPTER VI RECAPITULATION

Description of matter--Definition of mind--Objections to, answered--Incomplete existence of mind--Other theories--Nervous system must add its own effect to that of its excitant BOOK I THE DEFINITION OF MATTER

THE MIND AND THE BRAIN[1]

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

This book is a prolonged effort to establish a distinction between what is called mind and what is called matter.

Nothing is more simple than to realise this distinction when you do not go deeply into it;

nothing is more difficult when you analyse it a little.

At first sight, it seems impossible to confuse things so far apart as a thought and a block of stone; but on reflection this great contrast vanishes, and other differences have to be sought which are less apparent and of which one has not hitherto dreamed.

First let us say how the question presents itself to us.

The fact which we must take as a starting point, for it is independent of every kind of theory, is that there exists something which is "knowable."

Not only science, but ordinary life and our everyday conversation, imply that there are things that we know.

It is with regard to these things that we have to ask ourselves if some belong to what we call the mind and others to what we call matter.

Let us suppose, by way of hypothesis, the knowable to be entirely and absolutely homogeneous.

In that case we should be obliged to set aside the question as one already decided.

Where everything is homogeneous, there is no distinction to be drawn.

But this hypothesis is, as we all know, falsified by observation.

The whole body of the knowable is formed from an agglomeration of extremely varied elements, amongst which it is easy to distinguish a large number of divisions.

Things may be classified according to their colour, their shape, their weight, the pleasure they give us, their quality of being alive or dead, and so on; one much given to classification would only be troubled by the number of possible distinctions.

Since so many divisions are possible, at which shall we stop and say: this is the one which corresponds exactly to the opposition of mind and matter?

The choice is not easy to make; for we shall see that certain authors put the distinction between the physical and the mental in one thing, others in another.

Thus there have been a very large number of distinctions proposed, and their number is much greater than is generally thought.

Since we propose to make ourselves judges of these distinctions, since, in fact, we shall reject most of them in order to suggest entirely new ones, it must be supposed that we shall do so by means of a criterion.

Otherwise, we should only be acting fantastically.

We should be saying peremptorily, "In my opinion this is mental," and there would be no more ground for discussion than, if the assertion were "I prefer the Romanticists to the Classicists," or "I consider prose superior to poetry."

The criterion which I have employed, and which I did not analyse until the unconscious use I had made of it revealed its existence to me, is based on the two following rules:-- 1. _A Rule of Method.

_--The distinction between mind and matter must not only apply to the whole of the knowable, but must be the deepest which can divide the knowable, and must further be one of a permanent character.

_A priori_, there is nothing to prove the existence of such a distinction; it must be sought for and, when found, closely examined.

2. _An Indication of the Direction in which the Search must be Made.

_--Taking into account the position already taken up by the majority of philosophers, the manifestation of mind, if it exists, must be looked for in the domain of facts dealt with by psychology, and the manifestation of matter in the domain explored by physicists.

I do not conceal from myself that there may be much that is arbitrary in my own criterion; but this does not seem to me possible to avoid.

We must therefore appeal to psychology, and ask whether it is cognisant of any phenomenon offering a violent, lasting, and ineffaceable contrast with all the rest of the knowable.

_The Method of Concepts and the Method of Enumeration.

_--Many authors are already engaged in this research, and employ a method which I consider very bad and very dangerous--the method of concepts.

This consists in looking at real and concrete phenomena in their most abstract form.

For example, in studying the mind, they use this word "mind" as a general idea which is supposed to contain all the characteristics of psychical phenomena; but they do not wait to enumerate these characteristics or to realise them, and they remain satisfied with the extremely vague idea springing from an unanalysed concept.

Consequently they use the word "mind" with the imprudence of a banker who should discount a trade bill without ascertaining whether the payment of that particular piece of paper had been provided for.

This amounts to saying that the discussion of philosophical problems takes especially a verbal aspect; and the more complex the phenomena a concept thus handled, contains, the more dangerous it is.

A concept of the colour red has but a very simple content, and by using it, this content can be very clearly represented.

But how can the immense meaning of the word "mind" be realised every time that it is used?

For example, to define mind and to separate it from the rest of the knowable which is called matter, the general mode of reasoning is as follows: all the knowable which is apparent to our senses is essentially reduced to motion; "mind," that something which lives, feels, and judges, is reduced to "thought."

To understand the difference between matter and mind, it is necessary to ask one's self whether there exists any analogy in nature between motion and thought.

Now this analogy does not exist, and what we comprehend, on the contrary, is their absolute opposition.

Thought is not a movement, and has nothing in common with a movement.

A movement is never anything else but a displacement, a transfer, a change of place undergone by a particle of matter.

What relation of similarity exists between this geometrical fact and a desire, an emotion, a sensation of bitterness?

Far from being identical, these two facts are as distinct as any facts can be, and their distinction is so deep that it should be raised to the height of a principle, the principle of heterogeneity.

This is almost exactly the reasoning that numbers of philosophers have repeated for several years without giving proof of much originality.

This is what I term the metaphysics of concept, for it is a speculation which consists in juggling with abstract ideas.

The moment that a philosopher opposes thought to movement, I ask myself under what form he can think of a "thought," I suppose he must very poetically and very vaguely represent to himself something light and subtle which contrasts with the weight and grossness of material bodies.

And thus our philosopher is punished in the sinning part; his contempt of the earthly has led him into an abuse of abstract reasoning, and this abuse has made him the dupe of a very naïve physical metaphor.

At bottom I have not much faith in the nobility of many of our abstract ideas.

In a former psychological study[2] I have shown that many of our abstractions are nothing else than embryonic, and, above all, loosely defined concrete ideas, which can satisfy only an indolent mind, and are, consequently, full of snares.

The opposition between mind and matter appears to me to assume a very different meaning if, instead of repeating ready-made formulas and wasting time on the game of setting concept against concept, we take the trouble to return to the study of nature, and begin by drawing up an inventory of the respective phenomena of mind and matter, examining with each of these phenomena the characteristics in which the first-named differ from the second.

It is this last method, more slow but more sure than the other, that we shall follow; and we will commence by the study of matter.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: _L'Ame et la Corps.

_--Disagreeable as it is to alter an author's title, the words "Soul and Body" had to be abandoned because of their different connotation in English.

The title "Mind and Body" was also preoccupied by Bain's work of that name in this series.

The title chosen has M. Binet's approval.

--ED.

]