Afghan Wars 1839-42 and 1878-80, Part 2 — Chapter IV - The December Storm, part 2

The result of the day's operations left General Baker momentarily belated.

But on the morning of the 11th that officer, finding that no Afghans were being driven down upon him in accordance with the programme, quitted the Maidan country and marched northward toward Urgundeh.

An attack on his baggage and rear-guard was foiled; but as he reached his camping ground for the night at Urgundeh the Afghans were found in possession of the gorge opening into the Chardeh valley, through which ran his road to Cabul.

They were dislodged by a dashing attack of part of the 92d Highlanders led by Lieutenant Scott Napier.

It was not until the morning of the 12th that Baker was informed by heliograph from Sherpur of the occurrences of the previous day, and received directions to return to the cantonment without delay.

In the course of a few hours he was inside Sherpur, notwithstanding that his march had been constantly molested by attacks on his rear-guard.

The casualties of the 11th had been after all not very serious.

All told they amounted to thirty men killed and forty-four wounded; fifty-one horses killed and sixteen wounded.

But the Afghans were naturally elated by the success they had unquestionably achieved; the national rising had been inaugurated by a distinct triumph, the news of which would bring into the field incalculable swarms of fierce and fanatical partisans.

It was clear that Mahomed Jan had a quick eye for opportunities, and some skill in handling men.

That he could recognise the keypoint of a position and act boldly and promptly on that recognition, his tactics of the 11th made abundantly obvious, and his commanding position on the morning of the 12th still further demonstrated his tactical ability.

_L'audace, encore l'audace, et toujours l'audace_ is the game to be played by the commander of disciplined troops against Asiatic levies, and no man was more sensible of this than the gallant soldier who now from the bastion of Sherpur could see the Afghan standards waving on the summit of the Takht-i-Shah.

Indeed he was impressed so thoroughly by the force of the maxim as to allow himself to hope that some 560 soldiers, of whom about one-third were Europeans, backed by a couple of mountain guns, would be able to carry by assault the lofty peak, strongly held by resolute Afghans in protected positions, supported by several thousands of their fellows lying out of sight until an attack should develop itself, to meet which they were at hand to reinforce the garrison of the Takht-i-Shah.

From the gorge of the Cabul river there runs due south to near Charasiah a lofty and rugged range, the highest point of which, the Takht-i-Shah, is about midway from either extremity.

From this main ridge there project eastward at right angles two lateral spurs.

The shorter and more northerly of those runs down to the Balla Hissar, the longer and more southerly obtruding itself into the plain as far as the village of Beni Hissar.

This latter spur quits the main ridge no great distance south of the Takht-i-Shah peak, and on the 12th the Afghan reserves were massed in rear of the peak, both on the main ridge and on this spur.

The steep faces of the mountain were strewn with great smooth boulders and jagged masses of rock; the ascent, everywhere laborious, was complicated in places by sheer scarps, and those formidable impediments were made still more difficult by frequent sungahs, strong stone curtains behind which the defenders lay safe or fired with a minimum of exposure.

On the summit was a great natural cavity which had been made bomb proof by art, and further cover was afforded by caves and lines of rock.

The most northerly portion of the ridge described is known as the Sher Derwaza heights, which Macpherson had occupied on the morning of the 12th, and his brigade it was which furnished the little force already mentioned as charged to attempt the task of storming the Takht-i-Shah.

For several hours Morgan's two mountain guns industriously shelled that peak, and then the infantry made their effort.

The Afghans fought stubbornly in defence of a lower hill they held in advance of the Takht-i-Shah, but after a hard struggle they had to abandon it to Macpherson's resolute men.

But the exertions of the latter to ascend the peak were baulked by its rugged steepness and the fire of the Afghans holding the sungahs on its face.

Sir Frederick Roberts had to recognise that the direct attack by so weak a force unaided by a diversion, could not succeed, and he ordered further efforts to be deferred.

The casualties of the abortive attempt included three officers, one of whom, Major Cook, V. C.

of the Goorkhas, than whom the British army contained no better soldier, died of his wound.

Macpherson was directed to hold the ground he had won, including the lower advanced hill, and was informed that on the following morning he was to expect the co-operation of General Baker from the direction of Beni Hissar.

The lesson of the result of attempting impossibilities had been taken to heart, and the force which Baker led out on the morning of the 13th was exceptionally strong, consisting as it did of the 92d Highlanders and Guides infantry, a wing of the 3d Sikhs, a cavalry regiment, and eight guns.

Marching in the direction of the lateral spur extending from the main ridge eastward to Beni Hissar, Baker observed that large masses of the enemy were quitting the plain villages about Beni Hissar in which they had taken shelter for the night, and were hurrying to gain the summit of the spur which constituted the defensive position of the Afghan reserve.

Baker's _coup d'oeil_ was quick and true.

By gaining the centre of the spur he would cut in two the Afghan line along its summit, and so isolate and neutralise the section of it from the centre to the Beni Hissar extremity, toward which section the reinforcements from the plain villages were climbing.

But to accomplish this shrewd stroke it was necessary that he should act with promptitude and energy.

His guns opened fire on the summit.

The Sikhs, extended athwart the plain, protected his right flank.

His cavalry on the left cut into the bodies of Afghans hurrying to ascend the eastern extremity of the spur.

With noble emulation the Highlanders and the Guides sprang up the rugged slope, their faces set towards the centre of the summit line.

Major White, who already had earned many laurels in the campaign, led on his Highlanders; the Guides, burning to make the most of their first opportunity to distinguish themselves, followed eagerly the gallant chief who had so often led them to victory on other fields.

Lieutenant Forbes, a young officer of the 92d heading the advance of his regiment, reached the summit accompanied only by his colour-sergeant.

A band of ghazees rushed on the pair and the sergeant fell.

As Forbes stood covering his body he was overpowered and slain.

The sudden catastrophe staggered for a moment the soldiers following their officer, but Lieutenant Dick Cunyngham rallied them immediately and led them forward at speed.

For his conduct on this occasion Cunyngham received the Victoria Cross.

With rolling volleys Highlanders and Guides reached and won the summit.

The Afghans momentarily clung to the position, but the British fire swept them away and the bayonets disposed of the ghazees, who fought and died in defence of their standards.

The severance of the Afghan line was complete.

A detachment was left to maintain the isolation of some 2000 of the enemy who had been cut off; and then swinging to their right Baker's regiments swept along the summit of the spur toward the main ridge and the Takht-i-Shah, the Highlanders leading.

As they advanced they rolled up the Afghan line and a panic set in among the enemy, who sought safety in flight.

Assailed from both sides, for Macpherson's men from the conical hill were passing up the north side of the peak, and shaken by the steady fire of the mountain guns, the garrison of the Takht-i-Shah evacuated the position.

Baker's soldiers toiled vigorously upward toward the peak, keen for the honour of winning it; but the credit of that achievement justly fell to their comrades of Macpherson's command, who had striven so valiantly to earn it the day before, and who had gained possession of the peak and the Afghan standards flying on its summit, a few minutes before the arrival of White's Highlanders and Jenkins' Guides.

As the midday gun was fired in the cantonment the flash of the heliograph from the peak told that the Takht-i-Shah was won.

While Baker was sweeping the spur and climbing the lofty peak of the main ridge, his reserve, which remained in the plain, was in sharp action against masses of assailants from the city and other bodies from the villages about Beni Hissar.

Those were beaten off by the 3d Sikhs and Baker's flanks were thus cleared, but the resolute Afghans, bent on interfering with his return march, surged away in the direction of the Siah Sung ridge and gathered thereon in considerable strength.

The guns of Sherpur shelled them smartly, but they held their ground; and Massy went out to disperse them with the cavalry.

The Afghans showed unwonted resolution, confronting the cavalry with extraordinary steadiness in regular formation and withholding their fire until the troopers were close upon them.

But the horsemen were not to be denied.

Captains Butson and Chisholme led their squadrons against the Afghan flanks, and the troopers of the 9th avenged the mishap which had befallen that gallant regiment two days before, riding through and through the hostile masses and scattering them over the plain.

But in the charge Butson was killed, Chisholme and Trower were wounded; the sergeant-major and three men were killed and seven were wounded.

Brilliant charges were delivered by the other cavalry detachments, and the Siah Sung heights were ultimately cleared.

The Guides' cavalry attacked, defeated, and pursued for a long distance a body of Kohistanees marching from the north-east apparently with intent to join Mahomed Jan.

The casualties of the day were sixteen killed and forty-five wounded; not a heavy loss considering the amount of hard fighting.

The Afghans were estimated to have lost in killed alone from 200 to 300 men.

The operations of the day were unquestionably successful so far as they went, but the actual results attained scarcely warranted the anticipation that the Afghans would acknowledge themselves defeated by breaking up their combination and dispersing to their homes.

It was true that they had been defeated, but they had fought with unprecedented stubbornness and gave little evidence of being cowed.

Throughout the day the villages around Cabul had evinced a rancorous hostility which had a marked significance.

Not less significant was the participation in the fighting of the day on the part of the population of Cabul.

As Baker was returning to Sherpur in the evening he had been fired upon from the Balla Hissar, and his flanking parties had found ambushes of armed Afghans among the willows between the city and the cantonment.

But for the skill and courage of the non-commissioned officer in charge a convoy of wounded on its way to Sherpur would certainly have been destroyed.

But there was a stronger argument than any of those indications, significant as they were of the unbroken spirit of the Afghans, telling against the probability that the operations of the day would have the effect of putting down the national rising.

The hordes which had gathered to the banners of the Mushk-i-Alum and Mahomed Jan combined with the fanaticism of the _jehad_ a fine secular greed for plunder.

Was it likely that they would scatter resignedly, leaving untouched the rich booty of the city that had been almost within arm's-length as they looked down on it from the peak of the Takht-i-Shah, and whose minarets they were within sight of on the spur and in the villages of Beni Hissar?

Was that ever likely?

And was it not made more and yet more unlikely when on the afternoon of the 13th Macpherson, acting on orders, moved his camp to the Balla Hissar heights, evacuating Deh Mazung and leaving open to the enemy the road into the city through the Cabul gorge?

The following morning was to show how promptly and how freely the Afghans had taken advantage of the access to the capital thus afforded them.

It must never be forgotten that at this time our people in Afghanistan held no more territory than the actual ground they stood upon and the terrain swept by their fire.

No trustworthy intelligence from outside that region was procurable; and of this there can be no clearer evidence than that the General was under the belief that the enemy had been 'foiled in their western and southern operations.'

The morning of the 14th effectually dispelled the optimistic anticipations indulged in overnight.

At daybreak a large body of Afghans, with many standards, were discerned on a hill about a mile northward of the Asmai ridge, from which and from the Kohistan road they were moving on to the crest of that ridge.

They were joined there by several thousands coming up the slopes from out the village of Deh Afghan, the northern suburb of Cabul.

It was estimated that there were about 8000 men in position along the summit of the ridge, and occupying also a low conical hill beyond its north-western termination.

The array of Afghans displayed itself within a mile of the west face of the Sherpur cantonment, and formed a menace which could not be brooked.

To General Baker was entrusted the task of dislodging the enemy from the threatening position, and there was assigned to him for this purpose a force consisting of about 1200 bayonets, eight guns, and a regiment of native cavalry.

His first object was to gain possession of the conical hill already mentioned, and thus debar the Afghan force on the Asmai heights from receiving accessions either from the masses on the hill further north or by the Kohistan road.

Under cover of the artillery fire the Highlanders and Guides occupied this conical hill after a short conflict.

A detachment was left to hold it and then Colonel Jenkins, who commanded the attack, set about the arduous task of storming from the northward the formidable position of the Asmai heights.

The assault was led by Brownlow's staunch Highlanders, supported on the right by the Guides operating on the enemy's flank; and the Afghan position was heavily shelled by four of Baker's guns, and by four more in action near the south-western corner of the Sherpur cantonment.

Macpherson from his position on the Balla Hissar hill aided the attack by the fire of his guns, and also by despatching two companies of the 67th to cross the Cabul gorge and operate against the enemy's left rear.

In the face of a heavy fire the Highlanders and Guides climbed with great speed and steadiness the rugged hill-side leading upward to the Afghan breastwork on the northern edge of the summit.

Their approach and the crushing shrapnel fire from the guns near Sherpur had caused numerous Afghans to move downward from the position toward Deh Afghan, heavily smitten as they went; but the ghazees in the breastworks made a strenuous resistance and died under their banners as the Highlanders carried the defences with a rush.

The crest, about a quarter of a mile long, was traversed under heavy fire and the southern breastwork on the peak was approached.

It was strong and strongly held, but a cross fire was brought to bear on its garrison, and then the frontal attack led by a lance-corporal of the 72d was delivered.

After a hand-to-hand grapple in which Highlanders and Guides were freely cut and slashed by the knives of the ghazees, the position, which was found full of dead, was carried, but with considerable loss.

The whole summit of the Asmai heights was now in British possession, and everything seemed auspicious.

The Afghans streaming down from the heights toward the city were being lacerated by shell fire and musketry fire as they descended.

When they took refuge in Deh Afghan that suburb was heavily shelled, and it was gradually evacuated.

Scarcely had Jenkins won the summit of the Asmai ridge when the fortune of the day was suddenly overcast; indeed while he was still engaged in the attainment of that object premonitory indications of serious mischief were unexpectedly presenting themselves.

A vast host of Afghans described as numbering from 15,000 to 20,000, debouched into the Chardeh valley from the direction of Indikee, and were moving northwards, apparently with the object of forming a junction with the masses occupying the hills to the north-west of the Asmai heights.

About the same time cavalry scouting in the Chardeh valley brought in the information that large parties of hostile infantry and cavalry were hurrying across the valley in the direction of the conical hill the defence of which had been entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Clark with 120 Highlanders and Guides.

Recognising Clark's weakness, General Baker had judiciously reinforced that officer with four mountain guns and 100 bayonets.

The guns opened fire on the Afghan bodies marching from the Killa Kazee direction, and drove them out of range.

But they coalesced with the host advancing from Indikee, and the vast mass of Afghans, facing to the right, struck the whole range of the British position from near the Cabul gorge on the south to and beyond the conical hill on the north.

The most vulnerable point was the section at and about that eminence, and the necessity for supplying Clark with further reinforcements became urgently manifest.

Baker sent up a second detachment, and 200 Sikhs came out from Sherpur at the double.

But the Afghans, creeping stealthily in great numbers up the slope from out the Chardeh valley, had the shorter distance to travel, and were beforehand with the reinforcements.

Their tactics were on a par with their resolution.

The left of their attack grasped and held a knoll north of the conical hill, and from this position of vantage brought a cross fire to bear on Clark's detachment.

As their direct attack developed itself it encountered from the conical hill a heavy rifle fire, and shells at short range tore through the loose rush of ghazees, but the fanatics sped on and up without wavering.

As they gathered behind a mound for the final onslaught, Captain Spens of the 72d with a handful of his Highlanders went out on the forlorn hope of dislodging them.

A rush was made on him; he was overpowered and slaughtered after a desperate resistance, and the Afghan charge swept up the hill-side.

In momentary panic the defenders gave ground, carrying downhill with them the reinforcement of Punjaubees which Captain Hall was bringing up.

Two of the mountain guns were lost, but there was a rally at the foot of the hill under cover of which the other two were extricated.

The Afghans refrained from descending into the plain, and directed their efforts toward cutting off the occupants of the position on the Asmai summit.

They ascended by two distinct directions.

One body from the conical hill followed the route taken by Jenkins in the morning; another scaled a spur trending downward to the Chardeh valley from the southern extremity of the Asmai ridge.

It was estimated that the Afghan strength disclosed this day did not fall short of 40,000 men; and General Roberts was reluctantly compelled to abandon for the time any further offensive efforts.

His reasons, stated with perfect frankness, may best be given in his own words.

'Up to this time,' he wrote, 'I had no reason to apprehend that the Afghans were in sufficient force to cope successfully with disciplined troops, but the resolute and determined manner in which the conical hill had been recaptured, and the information sent to me by Brigadier-General Macpherson that large masses of the enemy were still advancing from the north, south, and west, made it evident that the numbers combined against us were too overwhelming to admit of my comparatively small force meeting them.

I therefore determined to withdraw from all isolated positions, and to concentrate the whole force at Sherpur, thus securing the safety of our large cantonment, and avoiding what had now become a useless sacrifice of life.'

The orders issued to Generals Baker and Macpherson to retire into the cantonment were executed with skill and steadiness.

Jenkins' evacuation of the Asmai position was conspicuously adroit.

When the order to quit reached that able officer, Major Stockwell of the 72d was out with a small detachment, maintaining a hot fire on the Afghan bodies ascending by the southern spur from the Chardeh valley.

He fell back with great deliberation, and when he rejoined the retirement down the hill face looking toward Sherpur was leisurely proceeded with, the hostile advance from, the northern side being held in check by the fire of covering parties from Jenkins' left flank.

General Macpherson's retirement was masterly.

Flanking his march through the Cabul gorge with two companies of the 67th who stalled off a rush of ghazees from the Asmai crest, he continued his march through the suburb of Deh Afghan, his baggage in front under a strong guard.

Some few shots were exchanged before the suburb was cleared, but the casualties were few and presently the brigade entered the cantonment.

General Baker continued to hold a covering position with part of his force, until the troops from the heights and Macpherson's command had made good their retirement, and he was the last to withdraw.

By dusk the whole force was safely concentrated within the cantonment, and the period of the defensive had begun.

The casualties of the day were serious; thirty-five killed, and 107 wounded.

During the week of fighting the little force had lost somewhat heavily; the killed numbered eighty-three, the wounded 192. Eight officers were killed, twelve were wounded.