Builders of United Italy — Cavour, The Statesman Part 2

To insure that when Piedmont should succeed in enlisting foreign aid the country might be consolidated and ready, Cavour planned a great stroke, to combine his own party in Parliament with that of the Moderate Liberals, or Left Center, as it was called.

None of the four parties was sufficiently strong in itself to insure any permanent success, but a combination of the two Center parties would allow for plans of certain durability.

Rattazzi, probably the most brilliant speaker in the House, and a man of much popularity, was leader of the Left Center, and to him Cavour broached his plans.

The alliance was concluded in January, 1852, and kept a secret for some time.

Finally, in a debate on a bill aimed to moderate newspaper attacks on foreign sovereigns, the ministry was violently attacked, and Rattazzi announced his compact with Cavour by stating that he intended generally to support the ministry in the present session unless there should be some decided change in its policy.

Cavour, speaking in reply, acknowledged the alliance between the two parties.

D'Azeglio and the other ministers had been kept in the dark, and were as much surprised as was the general public.

Cavour had feared that a discussion of the wisdom of such an alliance might have ended in disagreement, and he was determined that the plan should be put through.

That seems to have been the only excuse for keeping the plan secret from his colleagues.

The Prime Minister was highly indignant, but would not disown Cavour's act; he merely intimated to him that he would never sit in the same cabinet with Rattazzi.

Shortly afterward Cavour lent his support to electing Rattazzi President of the Chamber.

D'Azeglio was again indignant, and Cavour felt that it was best that he should leave the ministry.

He resigned, and was followed by all the other ministers.

Their act, however, was purely a matter of sentiment, and the King commanded them to remain at their posts.

Cavour endorsed this command, he saw no reason why D'Azeglio's ministry should not continue for a time without him.

He parted on the best of terms with the Premier, and in order that his presence might cause no embarrassment to the reconstructed ministry started on a journey to France and England.

This trip abroad came at a most opportune time.

It gave Cavour a chance to meet French and English statesmen and learn their views of his policy of allying Rattazzi's party with his own in order to obtain a working majority.

He knew that Rattazzi was generally regarded as a reckless revolutionary, but he found that the necessity of using his aid was generally acknowledged.

Cavour talked with the leaders of each party in England; he found Lord Palmerston then as always his ardent friend and admirer.

Palmerston saw that the overthrow of the Italian tyrannies must depend upon the home strength of the Sardinian government, and that if that government were once firmly established on a constitutional basis it could not be long before Austria would be driven out of Italy.

Palmerston promised Cavour the moral support of England, and the Italian left London delighted at what he had learned there.

In Paris Cavour met Thiers, who bade him be of good courage, and the Prince President.

To the latter he devoted much time, and succeeded in making a deep impression upon the astute Napoleon.

"Whether we like it or not," the Italian wrote from Paris, "our destinies depend on France;

we must be her partner in the great game which will be played sooner or later in Europe."

In the French capital Cavour found several leaders of Italian life who were living in exile; he visited Daniel Manin, the great Venetian, the idol of his city, and learned from him something of Venetian hopes.

He also saw the many-sided Gioberti, "the same child of genius, who would have been a great man had he had common-sense," said Cavour, the man who had once dreamt of a free Italy under the leadership of a great liberal Pope, and who was now in a book about to be published to show his gift of prescience by fixing on Cavour as the one man who understood the essentials of the new Italian civilization.

D'Azeglio was facing a ministerial crisis when Cavour returned to his home, and, ill with the wound he had received in the last war, besought the King to let him retire from office.

He suggested that Victor Emmanuel summon Cavour, "who," he wrote at this time, "you know is diabolically active, and fit in body and soul, and then, he enjoys it so much!"

The King asked Cavour to form a ministry, naming certain restrictions, the chief one being to come to a friendly agreement with the Pope on the matter of civil marriage, but Cavour felt that to do this would be to start his work under a handicap.

He suggested Count Balbo as Premier, but the latter had too small a following, and the King, judging that his country needed the strong hand of Cavour at the helm more than the friendship of Rome, asked him to form his cabinet without imposing any conditions whatever.

So came into existence what was to be known in Italian history as the "_Gran Ministero_," the first in which Cavour was openly to proclaim his plans.

It is curious to note that even now, when he had become the most considerable figure in Piedmont, he was not generally popular.

The King did not altogether like him, the public men could not even now understand him, the people scarcely knew the real man at all.

What King, public men, and people did know was that Cavour was a man of tremendous force, and a man destined to lead other men.

At this time there commenced to grow up in Piedmont that blind faith in Cavour which later assumed such great proportions that the people felt that he must have his own way no matter what they might think of it, because Cavour's way meant victory, no matter how little they might anticipate it.

Cavour chose to be President of the Council and Minister of Finance, and at once set to work to increase the resources of the country.

The history of his work at this time is that of an administrator preparing with scrupulous care each detail against a coming need.

He strengthened fortifications, he allowed La Marmora a free hand in the development of the army, he completed the railway system, he used all possible means to stimulate industry and increase agricultural output.

He instituted new taxes, cut down the salt tax, and introduced certain free-trade measures.

He followed a definite plan of preparation, regardless of popular opinion, which at one time turned so fiercely against him on the ground that he was a monopolist who was robbing the poor of bread, that his life was in danger at the hands of a mob.

Cavour had one concern, to strengthen the central government of his country, and he labored for that with little regard for other things.

He was accused, particularly after Rattazzi had joined his cabinet, of seeking to win certain constituencies by promises of local aid if they would return his candidate.

He understood too well the uncertain temper of the people to take any unnecessary risks, he knew that the work he was doing was essential for Italian independence, and he was willing to obtain his support as best he could.

What concerned him was the fact of support, not the reason.

His ultimate purpose required that the country be kept at peace until it should have reached full strength, and for this end Cavour tried to make friends with Austria, dissembling his real feelings as cleverly as he could, and sought confidence and friendly offices.

To this end he discountenanced Mazzini's attempt at revolution in Milan in February, 1853; he knew that conditions were not ready for success; he regarded Mazzini's faith in blind outbreaks of the people as a deterrent factor in his preparation for ultimate success.

Western Europe was making ready for war in the Crimea, England and France were aligning themselves against Russia.

Cavour felt what was coming, and conceived a step of marvelous daring.

With his old belief in the prudence of audacity he determined to join Sardinia to France and England, to stake the future of his little kingdom on an alliance with the two great western Powers.

He felt that Sardinia must now step forward as a nation or retire to the great group of little principalities.

He could not tell what position Austria would take, but he resolved no matter how that country might side, to cast his lot with the west.

When one recalls the size of Victor Emmanuel's kingdom and its resources Cavour's audacity becomes well-nigh inconceivable.

When his intention was made known to the people they gaped in amazement, after these years of preparation why should they hazard all on a purely foreign war, why leave their borders unguarded to the Austrians?

Cavour stood firm and unshaken, Victor Emmanuel, trusting to his minister's star of destiny, stood by him, the people stormed, protested, besought, but all without avail.

Cavour had decided that it was time to act, and so it must be time, the people had learned that there was no use in arguing with him, what he must do he must, they became fatalists under his colossal will.

A demand of a guarantee of certain restrictions against Austria was sought by Cavour's ministry, but the western Powers would not give it.

England and France would both be glad to have Sardinia as an ally, but would make no promises of future help.

The Sardinian Foreign Minister resigned when the attempt to obtain a guarantee failed.

Cavour offered the position to D'Azeglio, but he declined it, and so, on January 10, 1855, Cavour assumed the portfolio of Foreign Affairs himself, and on the same day signed the agreement binding Sardinia to an offensive and defensive alliance with France and England.

It was the first step towards making Italy again a world power.

Cavour had decided to show Europe that an Italian government could live under a liberal constitution, and that an Italian army could fight.

He believed that both Lord Palmerston and the French Emperor were convinced of the former fact; he was now anxious to convince them of the latter.

As matters fell out Austria remained neutral, and the allies opposed Russia alone.

Napoleon, thirsting for glory for French arms, was little disposed to give the Sardinian forces a chance, and wished to keep them as a reserve at Constantinople.

It required the greatest diplomacy on Cavour's part to obtain opportunities for his troops, but when he did they more than justified him.

Their spirit and powers of endurance were admirable, they seemed consciously to feel that they were being made ready for a greater and more sacred combat.

In August the Piedmontese troops won a victory on the Tchernaia, Turin was delighted, and Cavour felt that his great step was being justified.

The King wrote to General La Marmora, "Next year we shall have war where we had it before."

It was at this time that Victor Emmanuel visited England and France.

Cavour accompanied him, and, as always, made a close study of opinions in both those countries.

He found Queen Victoria and Prince Albert deeply interested in Italian affairs, and strongly favorable to Piedmont's hopes.

Napoleon, he found, was determined to end the war in the Crimea.

In February, 1856, peace was declared.

Austria, which had remained neutral, was apparently the greatest gainer by the war.

At home the Sardinian government had been seriously disturbed over the question of suppression of the religious houses, a measure which Cavour and a majority of the people favored, but which the King was very loath to accept.

After the Chamber of Deputies had passed the measure by an overwhelming majority, and it was being considered by the Senate, two ecclesiastics wrote to the King, promising to pay into the national treasury the sum the government expected to realize from the suppressions.

Victor Emmanuel, who was an ardent Churchman, conceived that this would be a most satisfactory settlement of the whole matter, and suggested to Cavour that he agree.

Cavour saw the impossibility of compromise at that hour, and declined, offering at the same time his resignation.

The King, who was never quite at his ease with Cavour, and who thought he was now in a position to dispense with his services, accepted the resignation.

When the people heard of the proposed compromise they were brought to an angry crisis, and for a moment it looked as though all the past careful efforts to establish a stable government might go for nothing.

Then D'Azeglio, with rare courage, wrote to the King, and pointed out the dangers that lay in his new course.

He entreated him not to align himself with the reactionaries, he pointed out how such a step had caused the downfall of both Stuart and Bourbon thrones.

The people desired the measure, it was too late now to withdraw it from the Senate.

Victor Emmanuel heeded the words of his old counselor, recalled Cavour to office, and allowed the bill, practically as at first presented, to become law.

This was the next great step in the progress towards a united Italy.

At the time of his last visit to Paris Cavour had been asked by Napoleon to submit a note of what France could do for Italy.

This Cavour now prepared, asking little at this time, the main object being the Austrian evacuation of Bologna.

Cavour found himself in a very difficult position, the war had closed before Austria had been drawn into it, and Sardinia was not in a sufficiently strong position to make many requests.

Both the King and Cavour had confidently hoped that Austria would be forced to side with Russia.

Now it was extremely doubtful what decisions the coming Congress of Paris would make, and Cavour had been privately given to understand that the Sardinian envoy to the Congress would only be allowed to attend those sessions which concerned Sardinia, and not to take his place with the envoys of the great Powers.

He was exceedingly anxious that D'Azeglio should attend, but the latter refused point-blank when he learned of the subservient position he would in all probability have to take.

Under these circumstances Cavour saw no alternative but to go himself, and so with considerable misgiving he set out for Paris, intent on observing and planning rather than on asking favors that might be unceremoniously refused.

The Congress of Paris of 1856 produced results far different from those the various plenipotentiaries intended.

Austria came to Paris in the enviable position of the great European peace-maker, she left as tyrannical upholder of the old régime.

Cavour came as the representative of a small state with interests far inferior to those of the other nations, he left as the moral champion of the much abused peninsula of Italy.

Austria actually conceded no territory and Sardinia gained none, but Austria was discredited in the eyes of England and France, and Sardinia more than justified.

Cavour achieved a great moral victory, perhaps the greatest result any statesman can gain from a treaty of peace.

He did not take a very prominent part in the actual meetings, he was very reserved, a good listener, a courteous and always affable companion.

He was loyal to both his English and his French allies, he won over the Russian Count Orloff, and contrived to keep on good terms with the Austrian Count Buol, whom he had formerly known at Turin.

He waited with indomitable patience until the major matters of the Congress had been discussed and disposed of, then he addressed a note to the English and French envoys inquiring into the rights of Austria to remain in occupation of the Roman Legations.

The question was most important, it struck at the discussion of the temporal power of the Pope, inasmuch as that power in Romagna was dependent upon Austrian support.

Moreover it gave notice that Sardinia was concerning itself with the affairs of the other Italian states.

Cavour had other projects, he was anxious to reunite Parma and Modena with Piedmont, he was eager to have their Lombard estates returned to those Italians concerned in the last revolt against Austria.

He planned and plotted to accomplish both these ends, and waited.

The treaty of peace was signed on March 30, and then the French President of the Congress, Count Walewski, called another session by order of the Emperor.

This session was to deal with the Austrian and French occupation of Naples.

The difficulty with regard to Cavour's original note was that in questioning Austria's right to uphold the Pope in Romagna it also questioned France's right to occupy Rome for the same purpose.

Cavour spoke on the Austrian occupation, but passed over the French.

It seems, however, that Napoleon, who had originally taken Rome to please the clerical party, was now willing to withdraw from Rome if he could do so without offending that party, and at the same time cause Austria to withdraw.

Lord Clarendon, the British plenipotentiary, urged the withdrawal of both Powers, which he claimed stood on the same footing.

He objected to both occupations as disturbing to the balance of power, he denounced the government of the King of Naples, he found occasion to say what the most ardent Italian would have liked to say, and his unreserved ardor gained added force from the caution of Cavour.

The effect of the Englishman's speech was striking, he put into words all Cavour's contentions, and left the Italian in the enviable position of having demanded nothing, but of having all the claims of justice on his side.

The Austrian envoy was indignant, and the session adjourned without tangible result.

The impression left upon every one's mind, however, was that Sardinia had championed Italy against Austria, and that it intended to prepare to make its championship more definite than by diplomatic notes.

Cavour returned to Turin with the satisfaction of having placed Italy's wrongs openly before the world.

The redress of these wrongs was now matter for European consideration, no longer the mere object of secret society plots.

Patriots in all the Italian states were quick to realize this, they saw that at last their national rights had been forced into attention, Cavour's note had cemented all their local causes.

There were still many in Piedmont who did not understand his policy, and many who would have preferred his winning of a single duchy to Sardinia rather than urging the withdrawal of Austria from the Papal States, but in spite of these doubters the great majority acclaimed his cause, and felt that, whether they understood him or not, he was the one man who could lead them to deliverance.

On his return his policy became more clear, he was aiming at an Italian nation under one king, he was looking far ahead, and the other great nationalists who had been puzzled by his conflicting declarations in the past saw that his goal was theirs.

The goal had unquestionably been in his thoughts throughout all his political career, now he came out frankly, no longer simply Prime Minister of Sardinia, but spokesman for Italy.

War must come as the next step.

Cavour now for the first time took account of the practical use to be made of those great waves of popular feeling that were continually recurring, those heroic forces Mazzini had been calling into being.

He met Garibaldi, and found that he was a great practical man, likely to be of infinite value to the country.

He went among the people and studied how their enthusiasms could be turned to best account, he planned with leaders of earlier revolts and convinced them that he was simply patient until the time came to strike, no more a reactionary than they.

In addition to the Foreign Office Cavour assumed the Ministry of Finance.

He was unwilling to trust too much to other men, he was anxious to know exactly how all the affairs of the nation stood.

The army he knew was rapidly improving, he studied how he might increase the finances without imposing too heavy taxes.

He moved the arsenal from Genoa to Spezia, he insisted on completing the tunneling of Mont Cenis, and all these steps showed that he was concerned now with the affairs of the whole peninsula rather than with the guidance of one small state.

As one of his political opponents said of him in detraction at this time, "the Prime Minister had all Italy in view, and was preparing for the future kingdom."

He had made himself practically the entire government, from King to peasant all classes followed him with a blind faith in his triumphant destiny as a leader.

Still he waited, preparing for the hour to strike.

On the evening of January 14, 1858, Felice Orsini, a Romagnol revolutionist, attempted to assassinate the French Emperor with a bomb as he was driving to the opera.

It was expected that this act would cause a bitter estrangement between France and Italy, but, although for a short time there was a considerable diplomatic interchange of notes, the ultimate result was quite the reverse.

We must remember that the wrongs under which Italy labored were in reality always on Napoleon's mind, that he sincerely desired to free and reunite the Italian nation, although at times his ideas of expediency made him appear more of an enemy than a friend.

As a young man he had himself been a revolutionary, probably at one time a member of the Carbonari, he had thrilled long ago at Mazzini's call, and he was an ardent nationalist.

When he heard Orsini's last words to him, "Free my country, and the blessings of twenty-five million Italians will go with you!"

he knew that it was not hatred of himself, but the desire in some way to bring about Italian independence that had inspired the assassin.

The words and acts of Napoleon wind in and out of this story of Italian liberation in a manner only too often difficult to reconcile, but it would seem that his interest was in reality sincere, and that he wished to help Italy as much as he could without jeopardizing the interests of France.

Events began to march, certain ideas were exchanged between influential persons at Paris and Turin; in June Dr. Conneau, an intimate of the Emperor, happened to visit Turin, and saw Victor Emmanuel and Cavour.

It was stated that Napoleon intended to make a private visit to Plombières.

Shortly after Cavour announced that his health required a change of scene and that he should go away into the mountains.

By a strange coincidence he also went to Plombières.

Napoleon saw him, they spent two days closeted together; when Cavour left the two men understood each other.

The details of what was known as the Pact of Plombières are not positive, the understanding appears to have been that a rising in Massa and Carrara should give a pretext for a war to expel the Austrians.

After such expulsion the country in the valley of the Po, the Roman Legations, and the Ancona Marches were to be united in a kingdom of Upper Italy.

Savoy was to be given to France, possession of Nice was left unsettled, Victor Emmanuel's daughter, the Princess Clotilde, was to be given in marriage to Prince Napoleon.

Napoleon had shown his interest in Italy, but Cavour left Plombières fully alive to the fact that actual help was still far distant.

Austria would be hard to defeat, and Cavour did not wish France to provide all the forces for war.

He already foresaw that it might be difficult to insure France's withdrawal after victory.

Furthermore he realized that England, to which he was always looking, was well content with the present peaceful situation of affairs, and would regard any offensive step by France or Sardinia as unwarrantable.

He saw that Prussia and Russia held the same view.

No country wanted war except his own, and possibly France, provided it could be made to appear that Austria and not France was the attacking party.

It seemed very certain that Austria would stand much before putting herself in the false position of wantonly opening war.

Again Cavour had to be patient and plan how Austria might be made to take that step.

While he waited Cavour organized a volunteer Italian army under the name of the Hunters of the Alps, he laid campaign plans with Garibaldi, he knit all the patriots of Italy into one common cause.

Even the old conservative leaders came over to him, D'Azeglio wrote him, "To-day it is no longer a question of discussing your policy, but of making it succeed."

The King supported him magnificently, Cavour found that his hardest work now was to hold King and people back.

Still he would not open war, he knew too well that he must have the support of other countries than his own.

At the New Year's Day reception in Paris, 1859, Napoleon made his famous comment to the Austrian Ambassador, "I regret that relations between us are so strained; tell your sovereign, however, that my sentiments for him are still the same."

The words created a sensation, no one was certain what lay back of them in the French Emperor's mind.

Cavour heard them and they gave him hope.

When the time came for Victor Emmanuel to open Parliament Cavour prepared the speech from the Throne with the greatest care and had a copy submitted in advance to Napoleon.

Napoleon strengthened it, and Victor Emmanuel changed it still further for the better.

When the King read it the effect upon his hearers was that of a call to arms in an heroic cause.

"If Piedmont, small in territory, yet counts for something in the councils of Europe, it is because it is great by reason of the ideas it represents and the sympathies it inspires.

This position doubtless creates for us many dangers;

nevertheless, while respecting treaties, we cannot remain insensible to the cry of grief that reaches us from so many parts of Italy."

The European Powers saw that the old treaties of 1815 were in imminent danger.

None of them realized who had in reality penned these words.

Cavour was now at one of the great crises of his life work, and bending every effort to secure Napoleon's consent to a definite treaty.

He succeeded in that the Emperor, delighted at the marriage of Prince Napoleon to a princess of one of the oldest houses in Europe, directed the bridegroom to sign an agreement obligating France to come to Piedmont's aid should the latter nation be subjected to any overt act of aggression on the part of Austria.

This agreement was intended to be kept altogether secret, but rumors that a treaty had been signed crept abroad.

Cavour now waited for Austria's aggressive act, and sought to gain national loans at home, and to arouse interest on Piedmont's behalf abroad.

The English government would not enthuse over Italian wrongs, they were zealous to maintain the present footing, but Cavour maintained his diplomatic suavity and kept the English friendship against the day when he might need it against France.

The spring of 1859 saw the natural crisis rapidly approaching, Mazzini's world forces again ready to break loose.

Into Piedmont swarmed the youth of all northern Italy, girt with sword and gun, palpitant for strife.

The government could not hold the rising tide much longer.

Cavour exclaimed, "They may throw me into the Po, but I will not stop it!"

And yet he had to wait.

Austria must first act on the offensive.

The last week of Lent came and Cavour stood face to face with the climax that was to make or mar his plans.