Jim Crow Car; Or, Denouncement of Injustice Meted Out to the Black Race — Chapter II, Part I: Discrimination

DISCRIMINATION.

The Jim Crow Car, as the negro’s first grievance relative to the Southern railroad system, is obviously seen in the foregoing observation.

There we see that the matter of being separated from the white passenger “cuts no figure,” but the very fact that colored passenger is robbed out of the worth of his well earned money, is the direct reason why the victimized colored passenger appeals to the conscience of those who have power and influence to abolish his present outraged condition.

To get the proper understanding of the cause of discrimination on Southern railroad cars, let us read the following clippings from that great Southern hero, statesman, and renowned Bishop H. M.

Turner, D. D.

, LL. D. , D.

C. L.

From this, we hope to reach a definite conclusion as to whether the fundamental course of discrimination can be suppressed by the enactment of “law.

” First of all the Civil Rights Bill is before us for consideration.

It has blinded the most studious and philanthropic men and women within the British Empire, and the civilized world.

Those who meditate on the negro’s condition, and sympathize with his environment, and who would attempt to assist him, are led to doubt some of the current reports against the race, believing that the Civil Rights Bill has imparted privileges to all men alike, and therefore the black man has a right to make use of equal enjoyment of citizenship.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS BILL, WHICH WAS DESTROYED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.

AN ACT to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights.

_Whereas_, It is essential to just government, we recognize the equality of all men before the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in its dealings with the people to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of whatever nativity, race, color or persuasion, religious or political; and it being the appropriate object of legislation to enact great fundamental principles into law; therefore, _Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled_, That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.

SEC.

2. That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall, for every such offence, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, with full costs; and shall also, for every such offence, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than one year; _provided_, that all persons may elect to sue for the penalty aforesaid or to proceed under their rights at common law and by State statutes; and having so elected to proceed in the one mode or the other, their right to proceed in the other jurisdiction shall be barred.

But this proviso shall not apply to criminal proceedings, either under this act or the criminal law of any State; _and provided further_, that a judgment for the penalty in favor of the party aggrieved, or a judgment upon an indictment, shall be a bar to either prosecution respectively.

SEC.

3. That the district and circuit courts of the United States shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences against, and violations of, the provisions of this act; and actions for the penalty given by the preceding section may be prosecuted in the territorial, district, or circuit courts of the United States wherever the defendant may be found, without regard to the other party; and the district attorneys, marshals, and deputy marshals of the United States, and commissioners appointed by the circuit and territorial courts of the United States, with powers of arresting and imprisoning or bailing offenders against laws of the United States, are hereby specially authorized and required to institute proceedings against every person who shall violate the provisions of this act, and cause him to be arrested and imprisoned or bailed, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States, or territorial court, as by law has cognizance of the offence except in respect of the right of action accruing to the person aggrieved; and such district attorneys shall cause such proceedings to be prosecuted to their termination as in other cases; _provided_, that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to deny or defeat any right of civil action accruing to any person, whether by reason of this act or otherwise; and any district attorney who shall wilfully fail to institute and prosecute the proceedings herein required, shall, for every such offence, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered by an action of debt, with full costs, and shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be fined not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand dollars;

_and provided further_, that a judgment for the penalty in favor of the party aggrieved against any such district attorney, or a judgment upon an indictment against any such district attorney, shall be a bar to either prosecution respectively.

SEC.

4. That no citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and any officer or other person, charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors, who shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the cause aforesaid shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be fined not more than five thousand dollars.

SEC.

5. That all cases arising under the provisions of this act in the courts of the United States shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States, without regard to the sum in controversy, under the same provisions and regulations as are now provided by law for the review of other causes in said court.

Approved March 1, 1875. The “Civil Rights Bill” comes secondary to the emancipation.

The bands of an unappalled monster, and disgrace upon a civilized nation, gave way for a better hope for the colored race in 1865. The life and conduct of the once bonded slave proved within a few years to be equal with his white brethren, and far better than some of his worst oppressors.

The general characteristics of the negro, his rapid progress, devotion to his Church, and loyalty to the United States Government, and able achievements in war, demanded a Civil Rights Bill.

When slavery, which was death to the colored race, was abolished, the Civil Rights Bill gave them a remedy to LIVE.

The following will prove conclusively that the present state of discrimination has not only hereditary origin, but also sanctioned by the Supreme Court:— UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REPORTS.

VOL.

109. J.

C. BANCROFT DAVIS, REPORTER.

CIVIL RIGHTS CASES.

Syllabus.

Civil Rights Cases.

—UNITED STATES _v.

_ STANLEY

(on Certificate of Division from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas)—UNITED STATES _v.

_ RYAN (in Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California)—UNITED STATES _v.

_ NICHOLS (on Certificate of Division from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri)—UNITED STATES _v.

_ SINGLETON (on Certificate of Division from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York)—ROBINSON AND WIFE _v.

_ MEMPHIS AND CHARLESTON RAILROAD

COMPANY (in Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee).

Submitted October Term, 1882. —Decided October 15, 1883. _Civil Rights—Constitution—District of Columbia—Inns—Places of Amusement—Public Conveyances—Slavery—Territories.

_ 1. The 1st and 2nd sections of the Civil Rights Act passed March 1st, 1875, are unconstitutional enactments as applied to the several States, not being authorized either by the XIIIth or XIVth Amendments of the Constitution.

2. The XIVth Amendment is prohibitory upon the States only, and the legislation authorized to be adopted by Congress for enforcing it is not _direct_ legislation on the matters respecting which the States are prohibited from making or enforcing certain laws, or doing certain acts, but it is _corrective_ legislation, such as may be necessary or proper for counteracting and redressing the effects of such laws or acts.

3. The XIIIth Amendment relates to slavery and involuntary servitude (which it abolishes); and although, by its reflex action, it establishes universal freedom in the United States, and Congress may probably pass laws directly enforcing its provisions; yet such legislative power extends only to the subject of slavery and its incidents; and the denial of equal accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of public amusement (which is forbidden by the sections in question), imposes no badge of slavery or involuntary servitude upon the party, but at most, infringes rights which are protected from State aggression by the XIVth Amendment.

4. Whether the accommodations and privileges sought to be protected by the 1st and 2nd sections of the Civil Rights Act are, or are not rights constitutionally demandable; and if they are, in what form they are to be protected is not now decided.

5. Nor is it decided whether the law as it stands is operative in the Territories and District of Columbia: the decision only relating to its validity as applied to States.

6. Nor is it decided whether Congress, under the commercial power, may or may not pass a law securing to all persons equal accommodations on lines of public conveyance between two or more States.

These cases were all founded on the first and second sections of the Act of Congress, known as the Civil Rights Act, passed March 1st, 1875, entitled, “An Act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights.

” 18 Stat.

335. Two of the cases, those against Stanley and Nichols, were indictments for denying to persons of color the accommodations and privileges of an inn or hotel; two of them, those against Ryan and Singleton, were, one on information, the other an indictment, for denying to individuals the privileges and accommodations of a theatre, the information against Ryan being for refusing a colored person a seat in the dress circle of Maguire’s theatre in San Francisco;

and the indictment against Singleton was for denying to another person, whose color was not stated, the full enjoyment of the accommodations of the theatre known as the Grand Opera House in New York, “said denial not being made for any reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude.

” The case of Robinson and wife against the Memphis and Charleston R. R.

Company, was an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee, to recover the penalty of five hundred dollars given by the second section of the act; and the gravamen was the refusal by the conductor of the railroad company to allow the wife to ride in the ladies’ car, for the reason, as stated in one of the counts, that she was a person of African descent.

The jury rendered a verdict for the defendants in this case upon the merits, under a charge of the court, to which a bill of exceptions was taken by the plaintiffs.

The case was tried on the assumption by both parties of the validity of the act of Congress; and the principal point made by the exceptions was, that the judge allowed evidence to go to the jury tending to show that the conductor had reason to suspect that the plaintiff, the wife, was an improper person, because she was in company with a young man whom he supposed to be a white man, and on that account inferred that there was some improper connection between them; and the judge charged the jury, in substance, that if this was the conductor’s _bona fide_ reason for excluding the woman from the car, they might take it into consideration on the question of the liability of the company.

The case was brought here by writ of error at the suit of the plaintiffs.

The cases of Stanley, Nichols, and Singleton came up on certificates of division of opinion between the judges below as to the constitutionality of the first and second sections of the act referred to; and the case of Ryan, on a writ of error to the judgment of the Circuit Court for the District of California sustaining a demurrer to the information.

The Stanley, Ryan, Nichols, and Singleton cases were submitted together by the solicitor general at the last term of court, on the 7th day of November, 1882. There were no appearances and no briefs filed for the defendants.

The Robinson case was submitted on the briefs at the last term, on the 29th day of March, 1883. _Mr.

Solicitor General Phillips_ for the United States.

After considering some objections in the forms of proceedings in the different cases, the counsel reviewed the following decisions of the court upon the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and on points cognate thereto, viz.

: _The Slaughter-House Cases_, 16 Wall.

36; _Bradwell ~v. ~ The State_, 16 Wall.

130; _Bartmeyer ~v. ~ Iowa_, 18 Wall.

129; _Minor ~v. ~ Happersett_, 21 Wall.

162; _Walker_ v.

_Sauvinet_, 92 U. S.

90; _United States ~v. ~ Reese_, 92 U. S.

214;

_Kennard ~v. ~ Louisiana_, 92 U. S.

480; _United States ~v. ~ Cruikshank_, 92 U.

S.

542; _Munn ~v. ~ Illinois_, 94 U. S.

113; _Chicago B. & C.

R.

R.

Co. ~v. ~ Iowa_, 94 U. S.

155; _Blyew ~v. ~ United States_, 13 Wall.

581;

_Railroad Co. ~v. ~ Brown_, 17 Wall.

445; _Hall ~v. ~ DeCuir_, 95 U. S.

485; _Strauder ~v. ~ West Virginia_, 100 U. S.

303; _Ex parte Virginia_, 100 U.

S.

339; _Missouri ~v. ~ Lewis_, 101 U. S.

22; _Neal ~v. ~ Delaware_, 103 U.

S.

370. Upon the whole, these cases decide that, 1. The Thirteenth Amendment forbids all sorts of involuntary personal servitude except penal, as to all sorts of men, the word servitude taking some color from the historical fact that the United States were then engaged in dealing with African slavery, as well as from the signification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which must be construed as _advancing_ constitutional rights previously existing.

2. The Fourteenth Amendment expresses prohibitions (and consequently implies corresponding positive immunities), _limiting State action only_, including in such action, however, action by all State agencies executive, legislative and judicial, of whatever degree.

3. The Fourteenth Amendment warrants legislation by Congress punishing violations of the immunities thereby secured when committed by agents of States in discharge of ministerial functions.

The right violated by Nichols, which is of the same class as that violated by Stanley and by Hamilton, is the right of locomotion, which Blackstone makes an element of personal liberty.

Blackstone’s Commentaries, Book I, ch. 1. In violation of this right, Nichols did not act in an exclusively private capacity, but in one devoted to public use, and so affected with a public, _i.

e. _, a State interest.

This phrase will be recognized as taken from the _Elevator Cases_ in 94 U. S.

, already cited.

Restraint upon the right of locomotion was a well-known feature of the slavery abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment.

A first requisite of the right to appropriate the use of another man was to become the master of his natural power of motion, and by a mayhem therein of the common law to require the whole community to be on the alert to restrain that power.

That this is not exaggeration is shown by the language of the court in _Eaton ~v. ~ Vaughan_, 9 Missouri, 734. Granting that by _involuntary servitude_, as prohibited in the Thirteenth Amendment, is intended some _institution_, viz.

, custom, etc. , of that sort, and not primarily mere scattered trespasses against liberty committed by private persons, yet, considering what must be the social tendency in at least large parts of the country, it is “appropriate legislation” against such an institution to forbid any action by private persons which in the light of our history may reasonably be apprehended to tend, on account of its being incidental to quasi public occupations, to create an _institution_.

Therefore the above act of 1875, in prohibiting persons from violating the rights of other persons to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations of inns and public conveyances, for any reason turning merely upon the race or color of the latter, partakers of the specific character of certain contemporaneous solemn and effective action by the United States to which it was a sequel—and is constitutional.

_Mr.

William M. Randolph_ for Robinson and wife, plaintiffs in error.

Where the constitution guarantees a right, Congress is empowered to pass the legislation appropriate to give effect to that right.

_Prigg_ v.

_Pennsylvania_, 16 Peters, 539; _Ableman ~v. ~ Booth_, 21 How.

506;

_United States ~v. ~ Reese_, 92 U. S.

214. Whether Mr. Robinson’s rights were created by the Constitution, or only guaranteed by it, in either event the act of Congress, so far as it protects them is within the Constitution.

_Pensacola Telegraph Co. ~v. ~ Western Union Tel.

Co. _, 96 U.

S.

1; _The Passenger Cases_, 7 Howard, 283; _Crandall ~v. ~ Nevada_, 6 Wall.

35. In _Munn ~v. ~ Illinois_, 94 U. S.

113 the following propositions were affirmed: “Under the powers inherent in every sovereignty, a government may regulate the conduct of its citizens toward each other, and, when necessary for the public good, the manner in which each shall use his own property.

” “It has, in the exercise of these powers, been customary in England, from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, etc. ” “When the owner of a property devotes it to a use in which the public has an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in such use, and must, to the extent of that interest, submit to be controlled by the public, for the common good, as long as he maintains the use.

” Undoubtedly, if Congress could legislate on the subject at all, its legislation, by the act of 1st March, 1875, was within the principles thus announced.

The penalty denounced by the statute is incurred by denying to any citizen “the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges” enumerated in the first section, and it is wholly immaterial whether the citizen whose rights are denied him belongs to one race or class or another, or is of one complexion or another.

And again, the penalty follows every denial of the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges, except and unless the denial was “_for reasons by law_ applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude.

”