Theodore Roosevelt: an Autobiography — Ch 08-The New York Governorship, pt 4

My troubles were not at an end, however.

The bill put the taxation in the hands of the local county boards, and as the railways sometimes passed through several different counties, this was inadvisable.

It was the end of the session, and the Legislature adjourned.

The corporations affected, through various counsel, and the different party leaders of both organizations, urged me not to sign the bill, laying especial stress on this feature, and asking that I wait until the following year, when a good measure could be put through with this obnoxious feature struck out.

I had thirty days under the law in which to sign the bill.

If I did not sign it by the end of that time it would not become a law.

I answered my political and corporation friends by telling them that I agreed with them that this feature was wrong, but that I would rather have the bill with this feature than not have it at all; and that I was not willing to trust to what might be done a year later.

Therefore, I explained, I would reconvene the Legislature in special session, and if the legislators chose to amend the bill by placing the power of taxation in the State instead of in the county or municipality, I would be glad;

but that if they failed to amend it, or amended it improperly, I would sign the original bill and let it become law as it was.

When the representatives of Mr. Platt and of the corporations affected found they could do no better, they assented to this proposition.

Efforts were tentatively made to outwit me, by inserting amendments that would nullify the effect of the law, or by withdrawing the law when the Legislature convened; which would at once have deprived me of the whip hand.

On May 12 I wrote Senator Platt, outlining the amendments I desired, and said: "Of course it must be understood that I will sign the present bill if the proposed bill containing the changes outlined above fails to pass."

On May 18 I notified the Senate leader, John Raines, by telegram: "Legislature has no power to withdraw the Ford bill.

If attempt is made to do so, I will sign the bill at once."

On the same day, by telegram, I wired Mr. Odell concerning the bill the leaders were preparing: "Some provisions of bill very objectionable.

I am at work on bill to show you to-morrow.

The bill must not contain greater changes than those outlined in my message."

My wishes were heeded, and when I had reconvened the Legislature it amended the bill as I outlined in my message; and in its amended form the bill became law.

There promptly followed something which afforded an index of the good faith of the corporations that had been protesting to me.

As soon as the change for which they had begged was inserted in the law, and the law was signed, they turned round and refused to pay the taxes; and in the lawsuit that followed, they claimed that the law was unconstitutional, because it contained the very clause which they had so clamorously demanded.

Senator David B. Hill had appeared before me on behalf of the corporations to argue for the change; and he then appeared before the courts to make the argument on the other side.

The suit was carried through to the Supreme Court of the United States, which declared the law constitutional during the time that I was President.

One of the painful duties of the chief executive in States like New York, as well as in the Nation, is the refusing of pardons.

Yet I can imagine nothing more necessary from the standpoint of good citizenship than the ability to steel one's heart in this matter of granting pardons.

The pressure is always greatest in two classes of cases: first, that where capital punishment is inflicted; second, that where the man is prominent socially and in the business world, and where in consequence his crime is apt to have been one concerned in some way with finance.

As regards capital cases, the trouble is that emotional men and women always see only the individual whose fate is up at the moment, and neither his victim nor the many millions of unknown individuals who would in the long run be harmed by what they ask.

Moreover, almost any criminal, however brutal, has usually some person, often a person whom he has greatly wronged, who will plead for him.

If the mother is alive she will always come, and she cannot help feeling that the case in which she is so concerned is peculiar, that in this case a pardon should be granted.

It was really heartrending to have to see the kinsfolk and friends of murderers who were condemned to death, and among the very rare occasions when anything governmental or official caused me to lose sleep were the times when I had to listen to some poor mother making a plea for a criminal so wicked, so utterly brutal and depraved, that it would have been a crime on my part to remit his punishment.

On the other hand, there were certain crimes where requests for leniency merely made me angry.

Such crimes were, for instance, rape, or the circulation of indecent literature, or anything connected with what would now be called the "white slave" traffic, or wife murder, or gross cruelty to women and children, or seduction and abandonment, or the action of some man in getting a girl whom he had seduced to commit abortion.

I am speaking in each instance of cases that actually came before me, either while I was Governor or while I was President.

In an astonishing number of these cases men of high standing signed petitions or wrote letters asking me to show leniency to the criminal.

In two or three of the cases--one where some young roughs had committed rape on a helpless immigrant girl, and another in which a physician of wealth and high standing had seduced a girl and then induced her to commit abortion--I rather lost my temper, and wrote to the individuals who had asked for the pardon, saying that I extremely regretted that it was not in my power to increase the sentence.

I then let the facts be made public, for I thought that my petitioners deserved public censure.

Whether they received this public censure or not I did not know, but that my action made them very angry I do know, and their anger gave me real satisfaction.

The list of these petitioners was a fairly long one, and included two United States Senators, a Governor of a State, two judges, an editor, and some eminent lawyers and business men.

In the class of cases where the offense was one involving the misuse of large sums of money the reason for the pressure was different.

Cases of this kind more frequently came before me when I was President, but they also came before me when I was Governor, chiefly in the cases of county treasurers who had embezzled funds.

A big bank president, a railway magnate, an official connected with some big corporation, or a Government official in a responsible fiduciary position, necessarily belongs among the men who have succeeded in life.

This means that his family are living in comfort, and perhaps luxury and refinement, and that his sons and daughters have been well educated.

In such a case the misdeed of the father comes as a crushing disaster to the wife and children, and the people of the community, however bitter originally against the man, grow to feel the most intense sympathy for the bowed-down women and children who suffer for the man's fault.

It is a dreadful thing in life that so much of atonement for wrong-doing is vicarious.

If it were possible in such a case to think only of the banker's or county treasurer's wife and children, any man would pardon the offender at once.

Unfortunately, it is not right to think only of the women and children.

The very fact that in cases of this class there is certain to be pressure from high sources, pressure sometimes by men who have been beneficially, even though remotely, interested in the man's criminality, no less than pressure because of honest sympathy with the wife and children, makes it necessary that the good public servant shall, no matter how deep his sympathy and regret, steel his heart and do his duty by refusing to let the wrong-doer out.

My experience of the way in which pardons are often granted is one of the reasons why I do not believe that life imprisonment for murder and rape is a proper substitute for the death penalty.

The average term of so-called life imprisonment in this country is only about fourteen years.

Of course there were cases where I either commuted sentences or pardoned offenders with very real pleasure.

For instance, when President, I frequently commuted sentences for horse stealing in the Indian Territory because the penalty for stealing a horse was disproportionate to the penalty for many other crimes, and the offense was usually committed by some ignorant young fellow who found a half-wild horse, and really did not commit anything like as serious an offense as the penalty indicated.

The judges would be obliged to give the minimum penalty, but would forward me memoranda stating that if there had been a less penalty they would have inflicted it, and I would then commute the sentence to the penalty thus indicated.

In one case in New York I pardoned outright a man convicted of murder in the second degree, and I did this on the recommendation of a friend, Father Doyle of the Paulist Fathers.

I had become intimate with the Paulist Fathers while I was Police Commissioner, and I had grown to feel confidence in their judgment, for I had found that they always told me exactly what the facts were about any man, whether he belonged to their church or not.

In this case the convicted man was a strongly built, respectable old Irishman employed as a watchman around some big cattle-killing establishments.

The young roughs of the neighborhood, which was then of a rather lawless type, used to try to destroy the property of the companies.

In a conflict with a watchman a member of one of the gangs was slain.

The watchman was acquitted, but the neighborhood was much wrought up over the acquittal.

Shortly afterwards, a gang of the same roughs attacked another watchman, the old Irishman in question, and finally, to save his own life, he was obliged in self-defense to kill one of his assailants.

The feeling in the community, however, was strongly against him, and some of the men high up in the corporation became frightened and thought that it would be better to throw over the watchman.

He was convicted.

Father Doyle came to me, told me that he knew the man well, that he was one of the best members of his church, admirable in every way, that he had simply been forced to fight for his life while loyally doing his duty, and that the conviction represented the triumph of the tough element of the district and the abandonment of this man, by those who should have stood by him, under the influence of an unworthy fear.

I looked into the case, came to the conclusion that Father Doyle was right, and gave the man a full pardon before he had served thirty days.

The various clashes between myself and the machine, my triumph in them, and the fact that the people were getting more and more interested and aroused, brought on a curious situation in the Republican National Convention at Philadelphia in June, 1900. Senator Platt and the New York machine leaders had become very anxious to get me out of the Governorship, chiefly because of the hostility of the big corporation men towards me; but they had also become convinced that there was such popular feeling on my behalf that it would be difficult to refuse me a renomination if I demanded it.

They accordingly decided to push me for Vice-President, taking advantage of the fact that there was at that time a good deal of feeling for me in the country at large.

[See Appendix B to this chapter.

] I myself did not appreciate that there was any such feeling, and as I greatly disliked the office of Vice-President and was much interested in the Governorship, I announced that I would not accept the Vice-Presidency.

I was one of the delegates to Philadelphia.

On reaching there I found that the situation was complicated.

Senator Hanna appeared on the surface to have control of the Convention.

He was anxious that I should not be nominated as Vice-President.

Senator Platt was anxious that I should be nominated as Vice-President, in order to get me out of the New York Governorship.

Each took a position opposite to that of the other, but each at that time cordially sympathized with the other's feelings about me--it was the manifestations and not the feelings that differed.

My supporters in New York State did not wish me nominated for Vice-President because they wished me to continue as Governor; but in every other State all the people who admired me were bound that I should be nominated as Vice-President.

These people were almost all desirous of seeing Mr. McKinley renominated as President, but they became angry at Senator Hanna's opposition to me as Vice-President.

He in his turn suddenly became aware that if he persisted he might find that in their anger these men would oppose Mr. McKinley's renomination, and although they could not have prevented the nomination, such opposition would have been a serious blow in the campaign which was to follow.

Senator Hanna, therefore, began to waver.

Meanwhile a meeting of the New York delegation was called.

Most of the delegates were under the control of Senator Platt.

The Senator notified me that if I refused to accept the nomination for Vice-President I would be beaten for the nomination for Governor.

I answered that I would accept the challenge, that we would have a straight-out fight on the proposition, and that I would begin it at once by telling the assembled delegates of the threat, and giving fair warning that I intended to fight for the Governorship nomination, and, moreover, that I intended to get it.

This brought Senator Platt to terms.

The effort to instruct the New York delegation for me was abandoned, and Lieutenant-Governor Woodruff was presented for nomination in my place.

I supposed that this closed the incident, and that no further effort would be made to nominate me for the Vice-Presidency.

On the contrary, the effect was directly the reverse.

The upset of the New York machine increased the feeling of the delegates from other States that it was necessary to draft me for the nomination.

By next day Senator Hanna himself concluded that this was a necessity, and acquiesced in the movement.

As New York was already committed against me, and as I was not willing that there should be any chance of supposing that the New Yorkers had nominated me to get rid of me, the result was that I was nominated and seconded from outside States.

No other candidate was placed in the field.

By this time the Legislature had adjourned, and most of my work as Governor of New York was over.

One unexpected bit of business arose, however.

It was the year of the Presidential campaign.

Tammany, which had been lukewarm about Bryan in 1896, cordially supported him in 1900; and when Tammany heartily supports a candidate it is well for the opposing candidate to keep a sharp lookout for election frauds.

The city government was in the hands of Tammany; but I had power to remove the Mayor, the Sheriff, and the District Attorney for malfeasance or misfeasance in office.

Such power had not been exercised by any previous Governor, as far as I knew; but it existed, and if the misfeasance or malfeasance warranted it, and if the Governor possessed the requisite determination, the power could be, and ought to be, exercised.

By an Act of the Legislature, a State Bureau of Elections had been created in New York City, and a Superintendent of Elections appointed by the Governor.

The Chief of the State Bureau of Elections was John McCullagh, formerly in the Police Department when I was Police Commissioner.

The Chief of Police for the city was William F. Devery, one of the Tammany leaders, who represented in the Police Department all that I had warred against while Commissioner.

On November 4 Devery directed his subordinates in the Police Department to disregard the orders which McCullagh had given to his deputies, orders which were essential if we were to secure an honest election in the city.

I had just returned from a Western campaign trip, and was at Sagamore Hill.

I

had no direct power over Devery; but the Mayor had; and I had power over the Mayor.

Accordingly, I at once wrote to the Mayor of New York, to the Sheriff of New York, and to the District Attorney of New York County the following letters: STATE OF NEW YORK OYSTER BAY, November 5, 1900. To the Mayor of the City of New York.

Sir: My attention has been called to the official order issued by Chief of Police Devery, in which he directs his subordinates to disregard the Chief of the State Election Bureau, John McCullagh, and his deputies.

Unless you have already taken steps to secure the recall of this order, it is necessary for me to point out that I shall be obliged to hold you responsible as the head of the city government for the action of the Chief of Police, if it should result in any breach of the peace and intimidation or any crime whatever against the election laws.

The State and city authorities should work together.

I will not fail to call to summary account either State or city authority in the event of either being guilty of intimidation or connivance at fraud or of failure to protect every legal voter in his rights.

I therefore hereby notify you that in the event of any wrong-doing following upon the failure immediately to recall Chief Devery's order, or upon any action or inaction on the part of Chief Devery, I must necessarily call you to account.

Yours, etc. , THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

STATE OF NEW YORK OYSTER BAY, November 5, 1900. To the Sheriff of the County of New York.

Sir: My attention has been called to the official order issued by Chief of Police Devery in which he directs his subordinates to disregard the Chief of the State Election Bureau, John McCullagh, and his deputies.

It is your duty to assist in the orderly enforcement of the law, and I shall hold you strictly responsible for any breach of the public peace within your county, or for any failure on your part to do your full duty in connection with the election to-morrow.

Yours truly, THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

STATE OF NEW YORK OYSTER BAY, November 5, 1900. To the District Attorney of the County of New York.

Sir: My attention has been called to the official order issued by Chief of Police Devery, in which he directs his subordinates to disregard the Chief of the State Election Bureau, John McCullagh, and his deputies.

In view of this order I call your attention to the fact that it is your duty to assist in the orderly enforcement of the law, and there must be no failure on your part to do your full duty in the matter.

Yours truly, THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

These letters had the desired effect.

The Mayor promptly required Chief Devery to rescind the obnoxious order, which was as promptly done.

The Sheriff also took prompt action.

The District Attorney refused to heed my letter, and assumed an attitude of defiance, and I removed him from office.

On election day there was no clash between the city and State authorities; the election was orderly and honest.

APPENDIX A

CONSERVATION

As foreshadowing the course I later, as President, followed in this matter, I give extracts from one of my letters to the Commission, and from my second (and last) Annual Message.

I spent the first months of my term in investigations to find out just what the situation was.

On November 28, 1899, I wrote to the Commission as follows: ".

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I have had very many complaints before this as to the inefficiency of the game wardens and game protectors, the complaints usually taking the form that the men have been appointed and are retained without due regard to the duties to be performed.

I do not wish a man to be retained or appointed who is not thoroughly fit to perform the duties of game protector.

The Adirondacks are entitled to a peculiar share of the Commission's attention, both from the standpoint of forestry, and from the less important, but still very important, standpoint of game and fish protection.

The men who do duty as game protectors in the Adirondacks should, by preference, be appointed from the locality itself, and should in all cases be thorough woodsmen.

The mere fact that a game protector has to hire a guide to pilot him through the woods is enough to show his unfitness for the position.

I want as game protectors men of courage, resolution, and hardihood, who can handle the rifle, ax, and paddle; who can camp out in summer or winter;

who can go on snow-shoes, if necessary; who can go through the woods by day or by night without regard to trails.

"I should like full information about all your employees, as to their capacities, as to the labor they perform, as to their distribution from and where they do their work."

Many of the men hitherto appointed owed their positions principally to political preference.

The changes I recommended were promptly made, and much to the good of the public service.

In my Annual Message, in January, 1900, I said: "Great progress has been made through the fish hatcheries in the propagation of valuable food and sporting fish.

The laws for the protection of deer have resulted in their increase.

Nevertheless, as railroads tend to encroach on the wilderness, the temptation to illegal hunting becomes greater, and the danger from forest fires increases.

There is need of great improvement both in our laws and in their administration.

The game wardens have been too few in number.

More should be provided.

None save fit men must be appointed; and their retention in office must depend purely upon the zeal, ability, and efficiency with which they perform their duties.

The game wardens in the forests must be woodsmen; and they should have no outside business.

In short, there should be a thorough reorganization of the work of the Commission.

A careful study of the resources and condition of the forests on State land must be made.

It is certainly not too much to expect that the State forests should be managed as efficiently as the forests on private lands in the same neighborhoods.

And the measure of difference in efficiency of management must be the measure of condemnation or praise of the way the public forests have been managed.

"The subject of forest preservation is of the utmost importance to the State.

The Adirondacks and Catskills should be great parks kept in perpetuity for the benefit and enjoyment of our people.

Much has been done of late years towards their preservation, but very much remains to be done.

The provisions of law in reference to sawmills and wood-pulp mills are defective and should be changed so as to prohibit dumping dye-stuff, sawdust, or tan-bark, in any amount whatsoever, into the streams.

Reservoirs should be made, but not where they will tend to destroy large sections of the forest, and only after a careful and scientific study of the water resources of the region.

The people of the forest regions are themselves growing more and more to realize the necessity of preserving both the trees and the game.

A live deer in the woods will attract to the neighborhood ten times the money that could be obtained for the deer's dead carcass.

Timber theft on the State lands is, of course, a grave offense against the whole public.

"Hardy outdoor sports, like hunting, are in themselves of no small value to the National character and should be encouraged in every way.

Men who go into the wilderness, indeed, men who take part in any field sports with horse or rifle, receive a benefit which can hardly be given by even the most vigorous athletic games.

"There is a further and more immediate and practical end in view.

A

primeval forest is a great sponge which absorbs and distills the rain water.

And when it is destroyed the result is apt to be an alternation of flood and drought.

Forest fires ultimately make the land a desert, and are a detriment to all that portion of the State tributary to the streams through the woods where they occur.

Every effort should be made to minimize their destructive influence.

We need to have our system of forestry gradually developed and conducted along scientific principles.

When this has been done it will be possible to allow marketable lumber to be cut everywhere without damage to the forests--indeed, with positive advantage to them.

But until lumbering is thus conducted, on strictly scientific principles no less than upon principles of the strictest honesty toward the State, we cannot afford to suffer it at all in the State forests.

Unrestrained greed means the ruin of the great woods and the drying up of the sources of the rivers.

"Ultimately the administration of the State lands must be so centralized as to enable us definitely to place responsibility in respect to everything concerning them, and to demand the highest degree of trained intelligence in their use.

"The State should not permit within its limits factories to make bird skins or bird feathers into articles of ornament or wearing apparel.

Ordinary birds, and especially song birds, should be rigidly protected.

Game birds should never be shot to a greater extent than will offset the natural rate of increase.

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Care should be taken not to encourage the use of cold storage or other market systems which are a benefit to no one but the wealthy epicure who can afford to pay a heavy price for luxuries.

These systems tend to the destruction of the game, which would bear most severely upon the very men whose rapacity has been appealed to in order to secure its extermination.

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I reorganized the Commission, putting Austin Wadsworth at its head.

APPENDIX B

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN 1900

My general scheme of action as Governor was given in a letter I wrote one of my supporters among the independent district organization leaders, Norton Goddard, on April 16, 1900. It runs in part as follows: "Nobody can tell, and least of all the machine itself, whether the machine intends to renominate me next fall or not.

If for some reason I should be weak, whether on account of faults or virtues, doubtless the machine will throw me over, and I think I am not uncharitable when I say they would feel no acute grief at so doing.

It would be very strange if they did feel such grief.

If, for instance, we had strikes which led to riots, I would of course be obliged to preserve order and stop the riots.

Decent citizens would demand that I should do it, and in any event I should do it wholly without regard to their demands.

But, once it was done, they would forget all about it, while a great many laboring men, honest but ignorant and prejudiced, would bear a grudge against me for doing it.

This might put me out of the running as a candidate.

Again, the big corporations undoubtedly want to beat me.

They prefer the chance of being blackmailed to the certainty that they will not be allowed any more than their due.

Of course they will try to beat me on some entirely different issue, and, as they are very able and very unscrupulous, nobody can tell that they won't succeed.

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I have been trying to stay in with the organization.

I did not do it with the idea that they would renominate me.

I did it with the idea of getting things done, and in that I have been absolutely successful.

Whether Senator Platt and Mr. Odell endeavor to beat me, or do beat me, for the renomination next fall, is of very small importance compared to the fact that for my two years I have been able to make a Republican majority in the Legislature do good and decent work and have prevented any split within the party.

The task was one of great difficulty, because, on the one hand, I had to keep clearly before me the fact that it was better to have a split than to permit bad work to be done, and, on the other hand, the fact that to have that split would absolutely prevent all _good_ work.

The result has been that I have avoided a split and that as a net result of my two years and the two sessions of the Legislature, there has been an enormous improvement in the administration of the Government, and there has also been a great advance in legislation."

To show my reading of the situation at the time I quote from a letter of mine to Joseph B. Bishop, then editor of the _Commercial Advertiser_, with whom towards the end of my term I had grown into very close relations, and who, together with two other old friends, Albert Shaw, of the _Review of Reviews_, and Silas McBee, now editor of the _Constructive Quarterly_, knew the inside of every movement, so far as I knew it myself.

The letter, which is dated April 11, 1900, runs in part as follows: "The dangerous element as far as I am concerned comes from the corporations.

The [naming certain men] crowd and those like them have been greatly exasperated by the franchise tax.

They would like to get me out of politics for good, but at the moment they think the best thing to do is to put me into the Vice-Presidency.

Naturally I will not be opposed openly on the ground of the corporations' grievance; but every kind of false statement will continually be made, and men like [naming the editors of certain newspapers] will attack me, not as the enemy of corporations, but as their tool!

There is no question whatever that if the leaders can they will upset me."

One position which as Governor (and as President) I consistently took, seems to me to represent what ought to be a fundamental principle in American legislative work.

I steadfastly refused to advocate any law, no matter how admirable in theory, if there was good reason to believe that in practice it would not be executed.

I have always sympathized with the view set forth by Pelatiah Webster in 1783--quoted by Hannis Taylor in his _Genesis of the Supreme Court_--"Laws or ordinances of any kind (especially of august bodies of high dignity and consequence) which fail of execution, are much worse than none.

They weaken the government, expose it to contempt, destroy the confidence of all men, native and foreigners, in it, and expose both aggregate bodies and individuals who have placed confidence in it to many ruinous disappointments which they would have escaped had no such law or ordinance been made."

This principle, by the way, not only applies to an internal law which cannot be executed; it applies even more to international action, such as a universal arbitration treaty which cannot and will not be kept; and most of all it applies to proposals to make such universal arbitration treaties at the very time that we are not keeping our solemn promise to execute limited arbitration treaties which we have already made.

A

general arbitration treaty is merely a promise; it represents merely a debt of honorable obligation; and nothing is more discreditable, for a nation or an individual, than to cover up the repudiation of a debt which can be and ought to be paid, by recklessly promising to incur a new and insecure debt which no wise man for one moment supposes ever will be paid.

CHAPTER IX