Ethics — 3-04-Part III, Propositions 11 to 15
PROP.
XI.
Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.
Proof.
--This proposition is evident from II.
vii.
or from II.
xiv.
Note.
--Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes to a state of lesser perfection.
These passive states of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.
By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection.
By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection.
Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy.
But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike affected.
What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to Prop.
ix.
of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other emotions arise from these three.
But, before I go further, I should like here to explain at greater length Prop.
x of this part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another.
In the note to II.
xvii.
we showed that the idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so long as the body itself exists.
Again, it follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II.
viii.
, that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body.
Lastly, we showed (II.
xvii.
, xviii.
and note) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body.
Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body.
Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (III.
iv.
), nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist.
For (by II.
vi.
) the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist;
therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but (II.
xvii.
) this result follows from another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence of our mind.
PROP.
XII.
The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body.
Proof.
--So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard that external body as present (II.
xvii.
), and consequently (II.
vii.
), so long as the human mind regards an external body as present, that is (II.
xvii.
note), conceives it, the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature of the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceives things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body, the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of activity (III.
Post.
i.
); consequently (III.
xi.
) the mind's power of thinking is for that period increased or helped.
Thus (III.
vi.
, ix.
) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine such things.
Q.
E.
D. PROP.
XIII.
When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the first--named things.
Proof.
--So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or constrained (cf.
III.
xii.
Proof); nevertheless it will continue to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the present existence thereof (II.
xvii.
); that is (as I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived: therefore the mind (III.
ix.
), as far as it can, will endeavour to conceive or remember the latter.
Q.
E.
D.
Corollary.
--Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of itself and of the body.
Note.
--From what has been said we may clearly understand the nature of Love and Hate.
Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
We further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.
But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.
PROP.
XIV.
If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of these two, be also affected by the other.
Proof.
--If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it will straightway remember the other also (II.
xviii.
).
But the mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than the nature of external bodies (II.
xvi.
Coroll.
ii.
); therefore, if the body, and consequently the mind (III.
Def.
iii.
) has been once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other.
PROP.
XV.
Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire.
Proof.
--Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either increase or diminish the said power (III.
Post.
i.
).
From the foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III.
xi.
note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain.
Thus the former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain.
In the same way also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the cause of desire.
Q.
E.
D.
Corollary.
--Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it.
Proof.
--For from this fact alone it arises (III.
xiv.
), that the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III.
xi.
note), according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished, &c. ; and consequently (III.
xii.
), according as the mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III.
xiii.
Coroll.
), in other words (III.
xiii.
note), according as it may love or hate the same.
Q.
E.
D.
Note.
--Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;
merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy.
We should refer to the same category those objects, which affect us pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way.
This I will show in the next Prop.
I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest qualities.
