Naval War of 1812 — 11 Part 11

From the 13th of August to the 10th of September both fleets were on the lake most of the time, each commodore stoutly maintaining that he was chasing the other; and each expressing in his letters his surprise and disgust that his opponent should be afraid of meeting him "though so much superior in force."

The facts are of course difficult to get at, but it seems pretty evident that Yeo was determined to engage in heavy, and Chauncy in light, weather; and that the party to leeward generally made off.

The Americans had been re-inforced by the _Sylph_ schooner, of 300 tons and 70 men, carrying four long 32's on pivots, and six long 6's. Theoretically her armament would make her formidable; but practically her guns were so crowded as to be of little use, and the next year she was converted into a brig, mounting 24-pound carronades.

On the 11th of September a partial engagement, at very long range, in light weather, occurred near the mouth of the Genesee River; the Americans suffered no loss whatever, while the British had one midshipman and three seamen killed and seven wounded, and afterward ran into Amherst Bay.

One of their brigs, the _Melville_, received a shot so far under water that to get at and plug it, the guns had to be run in on one side and out on the other.

Chauncy describes it as a running fight of 3 1/2 hours, the enemy then escaping into Amherst Bay.

[Footnote: Letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept.

13, 1813. ] James (p. 38) says that "At sunset a breeze sprang up from the westward, when Sir James steered for the American fleet;

but the American commodore avoided a close action, and thus the affair ended."

This is a good sample of James' trustworthiness; his account is supposed to be taken from Commodore Yeo's letter, [Footnote: Letter to Admiral Warren, Sept.

12. 1813. ] which says: "At sunset a breeze sprang up from the westward, when I steered for the False Duck Islands, under which the enemy could not keep the weather-gage, but be obliged to meet us on equal terms.

This, however, he carefully avoided doing."

In other words Yeo did _not_ steer _for_ but _away from_ Chauncy.

Both sides admit that Yeo got the worst of it and ran away, and it is only a question as to whether Chauncy followed him or not.

Of course in such light weather Chauncy's long guns gave him a great advantage.

He had present 10 vessels; the _Pike_, _Madison_, _Oneida_, _Sylph_, _Tompkins_, _Conquest_, _Ontario_, _Pert_, _American_, and _Asp_, throwing 1,288 lbs.

of shot, with a total of 98 guns.

Yeo had 92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1,374 lbs.

Nevertheless, Chauncy told but part of the truth in writing as he did: "I was much disappointed at Sir James refusing to fight me, as he was so much superior in point of force, both in guns and men, having upward of 20 guns more than we have, and heaves a greater weight of shot."

His inferiority in the long guns placed Yeo at a great disadvantage in such a very light wind; but in his letter he makes a marvellous admission of how little able he was to make good use of even what he had.

He says: "I found it impossible to bring them to close action.

We remained in this mortifying situation five hours, having only six guns in all the squadron that would reach the enemy (not a carronade being fired)."

Now according to James himself ("Naval Occurrences," p. 297) he had in his squadron 2 long 24's, 13 long 18's, 2 long 12's, and 3 long 9's, and, in a fight of five hours, at very long range, in smooth water, it was a proof of culpable incompetency on his part that he did not think of doing what Elliott and Perry did in similar circumstances on Lake Erie--substitute all his long guns for some of the carronades on the engaged side.

Chauncy could place in broadside 7 long 32's, 18 long 24's, 4 long 12's, 8 long 6's; so he could oppose 37 long guns, throwing 752 lbs.

of shot, to Yeo's 20 long guns, throwing 333 lbs.

of shot.

The odds were thus more than two to one against the British in any case; and their commander's lack of resource made them still greater.

But it proved a mere skirmish, with no decisive results.

The two squadrons did not come in contact again till on the 28th, in York Bay.

The Americans had the weather-gage, the wind being fresh from the east.

Yeo tacked and stretched out into the lake, while Chauncy steered directly for his centre.

When the squadrons were still a league apart the British formed on the port tack, with their heavy vessels ahead; the Americans got on the same tack and edged down toward them, the _Pike_ ahead, towing the _Asp_; the _Tompkins_, under Lieut.

Bolton Finch, next; the _Madison_ next, being much retarded by having a schooner in tow; then the _Sylph_, with another schooner in tow, the _Oneida_, and the two other schooners.

The British, fearing their sternmost vessels would be cut off, at 12. 10 came round on the starboard tack, beginning with the _Wolfe_, Commodore Yeo, and _Royal George_, Captain William Howe Mulcaster, which composed the van of the line.

They opened with their starboard guns as soon as they came round.

When the _Pike_ was a-beam of the _Wolfe_, which was past the centre of the British line, the Americans bore up in succession for their centre.

The _Madison_ was far back, and so was the _Sylph_, neither having cast off their tows; so the whole brunt of the action fell on the _Pike_, _Asp_, and _Tompkins_.

The latter kept up a most gallant and spirited fire till her foremast was shot away.

But already the _Pike_ had shot away the _Wolfe's_ main-top-mast and main-yard, and inflicted so heavy a loss upon her that Commodore Yeo, not very heroically, put dead before the wind, crowding all the canvas he could on her forward spars, and she ran completely past all her own vessels, who of course crowded sail after her.

The retreat of the commodore was most ably covered by the _Royal George_, under Captain Mulcaster, who was unquestionably the best British officer on the lake.

He luffed up across the commodore's stern, and delivered broadsides in a manner that won the admiration even of his foes.

The _Madison_ and _Sylph_, having the schooners in tow, could not overtake the British ships, though the _Sylph_ opened a distant fire;

the _Pike_ kept on after them, but did not cast off the _Asp_, and so did not gain; and at 3. 15 the pursuit was relinquished, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Chauncy.

Sept.

28, 1813. ] when the enemy were running into the entirely undefended port of Burlington Bay, whence escape would have been impossible.

The _Tompkins_ had lost her foremast, and the _Pike_ her foretop-gallant mast, with her bowsprit and main-mast wounded; and of her crew five men were killed or wounded, almost all by the guns of the _Royal George_.

These were the only injuries occasioned by the enemy's fire, but the _Pike's_ starboard bow-chaser burst, killing or wounding 22 men, besides blowing up the top-gallant forecastle, so that the bow pivot gun could not be used.

Among the British ships, the _Wolfe_ lost her main-top-mast, mizzen-top-mast, and main-yard, and the _Royal George_ her foretop-mast;

both suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded, according to the report of the British officers captured in the transports a few days afterward.

[Illustration of the action between _TOMPKINS_, _ASP_, and _PIKE_, and the _WOLFE_, _ROYAL GEORGE_, and small gun-boats.

] As already mentioned, the British authorities no longer published accounts of their defeats, so Commodore Yeo's report on the action was not made public.

Brenton merely alludes to it as follows (vol. ii, p. 503): "The action of the 28th of September, 1813, in which Sir James Yeo in the _Wolfe_ had his main- and mizzen-top-masts shot away, and was obliged to put before the wind, gave Mulcaster an opportunity of displaying a trait of valor and seamanship which elicited the admiration of friends and foes, when he gallantly placed himself between his disabled commodore and a superior enemy."

James speaks in the vaguest terms.

He first says, "Commodore Chauncy, having the weather-gage, kept his favorite distance," which he did because Commodore Yeo fled so fast that he could not be overtaken;

then James mentions the injuries the _Wolfe_ received, and says that "it was these and not, as Mr. Clark says, 'a manoeuvre of the commodore's' that threw the British in confusion."

In other words, it was the commodore's shot and not his manoeuvring that threw the British into confusion--a very futile distinction.

Next he says that "Commodore Chauncy would not venture within carronade range," whereas he _was_ within carronade range of the _Wolfe_ and _Royal George_, but the latter did not wait for the _Madison_ and _Oneida_ to get within range with _their_ carronades.

The rest of his article is taken up with exposing the absurdities of some of the American writings, miscalled histories, which appeared at the close of the war.

His criticisms on these are very just, but afford a funny instance of the pot calling the kettle black.

This much is clear, that the British were beaten and forced to flee, when but part of the American force was engaged.

But in good weather the American force was so superior that being beaten would have been no disgrace to Yeo, had it not been for the claims advanced both by himself and his friends, that on the whole he was victorious over Chauncy.

The _Wolfe_ made any thing but an obstinate fight, leaving almost all the work to the gallant Mulcaster, in the _Royal George_, who shares with Lieutenant Finch of the _Tompkins_ most of the glory of the day.

The battle, if such it may be called, completely established Chauncy's supremacy, Yeo spending most of the remainder of the season blockaded in Kingston.

So Chauncy gained a victory which established his control over the lakes; and, moreover, he gained it by fighting in succession, almost single-handed, the two heaviest ships of the enemy.

But gaining the victory was only what should have been expected from a superior force.

The question is, did Chauncy use his force to the best advantage?

And it can not be said that he did.

When the enemy bore up it was a great mistake not to cast off the schooners which were being towed.

They were small craft, not of much use in the fight, and they entirely prevented the _Madison_ from taking any part in the contest, and kept the _Sylph_ at a great distance; and by keeping the _Asp_ in tow the _Pike_, which sailed faster than any of Yeo's ships, was distanced by them.

Had she left the _Asp_ behind and run in to engage the _Royal George_ she could have mastered, or at any rate disabled, her; and had the swift _Madison_ cast off her tow she could also have taken an effective part in the engagement.

If the _Pike_ could put the British to flight almost single-handed, how much more could she not have done when assisted by the _Madison_ and _Oneida_?

The cardinal error, however, was made in discontinuing the chase.

The British were in an almost open roadstead, from which they could not possibly escape.

Commodore Chauncy was afraid that the wind would come up to blow a gale, and both fleets would be thrown ashore; and, moreover, he expected to be able to keep a watch over the enemy and to attack him at a more suitable time.

But he utterly failed in this last; and had the American squadron cast off their tows and gone boldly in, they certainly ought to have been able to destroy or capture the entire British force before a gale could blow up.

Chauncy would have done well to keep in mind the old adage, so peculiarly applicable to naval affairs: "L'audace!

toujours l'audace!

et encore l'audace!"

Whether the fault was his or that of his subordinates, it is certain that while the victory of the 28th of September definitely settled the supremacy of the lake in favor of the Americans, yet this victory was by no means so decided as it should have been, taking into account his superiority in force and advantage in position, and the somewhat spiritless conduct of his foe.

Next day a gale came on to blow, which lasted till the evening of the 31st.

There was no longer any apprehension of molestation from the British, so the troop transports were sent down the lake by themselves, while the squadron remained to watch Yeo.

On Oct.

2d he was chased, but escaped by his better sailing; and next day false information induced Chauncy to think Yeo had eluded him and passed down the lake, and he accordingly made sail in the direction of his supposed flight.

On the 5th, at 3 P. M.

, while near the False Ducks, seven vessels were made out ahead, which proved to be British gun-boats, engaged in transporting troops.

All sails was made after them; one was burned, another escaped, and five were captured, the _Mary_, _Drummond_, _Lady Gore_, _Confiance_, and _Hamilton_, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Chauncy, Oct.

8, 1813. ]--the two latter being the rechristened _Julia_ and _Growler_.

Each gun-vessel had from one to three guns, and they had aboard in all 264 men, including seven naval (three royal and four provincial) and ten military officers.

These prisoners stated that in the action of the 28th the _Wolfe_ and _Royal George_ had lost very heavily.

After this Yeo remained in Kingston, blockaded there by Chauncy for most of the time; on Nov.

10th he came out and was at once chased back into port by Chauncy, leaving the latter for the rest of the season entirely undisturbed.

Accordingly, Chauncy was able to convert his small schooners into transports.

On the 17th these transports were used to convey 1,100 men of the army of General Harrison from the mouth of the Genesee to Sackett's Harbor, while Chauncy blockaded Yeo in Kingston.

The duty of transporting troops and stores went on till the 27th, when every thing had been accomplished; and a day or two afterward navigation closed.

As between the Americans and British, the success of the season was greatly in favor of the former.

They had uncontested control over the lake from April 19th to June 3d, and from Sept.

28th to Nov.

29th, in all 107 days; while their foes only held it from June 3d to July 21st, or for 48 days; and from that date to Sept.

28th, for 69 days, the two sides were contending for the mastery.

York and Fort George had been taken, while the attack on Sackett's Harbor was repulsed.

The Americans lost but two schooners, both of which were recaptured; while the British had one 24-gun-ship nearly ready for launching destroyed, and one 10-gun brig taken, and the loss inflicted upon each other in transports, gun-boats, store-houses, stores, etc. , was greatly in favor of the former.

Chauncy's fleet, moreover, was able to co-operate with the army for over twice the length of time Yeo's could (107 days to 48).

It is more difficult to decide between the respective merits of the two commanders.

We had shown so much more energy than the Anglo-Canadians that at the beginning of the year we had overtaken them in the building race, and the two fleets were about equally formidable.

The _Madison_ and _Oneida_ were not quite a match for the _Royal George_ and _Sydney Smith_ (opposing 12 32-pound and 8 24-pound carronades to 2 long 18's, 1 long 12, 1 68-pound and 13 32-pound carronades); and our ten gun-schooners would hardly be considered very much of an overmatch for the _Melville_, _Motra_, and _Beresford_.

Had Sir James Yeo been as bold and energetic as Barclay or Mulcaster he would certainly not have permitted the Americans, when the forces were so equal, to hold uncontested sway over the lake, and by reducing Fort George, to cause disaster to the British land forces.

It would certainly have been better to risk a battle with equal forces, than to wait till each fleet received an additional ship, which rendered Chauncy's squadron the superior by just about the superiority of the _Pike_ to the _Wolfe_.

Again, Yeo did not do particularly well in the repulse before Sackett's Harbor; in the skirmish off Genesee river he showed a marked lack of resource; and in the action of the 28th of September (popularly called the "Burlington Races" from the celerity of his retreat) he evinced an amount of caution that verged toward timidity, in allowing the entire brunt of the fighting to fall on Mulcaster in the _Royal George_, a weaker ship than the _Wolfe_.

On the other hand, he gave able co-operation to the army while he possessed control of the lake;

he made a most gallant and successful attack on a superior force on the 10th of August; and for six weeks subsequently by skilful manoeuvring he prevented this same superior force from acquiring the uncontested mastery.

It was no disgrace to be subsequently blockaded; but it is very ludicrous in his admirers to think that he came out first best.

Chauncy rendered able and invaluable assistance to the army all the while that he had control of the water; his attacks on York and Fort George were managed with consummate skill and success, and on the 28th of September he practically defeated the opposing force with his own ship alone.

Nevertheless he can by no means be said to have done the best he could with the materials he had.

His stronger fleet was kept two months in check by a weaker British fleet.

When he first encountered the foe, on August 10th, he ought to have inflicted such a check upon him as would at least have confined him to port and given the Americans immediate superiority on the lake; instead of which he suffered a mortifying, although not at all disastrous, defeat, which allowed the British to contest the supremacy with him for six weeks longer.

On the 28th of September, when he only gained a rather barren victory, it was nothing but excessive caution that prevented him from utterly destroying his foe.

Had Perry on that day commanded the American fleet there would have been hardly a British ship left on Ontario.

Chauncy was an average commander; and the balance of success inclined to the side of the Americans only because they showed greater energy and skill in shipbuilding, the crews and commanders on both sides being very nearly equal.

Lake Erie.

Captain Oliver Hazard Perry had assumed command of Erie and the upper lakes, acting under Commodore Chauncy.

With intense energy he at once began creating a naval force which should be able to contend successfully with the foe.

As already said, the latter in the beginning had exclusive control of Lake Erie; but the Americans had captured the _Caledonia_, brig, and purchased three schooners, afterward named the _Somers_, _Tigress_, and _Ohio_, and a sloop, the _Trippe_.

These at first were blockaded in the Niagara, but after the fall of Fort George and retreat of the British forces, Captain Perry was enabled to get them out, tracking them up against the current by the most arduous labor.

They ran up to Presque Isle (now called Erie), where two 20-gun brigs were being constructed under the directions of the indefatigable captain.

Three other schooners, the _Ariel_, _Scorpion_, and _Porcupine_, were also built.

The harbor of Erie was good and spacious, but had a bar on which there was less than seven feet of water.

Hitherto this had prevented the enemy from getting in; now it prevented the two brigs from getting out.

Captain Robert Heriot Barclay had been appointed commander of the British forces on Lake Erie; and he was having built at Amherstburg a 20-gun ship.

Meanwhile he blockaded Perry's force, and as the brigs could not cross the bar with their guns in, or except in smooth water, they of course could not do so in his presence.

He kept a close blockade for some time; but on the 2d of August he disappeared.

Perry at once hurried forward every thing;

and on the 4th, at 2 P. M.

, one brig, the _Lawrence_, was towed to that point of the bar where the water was deepest.

Her guns were whipped out and landed on the beach, and the brig got over the bar by a hastily improvised "camel."

"Two large scows, prepared for the purpose, were hauled alongside, and the work of lifting the brig proceeded as fast as possible.

Pieces of massive timber had been run through the forward and after ports, and when the scows were sunk to the water's edge, the ends of the timbers were blocked up, supported by these floating foundations.

The plugs were now put in the scows, and the water was pumped out of them.

By this process the brig was lifted quite two feet, though when she was got on the bar it was found that she still drew too much water.

It became necessary, in consequence, to cover up every thing, sink the scows anew, and block up the timbers afresh.

This duty occupied the whole night."

[Footnote: Cooper, ii, 389. Perry's letter of Aug.

5th is very brief.

] Just as the _Lawrence_ had passed the bar, at 8 A. M.

on the 5th, the enemy reappeared, but too late; Captain Barclay exchanged a few shots with the schooners and then drew off.

The _Niagara_ crossed without difficulty.

There were still not enough men to man the vessels, but a draft arrived from Ontario, and many of the frontiersmen volunteered, while soldiers also were sent on board.

The squadron sailed on the 18th in pursuit of the enemy, whose ship was now ready.

After cruising about some time the _Ohio_ was sent down the lake, and the other ships went into Put-in Bay.

On the 9th of September Captain Barclay put out from Amherstburg, being so short of provisions that he felt compelled to risk an action with the superior force opposed.

On the 10th of September his squadron was discovered from the mast-head of the _Lawrence_ in the northwest.

Before going into details of the action we will examine the force of the two squadrons, as the accounts vary considerably.

The tonnage of the British ships, as already stated, we know exactly, they having been all carefully appraised and measured by the builder Mr. Henry Eckford, and two sea-captains.

We also know the dimensions of the American ships.

The _Lawrence_ and _Niagara_ measured 480 tons apiece.

The _Caledonia_, brig, was about the size of the _Hunter_, or 180 tons.

The _Tigress_, _Somers_, and _Scorpion_ were subsequently captured by the foe and were then said to measure, respectively, 96, 94, and 86 tons; in which case they were larger than similar boats on Lake Ontario.

The _Ariel_ was about the size of the _Hamilton_;

the _Porcupine_ and _Trippe_ about the size of the _Asp_ and _Pert_.

As for the guns, Captain Barclay in his letter gives a complete account of those on board his squadron.

He has also given a complete account of the American guns, which is most accurate, and, if any thing, underestimates them.

At least Emmons in his "History" gives the _Trippe_ a long 32, while Barclay says she had only a long 24;

and Lossing in his "Field-Book" says (but I do not know on what authority) that the _Caledonia_ had 3 long 24's, while Barclay gives her 2 long 24's and one 32-pound carronade; and that the _Somers_ had two long 32's, while Barclay gives her one long 32 and one 24-pound carronade.

I shall take Barclay's account, which corresponds with that of Emmons; the only difference being that Emmons puts a 24-pounder on the _Scorpion_ and a 32 on the _Trippe_, while Barclay reverses this.

I shall also follow Emmons in giving the _Scorpion_ a 32-pound carronade instead of a 24. It is more difficult to give the strength of the respective crews.

James says the Americans had 580, all "picked men."

They were just as much picked men as Barclay's were, and no more; that is, the ships had "scratch" crews.

Lieutenant Emmons gives Perry 490 men; and Lossing says he "had upon his muster-roll 490 names."

In vol. xiv, p. 566, of the American State Papers, is a list of the prize-monies owing to each man (or to the survivors of the killed), which gives a grand total of 532 men, including 136 on the _Lawrence_ and 155 on the _Niagara_, 45 of whom were volunteers--frontiersmen.

Deducting these we get 487 men, which is pretty near Lieutenant Emmons' 490. Possibly Lieutenant Emmons did not include these volunteers; and it may be that some of the men whose names were down on the prize list had been so sick that they were left on shore.

Thus Lieutenant Yarnall testified before a Court of Inquiry in 1815, that there were but 131 men and boys of every description on board the _Lawrence_ in the action; and the _Niagara_ was said to have had but 140. Lieutenant Yarnall also said that "but 103 men on board the _Lawrence_ were fit for duty"; as Captain Perry in his letter said that 31 were unfit for duty, this would make a total of 134. So I shall follow the prize-money list; at any rate the difference in number is so slight as to be immaterial.

Of the 532 men whose names the list gives, 45 were volunteers, or landsmen, from among the surrounding inhabitants;

158 were marines or soldiers (I do not know which, as the list gives marines, soldiers, and privates, and it is impossible to tell which of the two former heads include the last); and 329 were officers, seamen, cooks, pursers, chaplains, and supernumeraries.

Of the total number, there were on the day of action, according to Perry's report, 116 men unfit for duty, including 31 on board the _Lawrence_, 28 on board the _Niagara_, and 57 on the small vessels.

All the later American writers put the number of men in Barclay's fleet precisely at "502," but I have not been able to find out the original authority.

James ("Naval Occurrences," p. 289) says the British had but 345, consisting of 50 seamen, 85 Canadians, and 210 soldiers.

But the letter of Adjutant-General E. Bayne, Nov.

24, 1813, states that there were 250 soldiers aboard Barclay's squadron, of whom 23 were killed, 49 wounded, and the balance (178) captured;

and James himself on a previous page (284) states that there were 102 Canadians on Barclay's vessels, not counting the _Detroit_, and we know that Barclay originally joined the squadron with 19 sailors from the Ontario fleet, and that subsequently 50 sailors came up from the _Dover_, James gives at the end of his "Naval Occurrences" some extracts from the court-martial held on Captain Barclay.

Lieut.

Thomas Stokes, of the _Queen Charlotte_, there testified that he had on board "between 120 and 130 men, officers and all together," of whom "16 came up from the _Dover_ three days before."

James, on p. 284, says her crew already consisted of 110 men; adding these 16 gives us 126 (almost exactly "between 120 and 130").

Lieutenant Stokes also testified that the _Detroit_ had more men on account of being a larger and heavier vessel; to give her 150 is perfectly safe, as her heavier guns and larger size would at least need 24 men more than the _Queen Charlotte_.

James gives the _Lady Prevost_ 76, _Hunter_ 39, _Little Belt_ 15, and _Chippeway_ 13 men, Canadians and soldiers, a total of 143; supposing that the number of British sailors placed on them was proportional to the amount placed on board the _Queen Charlotte_, we could add 21. This would make a grand total of 440 men, which must certainly be near the truth.

This number is corroborated otherwise: General Bayne, as already quoted, says that there were aboard 250 soldiers, of whom 72 were killed or wounded.

Barclay reports a total loss of 135, of whom 63 must therefore have been sailors or Canadians, and if the loss suffered by these bore the same proportion to their whole number as in the case of the soldiers, there ought to have been 219 sailors and Canadians, making in all 469 men.

It can thus be said with certainty that there were between 440 and 490 men aboard, and I shall take the former number, though I have no doubt that this is too small.

But it is not a point of very much importance, as the battle was fought largely at long range, where the number of men, provided there were plenty to handle the sails and guns, did not much matter.

The following statement of the comparative force must therefore be very nearly accurate: PERRY'S SQUADRON.

Crew Broad Total fit for side;

Name.

Rig.

Tons.

Crew.

Duty.

lbs.

Armament.

_Lawrence_, brig 480 136 105 300 -+- 2 long 12's '-18 short 32's _Niagara_, " 480 155 127 300 -+- 2 long 12's |-18 short 32's _Caledonia_, " 180 53-+ 80 -+- 2 long 24's | '- 1 short 32 _Ariel_, schooner 112 36 | 48 4 long 12's _Scorpion_, " 86 35 | 64 -+- 1 " 32 | '- 1 short 32 _Somers_, " 86 35 +- 184 56 -+- 1 long 24 | '- 1 short 32 _Porcupine_, " 83 25 | 32 1 long 32 _Tigress_, " 96 27 | 32 1 " 32 _Trippe_, sloop 60 35-+ 24 1 " 24 --------- ---- --- ---- --- --------------- 9 vessels, 1,671 532 (416) 936 lbs.

During the action, however, the _Lawrence_ and _Niagara_ each fought a long 12 instead of one of the carronades on the engaged side, making a broadside of 896 lbs.

, 288 lbs.

being from long guns.

BARCLAY'S SQUADRON.

Broadside;

Name.

Rig.

Tons.

Crew.

lbs.

Armament.

,- 1 long 18 | 2 " 24's _Detroit_, Ship 490 150 138 -+ 6 " 12's | 2 " 24's | 8 " 9's | 1 short 24 '- 1 " 18 ,- 1 long 12 _Queen Charlotte_, " 400 126 189 -+ 2 " 9's '-14 short 24's _Lady Prevost_, schooner 230 86 75 -+- 1 long 9 | 2 " 6's '- 10 short 12's _Hunter_, brig 180 45 30 -+- 4 long 6's | 2 " 4's | 2 " 2's '- 2 short 12's _Chippeway_, schooner 70 15 9 1 long 9 _Little Belt_, sloop 90 18 18 -+- 1 " 12 '- 2 " 6's -------- ---- --- ------ 6 vessels 1460 440 459 lbs.

These six vessels thus threw at a broadside 459 lbs.

, of which 195 were from long guns.

The superiority of the Americans in long-gun metal was therefore nearly as three is to two, and in carronade metal greater than two to one.

The chief fault to be found in the various American accounts is that they sedulously conceal the comparative weight of metal, while carefully specifying the number of guns.

Thus, Lossing says: "Barclay had 35 long guns to Perry's 15, and possessed greatly the advantage in action at a distance"; which he certainly did not.

The tonnage of the fleets is not so very important; the above tables are probably pretty nearly right.

It is, I suppose, impossible to tell exactly the number of men in the two crews.

Barclay almost certainly had more than the 440 men I have given him, but in all likelihood some of them were unfit for duty, and the number of his effectives was most probably somewhat less than Perry's. As the battle was fought in such smooth water, and part of the time at long range, this, as already said, does not much matter.

The Niagara might be considered a match for the Detroit, and the Lawrence and Caledonia for the five other British vessels; so the Americans were certainly very greatly superior in force.

At daylight on Sept.

10th Barclay's squadron was discovered in the N.

W.

, and Perry at once got under weigh; the wind soon shifted to the N. E.

, giving us the weather-gage, the breeze being very light.

Barclay lay to in a close column, heading to the S. W in the following order: _Chippeway_, _Master's Mate J. Campbell; _Detroit_, Captain R. H.

Barclay; _Hunter_, Lieutenant G. Bignall; _Queen Charlotte_, Captain R. Finnis; _Lady Prevost_, Lieutenant Edward Buchan; and _Little Belt_, by whom commanded is not said.

Perry came down with the wind on his port beam, and made the attack in column ahead, obliquely.

First in order came the _Ariel_, Lieut.

John H. Packet, and _Scorpion_, Sailing-Master Stephen Champlin, both being on the weather bow of the _Lawrence_, Captain O. H.

Perry; next came the _Caledonia_, Lieut.

Daniel Turner; _Niagara_, Captain Jesse D. Elliott; _Somers_, Lieutenant A. H.

M.

Conklin;

_Porcupine_, Acting Master George Serrat; _Tigress_, Sailing-Master Thomas C. Almy, and _Trippe_, Lieutenant Thomas Holdup.

[Footnote: The accounts of the two commanders tally almost exactly.

Barclay's letter is a model of its kind for candor and generosity.

Letter of Captain R. H.

Barclay to Sir James.

Sept.

2, 1813; of Lieutenant Inglis to Captain Barclay, Sept.

10th; of Captain Perry to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept.

10th and Sept.

13th, and to General Harrison, Sept.

11th and Sept.

13th.

I have relied mainly on Lossing's "Field-Book of the War of 1812" (especially for the diagrams furnished him by Commodore Champlin), on Commander Ward's "Naval Tactics," p. 76, and on Cooper's "Naval History."

Extracts from the court-martial on Captain Barclay are given in James' "Naval Occurrences," lxxxiii.

] As, amid light and rather baffling winds, the American squadron approached the enemy, Perry's straggling line formed an angle of about fifteen degrees with the more compact one of his foes.

At 11. 45 the Detroit opened the action by a shot from her long 24, which fell short; at 11. 50 she fired a second which went crashing through the _Lawrence_, and was replied to by the _Scorpion's_ long 32. At 11. 55 the _Lawrence_, having shifted her port bow-chaser, opened with both the long 12's, and at meridian began with her carronades, but the shot from the latter all fell short.

At the same time the action became general on both sides, though the rearmost American vessels were almost beyond the range of their own guns, and quite out of range of the guns of their antagonists.

Meanwhile the _Lawrence_ was already suffering considerably as she bore down on the enemy.

[Illustration: The Battle of Lake Eire: a painting done for Thomas Brownell, sailing master of the _Ariel_, by George I. Cook in 1815-16. The composition was inspected for accuracy by Commodore Perry and three other officers as well as by Brownell himself, "all of whom," he wrote years later, "were in the battle, and in whose minds all its incidents, the positions of the fleets & appearance of the vessels was fresh.

In the last two particulars the picture is the product of our joined opinions and recollections; it is, therefore, to be presumed that it is a correct representation of that naval combat."

Here published for the first time, it depicts the second stage of the battle, in which Perry, having transferred his flag to the _Niagara_, brought the entire American squadron into action.

The vessels, from left to right, are American unless denoted (Br): _Lady Prevost_ (Br), _Trippe_, _Chippeway_ (Br), _Caledonia_, _Niagara_, _Detroit_ (Br), _Queen Charlotte_ (Br), _Hunter_ (Br), _Scorpion_, _Ariel_, _Porcupine_, and _Lawrence_.

(Courtesy U. S.

Naval Academy Museum)] It was twenty minutes before she succeeded in getting within good carronade range, and during that time the action at the head of the line was between the long guns of the _Chippeway_ and _Detroit_, throwing 123 pounds, and those of the _Scorpion_, _Ariel_, and _Lawrence_, throwing 104 pounds.

As the enemy's fire was directed almost exclusively at the _Lawrence_ she suffered a great deal.

The _Caledonia_, _Niagara_, and _Somers_ were meanwhile engaging, at long range, the _Hunter_ and _Queen Charlotte_, opposing from their long guns 96 pounds to the 39 pounds of their antagonists, while from a distance the three other American gun-vessels engaged the _Prevost_ and _Little Belt_.

By 12. 20 the _Lawrence_ had worked down to close quarters, and at 12. 30 the action was going on with great fury between her and her antagonists, within canister range.

The raw and inexperienced American crews committed the same fault the British so often fell into on the ocean, and overloaded their carronades.

In consequence, that of the _Scorpion_ upset down the hatchway in the middle of the action, and the sides of the _Detroit_ were dotted with marks from shot that did not penetrate.

One of the _Ariel's_ long 12's also burst.

Barclay fought the _Detroit_ exceedingly well, her guns being most excellently aimed, though they actually had to be discharged by flashing pistols at the touchholes, so deficient was the ship's equipment.

Meanwhile the _Caledonia_ came down too, but the _Niagara_ was wretchedly handled, Elliott keeping at a distance which prevented the use either of his carronades or of those of the _Queen Charlotte_, his antagonist; the latter, however, suffered greatly from the long guns of the opposing schooners, and lost her gallant commander, Captain Finnis, and first lieutenant, Mr. Stokes, who were killed early in the action; her next in command, Provincial Lieutenant Irvine, perceiving that he could do no good, passed the _Hunter_ and joined in the attack on the _Lawrence_, at close quarters.

The _Niagara_, the most efficient and best-manned of the American vessels, was thus almost kept out of the action by her captain's misconduct.

At the end of the line the fight went on at long range between the _Somers_, _Tigress_, _Porcupine_, and _Trippe_ on one side, and _Little Belt_ and _Lady Prevost_ on the other; the _Lady Prevost_ making a very noble fight, although her 12-pound carronades rendered her almost helpless against the long guns of the Americans.

She was greatly cut up, her commander, Lieutenant Buchan, was dangerously, and her acting first lieutenant, Mr. Roulette, severely wounded, and she began falling gradually to leeward.

The fighting at the head of the line was fierce and bloody to an extraordinary degree.

The _Scorpion_, _Ariel_, _Lawrence_, and _Caledonia_, all of them handled with the most determined courage, were opposed to the _Chippeway_, _Detroit_, _Queen Charlotte_, and _Hunter_, which were fought to the full as bravely.

At such close quarters the two sides engaged on about equal terms, the Americans being superior in weight of metal, and inferior in number of men.

But the _Lawrence_ had received such damage in working down as to make the odds against Perry.

On each side almost the whole fire was directed at the opposing large vessel or vessels; in consequence the _Queen Charlotte_ was almost disabled, and the _Detroit_ was also frightfully shattered, especially by the raking fire of the gun-boats, her first lieutenant, Mr. Garland, being mortally wounded, and Captain Barclay so severely injured that he was obliged to quit the deck, leaving his ship in the command of Lieutenant George Inglis.

But on board the _Lawrence_ matters had gone even worse, the combined fire of her adversaries having made the grimmest carnage on her decks.

Of the 103 men who were fit for duty when she began the action, 83, or over four fifths, were killed or wounded.

The vessel was shallow, and the ward-room, used as a cockpit, to which the wounded were taken, was mostly above water, and the shot came through it continually, killing and wounding many men under the hands of the surgeon.

The first lieutenant, Yarnall, was three times wounded, but kept to the deck through all; the only other lieutenant on board, Brooks, of the marines, was mortally wounded.

Every brace and bowline was shot away, and the brig almost completely dismantled; her hull was shattered to pieces, many shot going completely through it, and the guns on the engaged side were by degrees all dismounted.

Perry kept up the fight with splendid courage.

As the crew fell one by one, the commodore called down through the skylight for one of the surgeon's assistants; and this call was repeated and obeyed till none were left; then he asked, "Can any of the wounded pull a rope?"

and three or four of them crawled up on deck to lend a feeble hand in placing the last guns.

Perry himself fired the last effective heavy gun, assisted only by the purser and chaplain.

A man who did not possess his indomitable spirit would have then struck.

Instead, however, although failing in the attack so far, Perry merely determined to win by new methods, and remodelled the line accordingly.

Mr. Turner, in the _Caledonia_, when ordered to close, had put his helm up, run down on the opposing line, and engaged at very short range, though the brig was absolutely without quarters.

The _Niagara_ had thus become the next in line astern of the _Lawrence_, and the sloop _Trippe_, having passed the three schooners in front of her, was next ahead.

The _Niagara_ now, having a breeze, steered for the head of Barclay's line, passing over a quarter of a mile to windward of the _Lawrence_, on her port beam.

She was almost uninjured, having so far taken very little part in the combat, and to her Perry shifted his flag.

Leaping into a row boat, with his brother and four seamen, he rowed to the fresh brig, where he arrived at 2. 30, and at once sent Elliott astern to hurry up the three schooners.

The _Trippe_ was now very near the _Caledonia_.

The _Lawrence_, having but 14 sound men left, struck her colors, but could not be taken possession of before the action re-commenced.

She drifted astern, the _Caledonia_ passing between her and her foes.

At 2. 45, the schooners having closed up, Perry, in his fresh vessel, bore up to break Barclay's line.

The British ships had fought themselves to a standstill.

The _Lady Prevost_ was crippled and sagged to leeward, though ahead of the others.

The _Detroit_ and _Queen Charlotte_ were so disabled that they could not effectually oppose fresh antagonists.

There could thus be but little resistance to Perry, as the _Niagara_ stood down, and broke the British line, firing her port guns into the _Chippeway_, _Little Belt_, and _Lady Prevost_, and the starboard ones into the _Detroit_, _Queen Charlotte_, and _Hunter_, raking on both sides.

Too disabled to tack, the _Detroit_ and _Charlotte_ tried to wear, the latter running up to leeward of the former; and, both vessels having every brace and almost every stay shot away, they fell foul.

The _Niagara_ luffed athwart their bows, within half pistol-shot, keeping up a terrific discharge of great guns and musketry, while on the other side the British vessels were raked by the _Caledonia_ and the schooners so closely that some of their grape shot, passing over the foe, rattled through Perry's spars.

Nothing further could be done, and Barclay's flag was struck at 3 P. M.

, after three and a quarter hours' most gallant and desperate fighting.