Naval War of 1812 — 12 Part 12

There happened to be circumstances which rendered the bragging of our writers over the victory somewhat plausible.

Thus they could say with an appearance of truth that the enemy had 63 guns to our 54, and outnumbered us.

In reality, as well as can be ascertained from the conflicting evidence, he was inferior in number; but a few men more or less mattered nothing.

Both sides had men enough to work the guns and handle the ships, especially as the fight was in smooth water, and largely at long range.

The important fact was that though we had nine guns less, yet, at a broadside, they threw half as much metal again as those of our antagonist.

With such odds in our favor it would have been a disgrace to have been beaten.

The water was too smooth for our two brigs to show at their best; but this very smoothness rendered our gun-boats more formidable than any of the British vessels, and the British testimony is unanimous, that it was to them the defeat was primarily due.

The American fleet came into action in worse form than the hostile squadron, the ships straggling badly, either owing to Perry having formed his line badly, or else to his having failed to train the subordinate commanders how to keep their places.

The Niagara was not fought well at first, Captain Elliott keeping her at a distance that prevented her from doing any damage to the vessels opposed, which were battered to pieces by the gun-boats without the chance of replying.

It certainly seems as if the small vessels at the rear of the line should have been closer up, and in a position to render more effectual assistance;

the attack was made in too loose order, and, whether it was the fault of Perry or of his subordinates, it fails to reflect credit on the Americans.

Cooper, as usual, praises all concerned; but in this instance not with very good judgment.

He says the line-of-battle was highly judicious, but this may be doubted.

The weather was peculiarly suitable for the gun-boats, with their long, heavy guns;

and yet the line-of-battle was so arranged as to keep them in the rear and let the brunt of the assault fall on the _Lawrence_, with her short carronades.

Cooper again praises Perry for steering for the head of the enemy's line, but he could hardly have done any thing else.

In this battle the firing seems to have been equally skilful on both sides, the _Detroit's_ long guns being peculiarly well served;

but the British captains manoeuvred better than their foes at first, and supported one another better, so that the disparity in damage done on each side was not equal to the disparity in force.

The chief merit of the American commander and his followers was indomitable courage, and determination not to be beaten.

This is no slight merit;

but it may well be doubted if it would have ensured victory had Barclay's force been as strong as Perry's. Perry made a headlong attack; his superior force, whether through his fault or his misfortune can hardly be said, being brought into action in such a manner that the head of the line was crushed by the inferior force opposed.

Being literally hammered out of his own ship, Perry brought up its powerful twin-sister, and the already shattered hostile squadron was crushed by sheer weight.

The manoeuvres which marked the close of the battle, and which ensured the capture of all the opposing ships, were unquestionably very fine.

The British ships were fought as resolutely as their antagonists, not being surrendered till they were crippled and helpless, and almost all the officers, and a large proportion of the men placed _hors de combat_.

Captain Barclay handled his ships like a first-rate seaman.

It was impossible to arrange them so as to be superior to his antagonist, for the latter's force was of such a nature that in smooth water his gun-boats gave him a great advantage, while in any sea his two brigs were more than a match for the whole British squadron.

In short, our victory was due to our heavy metal.

As regards the honor of the affair, in spite of the amount of boasting it has given rise to, I should say it was a battle to be looked upon as in an equally high degree creditable to both sides.

Indeed, if it were not for the fact that the victory was so complete, it might be said that the length of the contest and the trifling disparity in loss reflected rather the most credit on the British.

Captain Perry showed indomitable pluck, and readiness to adapt himself to circumstances;

but his claim to fame rests much less on his actual victory than on the way in which he prepared the fleet that was to win it.

Here his energy and activity deserve all praise, not only for his success in collecting sailors and vessels and in building the two brigs, but above all for the manner in which he succeeded in getting them out on the lake.

On _that_ occasion he certainly out-generalled Barclay;

indeed the latter committed an error that the skill and address he subsequently showed could not retrieve.

But it will always be a source of surprise that the American public should have so glorified Perry's victory over an inferior force, and have paid comparatively little attention to Macdonough's victory, which really was won against decided odds in ships, men, and metal.

There are always men who consider it unpatriotic to tell the truth, if the truth is not very flattering; but, aside from the morality of the case, we never can learn how to produce a certain effect unless we know rightly what the causes were that produced a similar effect in times past.

Lake Erie teaches us the advantage of having the odds on our side; Lake Champlain, that, even if they are not, skill can still counteract them.

It is amusing to read some of the pamphlets written "in reply" to Cooper's account of this battle, the writers apparently regarding him as a kind of traitor for hinting that the victory was not "Nelsonic," "unsurpassed," etc. The arguments are stereotyped: Perry had 9 fewer guns, and also fewer men than the foe.

This last point is the only one respecting which there is any doubt.

Taking sick and well together, the Americans unquestionably had the greatest number in crew; but a quarter of them were sick.

Even deducting these they were still, in all probability, more numerous than their foes.

But it is really not a point of much consequence, as both sides had enough, as stated, to serve the guns and handle the ships.

In sea-fights, after there are enough hands for those purposes additional ones are not of so much advantage.

I have in all my accounts summed up as accurately as possible the contending forces, because it is so customary with British writers to follow James' minute and inaccurate statements, that I thought it best to give every thing exactly; but it was really scarcely necessary, and, indeed, it is impossible to compare forces numerically.

Aside from a few exceptional cases, the number of men, after a certain point was reached, made little difference.

For example, the _Java_ would fight just as effectually with 377 men, the number James gives her, as with 426, the number I think she really had.

Again, my figures make the _Wasp_ slightly superior in force to the _Frolic_, as she had 25 men the most; but in reality, as the battle was fought under very short sail, and decided purely by gunnery, the difference in number of crew was not of the least consequence.

The Hornet had nine men more than the _Penguin_, and it would be absurd to say that this gave her much advantage.

In both the latter cases, the forces were practically equal, although, numerically expressed, the odds were in favor of the Americans.

The exact reverse is the case in the last action of the _Constitution_.

Here, the _Levant_ and _Cyane_ had all the men they required, and threw a heavier broadside than their foe.

Expressed in numbers, the odds against them were not great, but numbers could not express the fact that carronades were opposed to long guns, and two small ships to one big one.

Again, though in the action on Lake Champlain numbers do show a slight advantage both in weight of metal and number of men on the British side, they do not make the advantage as great as it really was, for they do not show that the British possessed a frigate with a main-deck battery of 24-pounders, which was equal to the two chief vessels of the Americans, exactly as the _Constitution_ was superior to the _Cyane_ and _Levant_.

[Footnote: It must always be remembered that these rules cut both ways.

British writers are very eloquent about the disadvantage in which carronades placed the _Cyane_ and _Levant_, but do not hint that the _Essex_ suffered from a precisely similar cause, in addition to her other misfortunes; either they should give the _Constitution_ more credit or the _Phoebe_ less.

So the _Confiance_, throwing 480 pounds of metal at a broadside, was really equal to both the _Eagle_ and _Saratoga_, who jointly threw 678. From her long guns she threw 384 pounds, from her carronades 96. Their long guns threw 168, their carronades 510. Now the 32-pound carronade mounted on the spar-deck of a 38-gun frigate, was certainly much less formidable than the long 18 on the main-deck; indeed, it probably ranked more nearly with a long 12, in the ordinary chances of war (and it must be remembered that Downie was the attacking party and chose his own position, so far as Macdonough's excellent arrangements would let him.

) So that in comparing the forces, the carronades should not be reckoned for more than half the value of the long guns, and we get, as a mere approximation, 384 + 48 = 432, against 168 + 255 = 423. At any rate, British writers, as well as Americans, should remember that if the _Constitution_ was greatly superior to her two foes, then the _Confiance_ was certainly equal to the _Eagle_ and _Saratoga_; and _vica versa_.

] And on the same principles I think that every fair-minded man must admit the great superiority of Perry's fleet over Barclay's, though the advantage was greater in carronades than in long guns.

But to admit this by no means precludes us from taking credit for the victory.

Almost all the victories gamed by the English over the Dutch in the 17th century were due purely to great superiority in force.

The cases have a curious analogy to this lake battle.

Perry won with 54 guns against Barclay's 63; but the odds were largely in his favor.

Blake won a doubtful victory on the 18th of February, 1653, with 80 ships against Tromp's 70; but the English vessels were twice the size of the Dutch, and in number of men and weight of metal greatly their superior.

The English were excellent fighters, but no better than the Dutch, and none of their admirals of that period deserve to rank with De Ruyter.

Again, the great victory of La Hogue was won over a very much smaller French fleet, after a day's hard fighting, which resulted in the capture of _one_ vessel!

This victory was most exultingly chronicled, yet it was precisely as if Perry had fought Barclay all day and only succeeded in capturing the _Little Belt_.

Most of Lord Nelson's successes were certainly won against heavy odds by his great genius and the daring skill of the captains who served under him; but the battle of the Baltic, as far as the fighting went, reflected as much honor on the defeated Danes as on the mighty sea-chief who conquered them.

Many a much-vaunted victory, both on sea and land, has really reflected less credit on the victors than the battle of Lake Erie did on the Americans.

And it must always be remembered that a victory, honorably won, if even over a weaker foe, _does_ reflect credit on the nation by whom it is gained.

It was creditable to us as a nation that our ships were better made and better armed than the British frigates, exactly as it was creditable to them that a few years before their vessels had stood in the same relation to the Dutch ships.

[Footnote: After Lord Duncan's victory at Camperdown, James chronicled the fact that all the captured line-of-battle ships were such poor craft as not to be of as much value as so many French frigates.

This at least showed that the Dutch sailors must have done well to have made such a bloody and obstinate fight as they did, with the materials they had.

According to his own statements the loss was about proportional to the forces in action.

It was another parallel to Perry's victory.

] It was greatly to our credit that we had been enterprising enough to fit out such an effective little flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this Perry deserves the highest praise.

[Footnote: Some of my countrymen will consider this but scant approbation, to which the answer must be that a history is not a panegyric.

] Before leaving the subject it is worth while making a few observations on the men who composed the crews.

James, who despised a Canadian as much as he hated an American, gives as one excuse for the defeat, the fact that most of Barclay's crew were Canadians, whom he considers to be "sorry substitutes."

On each side the regular sailors, from the seaboard, were not numerous enough to permit the battle to be fought purely by them.

Barclay took a number of soldiers of the regular army, and Perry a number of militia, aboard; the former had a few Indian sharp-shooters, the latter quite a number of negroes.

A great many men in each fleet were lake sailors, frontiersmen, and these were the especial objects of James' contempt; but it may be doubted if they, thoroughly accustomed to lake navigation, used to contests with Indians and whites, naturally forced to be good sailors, and skilful in the use of rifle and cannon, were not, when trained by good men and on their own waters, the very best possible material.

Certainly the battle of Lake Erie, fought mainly by Canadians, was better contested than that of Lake Champlain, fought mainly by British.

The difference between the American and British seamen on the Atlantic was small, but on the lakes what little there was disappeared.

A

New Englander and an Old Englander differed little enough, but they differed more than a frontiersman born north of the line did from one born south of it.

These last two resembled one another more nearly than either did the parent.

There had been no long-established naval school on the lakes, and the British sailors that came up there were the best of their kind; so the combatants were really so evenly matched in courage, skill, and all other fighting qualities, as to make it impossible to award the palm to either for these attributes.

The dogged obstinacy of the fighting, the skilful firing and manoeuvring, and the daring and coolness with which cutting-out expeditions were planned and executed, were as marked on one side as the other.

The only un-English element in the contest was the presence among the Canadian English of some of the descendants of the Latin race from whom they had conquered the country.

Otherwise the men were equally matched, but the Americans owed their success--for the balance of success was largely on their side--to the fact that their officers had been trained in the best and most practical, although the smallest, navy of the day.

The British sailors on the lakes were as good as our own, but no better.

None of their commanders compare with Macdonough.

Perry deserves all praise for the manner in which he got his fleet ready; his victory over Barclay was precisely similar to the quasi-victories of Blake over the Dutch, which have given that admiral such renown.

Blake's success in attacking Spanish and Algerian forts is his true title to fame.

In his engagements with the Dutch fleets (as well as in those of Monk, after him) his claim to merit is no greater and no less than Perry's. Each made a headlong attack, with furious, stubborn courage, and by dint of sheer weight crushed or disabled a greatly inferior foe.

In the fight that took place on Feb.

18, 1653, De Ruyter's ship carried but 34 guns, [Footnote: "La Vie et Les Actions Memorables de Lt. -Amiral Michel De Ruyter" (Amsterdam, 1677), p. 23. By the way, why is Tromp always called Van Tromp by English writers?

It would be quite as correct for a Frenchman to speak of MacNelson.

] and yet with it he captured the _Prosperous_ of 54; which vessel was stronger than any in the Dutch fleet.

The fact that Blake's battles were generally so indecisive must be ascribed to the fact that his opponents were, though inferior in force, superior in skill.

No decisive defeat was inflicted on the Dutch until Tromp's death.

Perry's operations were on a very small, and Blake's on a very large, scale; but whereas Perry left no antagonists to question his claim to victory, Blake's successes were sufficiently doubtful to admit of his antagonists in almost every instance claiming that _they_ had won, or else that it was a draw.

Of course it is absurd to put Perry and Blake on a par, for one worked with a fleet forty times the strength of the other's flotilla; but the way in which the work was done was very similar.

And it must always be remembered that when Perry fought this battle he was but 27 years old; and the commanders of his other vessels were younger still.

Champlain.

The commander on this lake at this time was Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, who had superseded the former commander, Lieutenant Sydney Smith,--whose name was a curious commentary on the close inter-relationship of the two contesting peoples.

The American naval force now consisted of two sloops, the _Growler_ and _Eagle_, each mounting 11 guns, and six galleys, mounting one gun each.

Lieutenant Smith was sent down with his two sloops to harass the British gun-boats, which were stationed round the head of Sorel River, the outlet to Lake Champlain.

On June 3d he chased three gun-boats into the river, the wind being aft, up to within sight of the fort of Isle-aux-noix.

A strong British land-force, under Major-General Taylor, now came up both banks of the narrow stream, and joined the three gun-boats in attacking the sloops.

The latter tried to beat up the stream, but the current was so strong and the wind so light that no headway could be made.

The gun-boats kept out of range of the sloop's guns, while keeping up a hot fire from their long 24's, to which no reply could be made; but the galling fire of the infantry who lined the banks was responded to by showers of grape.

After three hours' conflict, at 12. 30, a 24-pound shot from one of the galleys struck the _Eagle_ under her starboard quarter, and ripped out a whole plank under water.

She sank at once, but it was in such shoal water that she did not settle entirely, and none of the men were drowned.

Soon afterward the _Growler_ had her forestay and main-boom shot away, and, becoming unmanageable, ran ashore and was also captured.

The _Growler_ had 1 killed and 8 wounded, the _Eagle_ 11 wounded;

their united crews, including 34 volunteers, amounted to 112 men.

The British gun-boats suffered no loss; of the troops on shore three were wounded, one dangerously, by grape.

[Footnote: Letter from Major General Taylor (British) to Major-General Stone.

June 3, 1813. Lossing says the loss of the British was "probably at least one hundred,"--on what authority, if any, I do not know.

] Lieutenant Smith had certainly made a very plucky fight, but it was a great mistake to get cooped up in a narrow channel, with wind and current dead against him.

It was a very creditable success to the British, and showed the effectiveness of well-handled gun-boats under certain circumstances.

The possession of these two sloops gave the command of the lake to the British.

Macdonough at once set about building others, but with all his energy the materials at hand were so deficient that he could not get them finished in time.

On July 31st, 1,000 British troops, under Col. J.

Murray, convoyed by Captain Thomas Everard, with the sloops _Chubb_ and _Finch_ (late _Growler_ and _Eagle_) and three gunboats, landed at Plattsburg and destroyed all the barracks and stores both there and at Saranac.

For some reason Colonel Murray left so precipitately that he overlooked a picket of 20 of his men, who were captured; then he made descents on two or three other places, and returned to the head of the lake by Aug.

3d.

Three days afterward, on Aug.

6th, Macdonough completed his three sloops, the _President_, _Montgomery_, and _Preble_, of 7 guns each, and also six gunboats;

which force enabled him to prevent any more plundering expeditions taking place that summer, and to convoy Hampton's troops when they made an abortive effort to penetrate into Canada by the Sorel River on Sept.

21st.

BRITISH LOSS ON THE LAKES DURING 1813.

Name.

Tons Guns Remarks _Ship_.

600 24 Burnt on stocks.

_Gloucester_.

180 10 Taken at York.

_Mary_.

80 3 Burnt.

_Drummond_.

80 3 Captured.

_Lady Gore_.

80 3 " _Schooner_.

80 3 " _Detroit_.

490 19 " _Queen Charlotte_.

400 17 " _Lady Prevost_.

230 13 " _Hunter_.

180 10 " _Chippeway_.

70 1 " _Little Belt_.

90 3 " -------------- ----- ----- 12 vessels 2,560 109 AMERICAN LOSS.

[1] Name.

Tons.

Guns.

Remarks _Growler_.

112 11 Captured _Eagle_.

110 11 " ------------- ----- ---- 2 vessels, 222 22 [Footnote 1: Excluding the _Growler_ and _Julia_ which were recaptured.

] Chapter VII

1814 ON THE OCEAN

_Strictness of the blockade--Cruise of Rodgers--Cruise of the_ Constitution--_Her unsuccessful chase of_ La Pique--_Attack on the_ Alligator--_The_ Essex _captured--The_ Frolic _captured--The_ Peacock _captures the_ Epervier--_Commodore Barney's flotilla--The British in the Chesapeake--The_ Wasp _captures the_ Reindeer _and sinks the_ Avon--_Cruise and loss of the_ Adams--_The privateer_ General Armstrong--_The privateer_ Prince de Neufchatel--_Loss of the gunboats in Lake Borgne--Fighting near New Orleans--Summary_.

During this year the blockade of the American coast was kept up with ever increasing rigor.

The British frigates hovered like hawks off every seaport that was known to harbor any fighting craft; they almost invariably went in couples, to support one another and to lighten, as far as was possible, the severity of their work.

On the northern coasts in particular, the intense cold of the furious winter gales rendered it no easy task to keep the assigned stations; the ropes were turned into stiff and brittle bars, the hulls were coated with ice, and many, both of men and officers, were frost-bitten and crippled.

But no stress of weather could long keep the stubborn and hardy British from their posts.

With ceaseless vigilance they traversed continually the allotted cruising grounds, capturing the privateers, harrying the coasters, and keeping the more powerful ships confined to port; "no American frigate could proceed singly to sea without imminent risk of being crushed by the superior force of the numerous British squadrons."

[Footnote: Captain Broke's letter of challenge to Captain Lawrence.

] But the sloops of war, commanded by officers as skillful as they were daring, and manned by as hardy seamen as ever sailed salt water, could often slip out; generally on some dark night, when a heavy gale was blowing, they would make the attempt, under storm canvas, and with almost invariable success.

The harder the weather, the better was their chance; once clear of the coast the greatest danger ceased, though throughout the cruise the most untiring vigilance was needed.

The new sloops that I have mentioned as being built proved themselves the best possible vessels for this kind of work; they were fast enough to escape from most cruisers of superior force, and were overmatches for any British flush-decked ship, that is, for any thing below the rank of the frigate-built corvettes of the _Cyane's_ class.

The danger of recapture was too great to permit of the prizes being sent in, so they were generally destroyed as soon as captured; and as the cruising grounds were chosen right in the track of commerce, the damage done and consternation caused were very great.

Besides the numerous frigates cruising along the coast in couples or small squadrons, there were two or three places that were blockaded by a heavier force.

One of these was New London, before which cruised a squadron under the direction of Sir Thomas Hardy, in the 74 gun-ship _Ramillies_.

Most of the other cruising squadrons off the coast contained razees or two-deckers.

The boats of the _Hogue_, 74, took part in the destruction of some coasters and fishing-boats at Pettipauge in April; and those of the _Superb_, 74, shared in a similar expedition against Wareham in June.

[Footnote: James, vi.

474. ] The command on the coast of North America was now given to Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane.

The main British force continued to lie in the Chesapeake, where about 50 sail were collected.

During the first part of this year these were under the command of Sir Robert Barrie, but in May he was relieved by Rear-Admiral Cockburn.

[Footnote: James, vi, 437. ] The _President_, 44, Commodore Rodgers, at the beginning of 1814 was still out, cruising among the Barbadoes and West Indies, only making a few prizes of not much value.

She then turned toward the American coast, striking soundings near St. Augustine, and thence proceeding north along the coast to Sandy Hook, which was reached on Feb.

18th.

The light was passed in the night, and shortly afterward several sail were made out, when the _President_ was at once cleared for action.

[Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Feb.

20, 1814. ] One of these strange sail was the _Loire_, 38 (British), Capt. Thomas Brown, which ran down to close the _President_, unaware of her force;

but on discovering her to be a 44, hauled to the wind and made off.

[Footnote: James, vi, 412. ] The _President_ did not pursue, another frigate and a gunbrig being in sight.

[Footnote: "Naval Monument," p. 235. ] This rencontre gave rise to nonsensical boastings on both sides; one American writer calls the _Loire_ the _Plantagenet_, 74;

James, on the other hand, states that the _President_ was afraid to engage the 38-gun frigate, and that the only reason the latter declined the combat was because she was short of men.

The best answer to this is a quotation from his own work (vol. vi, p. 402), that "the admiralty had issued an order that no 18-pounder frigate was voluntarily to engage one of the 24-pounder frigates of America."

Coupling this order with the results of the combats that had already taken place between frigates of these classes, it can always be safely set down as sheer bravado when any talk is made of an American 44 refusing to give battle to a British 38; and it is even more absurd to say that a British line-of-battle ship would hesitate for a minute about engaging _any_ frigate.

On Jan.

1st, the _Constitution_, which had been lying in Boston harbor undergoing complete repairs, put out to sea under the command of Capt. Charles Stewart.

The British 38-gun frigate _Nymphe_ had been lying before the port, but she disappeared long before the _Constitution_ was in condition, in obedience to the order already mentioned.

Capt. Stewart ran down toward the Barbadoes, and on the 14th of February captured and destroyed the British 14-gun schooner _Pictou_, with a crew of 75 men.

After making a few other prizes and reaching the coast of Guiana she turned homeward, and on the 23d of the same month fell in, at the entrance to the Mona passage, with the British 36-gun frigate _Pique_ (late French _Pallas_), Captain Maitland.

The _Constitution_ at once made sail for the _Pique_, steering free; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Stewart, April 8, 1814. ] the latter at first hauled to the wind and waited for her antagonist, but when the latter was still 3 miles distant she made out her force and immediately made all sail to escape; the _Constitution_, however, gained steadily till 8 P. M.

, when the night and thick squally weather caused her to lose sight of the chase.

Captain Maitland had on board the prohibitory order issued by the admiralty, [Footnote: James, vi, 477. ] and acted correctly.

His ship was altogether too light for his antagonist.

James, however, is not satisfied with this, and wishes to prove that _both_ ships were desirous of avoiding the combat.

He says that Capt. Stewart came near enough to count "13 ports and a bridle on the _Pique's_ main-deck," and "saw at once that she was of a class inferior to the _Guerrière_ or _Java_," but "thought the _Pique's_ 18's were 24's, and therefore did not make an effort to bring her to action."

He portrays very picturesquely the grief of the _Pique's_ crew when they find they are not going to engage; how they come aft and request to be taken into action; how Captain Maitland reads them his instructions, but "fails to persuade them that there had been any necessity of issuing them"; and, finally, how the sailors, overcome by woe and indignation, refuse to take their supper-time grog,--which was certainly remarkable.

As the _Constitution_ had twice captured British frigates "with impunity," according to James himself, is it likely that she would now shrink from an encounter with a ship which she "saw at once was of an inferior class" to those already conquered?

Even such abject cowards as James' Americans would not be guilty of so stupid an action.

Of course neither Capt. Stewart nor any one else supposed for an instant that a 36-gun frigate was armed with 24-pounders.

It is worth while mentioning as an instance of how utterly untrustworthy James is in dealing with American affairs, that he says (p. 476) the _Constitution_ had now "what the Americans would call a bad crew," whereas, in her previous battles, all her men had been "picked."

Curiously enough, this is the exact reverse of the truth.

In no case was an American ship manned with a "picked" crew, but the nearest approach to such was the crew the _Constitution_ carried in this and the next cruise, when "she probably possessed as fine a crew as ever manned a frigate.

They were principally New England men, and it has been said of them that they were almost qualified to fight the ship without her officers."

[Footnote: Cooper, ii, 463. ] The statement that such men, commanded by one of the bravest and most skilful captains of our navy, would shrink from attacking a greatly inferior foe, is hardly worth while denying; and, fortunately, such denial is needless, Captain Stewart's account being fully corroborated in the "Memoir of Admiral Durham," written by his nephew, Captain Murray, London, 1846. The _Constitution_ arrived off the port of Marblehead on April 3d, and at 7 A. M.

fell in with the two British 38-gun frigates _Junon_, Captain Upton, and _Tenedos_, Captain Parker.

"The American frigate was standing to the westward with the wind about north by west and bore from the two British frigates about northwest by west.

The _Junon_ and _Tenedos_ quickly hauled up in chase, and the _Constitution_ crowded sail in the direction of Marblehead.

At 9. 30, finding the _Tenedos_ rather gaining upon her, the _Constitution_ started her water and threw overboard a quantity of provisions and other articles.

At 11. 30 she hoisted her colors, and the two British frigates, who were now dropping slowly in the chase, did the same.

At 1. 30 P.

M.

the _Constitution_ anchored in the harbor of Marblehead.

Captain Parker was anxious to follow her into the port, which had no defences;

but the _Tenedos_ was recalled by a signal from the _Junon_."

[Footnote: James, vi, 479. ] Shortly afterward the _Constitution_ again put out, and reached Boston unmolested.

On Jan.

29, 1814, the small U. S.

coasting schooner _Alligator_, of 4 guns and 40 men, Sailing-master R. Basset, was lying at anchor in the mouth of Stone River, S. C.

, when a frigate and a brig were perceived close inshore near the breakers.

Judging from their motions that they would attempt to cut him out when it was dark, Mr. Basset made his preparations accordingly.

[Footnote: Letter of Sailing-master Basset, Jan.

31, 1814. ] At half-past seven six boats were observed approaching cautiously under cover of the marsh, with muffled oars;

on being hailed they cheered and opened with boat carronades and musketry, coming on at full speed; whereupon the _Alligator_ cut her cable and made sail, the wind being light from the southwest;

while the crew opened such a heavy fire on the assailants, who were then not thirty yards off, that they stopped the advance and fell astern.

At this moment the _Alligator_ grounded, but the enemy had suffered so severely that they made no attempt to renew the attack, rowing off down stream.

On board the _Alligator_ two men were killed and two wounded, including the pilot, who was struck down by a grape-shot while standing at the helm; and her sails and rigging were much cut.

The extent of the enemy's loss was never known; next day one of his cutters was picked up at North Edisto, much injured and containing the bodies of an officer and a seaman.

[Footnote: Letter from Commander J. H.

Dent, Feb.

21, 1814. ] For his skill and gallantry Mr. Basset was promoted to a lieutenancy, and for a time his exploit put a complete stop to the cutting-out expeditions along that part of the coast.

The _Alligator_ herself sank in a squall on July 1st, but was afterward raised and refitted.

It is much to be regretted that it is almost impossible to get at the British account of any of these expeditions which ended successfully for the Americans; all such cases are generally ignored by the British historians; so that I am obliged to rely solely upon the accounts of the victors, who, with the best intentions in the world, could hardly be perfectly accurate.

At the close of 1813 Captain Porter was still cruising in the Pacific.

Early in January the _Essex_, now with 255 men aboard, made the South American coast, and on the 12th of that month anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso.

She had in company a prize, re-christened the _Essex Junior_, with a crew of 60 men, and 20 guns, 10 long sixes and 10 eighteen-pound carronades.

Of course she could not be used in a combat with regular cruisers.

On Feb.

8th, the British frigate _Phoebe_, 36, Captain James Hilyar, accompanied by the _Cherub_, 18, Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker, the former carrying 300 and the latter 140 men, [Footnote: They afterward took on board enough men from British merchant-vessels to raise their complements respectively to 320 and 180. ] made their appearance, and apparently proposed to take the _Essex_ by a _coup de main_.

They hauled into the harbor on a wind, the _Cherub_ falling to leeward;

while the _Phoebe_ made the port quarter of the _Essex_, and then, putting her helm down, luffed up on her starboard bow, but 10 or 15 feet distant.

Porter's crew were all at quarters, the powder-boys with slow matches ready to discharge the guns, the boarders standing by, cutlass in hand, to board in the smoke; every thing was cleared for action on both frigates.

Captain Hilyar now probably saw that there was no chance of carrying the _Essex_ by surprise, and, standing on the after-gun, he inquired after Captain Porter's health; the latter returned the inquiry, but warned Hilyar not to fall foul.

The British captain then braced back his yards, remarking that if he did fall aboard it would be purely accidental.

"Well," said Porter, "you have no business where you are; if you touch a rope-yarn of this ship I shall board instantly."

[Footnote: "Life of Farragut," p. 33. ] The _Phoebe_, in her then position, was completely at the mercy of the American ships, and Hilyar, greatly agitated, assured Porter that he meant nothing hostile; and the _Phoebe_ backed down, her yards passing over those of the _Essex_ without touching a rope, and anchored half a mile astern.

Shortly afterward the two captains met on shore, when Hilyar thanked Porter for his behavior, and, on his inquiry, assured him that after thus owing his safety to the latter's forbearance, Porter need be under no apprehension as to his breaking the neutrality.

[Illustration: The _Essex_: a watercolor by Joseph Howard of Salem, circa 1801. (Courtesy Peabody Museum of Salem)] The British ships now began a blockade of the port.

On Feb.

27th, the _Phoebe_ being hove to close off the port, and the _Cherub_ a league to leeward, the former fired a weather-gun; the _Essex_ interpreting this as a challenge, took the crew of the _Essex Junior_ aboard and went out to attack the British frigate.

But the latter did not await the combat; she bore up, set her studding-sails, and ran down to the _Cherub_.

The American officers were intensely irritated over this, and American writers have sneered much at "a British 36 refusing combat with an American 32." But the armaments of the two frigates were so wholly dissimilar that it is hard to make comparison.

When the fight really took place, the Essex was so crippled and the water so smooth that the British ships fought at their own distance;

and as they had long guns to oppose to Porter's carronades, this really made the _Cherub_ more nearly suited to contend with the _Essex_ than the latter was to fight the _Phoebe_.

But when the _Essex_ in fairly heavy weather, with the crew of the _Essex Junior_ aboard, was to windward, the circumstances were very different; she carried as many men and guns as the _Phoebe_, and in close combat, or in a hand-to-hand struggle, could probably have taken her.

Still, Hilyar's conduct in avoiding Porter except when the _Cherub_ was in company was certainly over-cautious, and very difficult to explain in a man of his tried courage.

On March 27th Porter decided to run out of the harbor on the first opportunity, so as to draw away his two antagonists in chase, and let the _Essex Junior_ escape.

This plan had to be tried sooner than was expected.

The two vessels were always ready, the _Essex_ only having her proper complement of 255 men aboard.

On the next day, the 28th, it came on to blow from the south, when the _Essex_ parted her port cable and dragged the starboard anchor to leeward, so she got under way, and made sail; by several trials it had been found that she was faster than the _Phoebe_, and that the _Cherub_ was very slow indeed, so Porter had little anxiety about his own ship, only fearing for his consort.

The British vessels were close in with the weather-most point of the bay, but Porter thought he could weather them, and hauled up for that purpose.

Just as he was rounding the outermost point, which, if accomplished, would have secured his safety, a heavy squall struck the _Essex_, and when she was nearly gunwale under, the main-top-mast went by the board.

She now wore and stood in for the harbor, but the wind had shifted, and on account of her crippled condition she could not gain it; so she bore up and anchored in a small bay, three miles from Valparaiso, and half a mile from a detached Chilian battery of one gun, the _Essex_ being within pistol-shot of the shore.

[Footnote: Letter of Captain David Porter, July 3, 1814. ] The _Phoebe_ and _Cherub_ now bore down upon her, covered with ensigns, union-jacks, and motto flags; and it became evident that Hilyar did not intend to keep his word, as soon as he saw that Porter was disabled.

So the _Essex_ prepared for action, though there could be no chance whatever of success.

Her flags were flying from every mast, and every thing was made ready as far as was possible.

The attack was made before springs could be got on her cables.

She was anchored so near the shore as to preclude the possibility of Captain Hilyar's passing ahead of her; [Footnote: Letter of Captain James Hilyar, March 30, 1814. ] so his two ships came cautiously down, the _Cherub_ taking her position on the starboard bow of the _Essex_, and the _Phoebe_ under the latter's stern.

The attack began at 4 P. M.

[Footnote: Mean time.

Porter says 3. 45; Hilyar, a few minutes past 4. The former says the first attack lasted half an hour; the latter, but 10 minutes.

I accordingly make it 20. ] Some of the bow-guns of the American frigate bore upon the _Cherub_, and, as soon as she found this out, the sloop ran down and stationed herself near the _Phoebe_.

The latter had opened with her broadside of long 18's, from a position in which not one of Porter's guns could reach her.

Three times springs were got on the cables of the _Essex_, in order to bring her round till her broadside bore; but in each instance they were shot away, as soon as they were hauled taut.

Three long 12's were got out of the stern-ports, and with these an animated fire was kept up on the two British ships, the aim being especially to cripple their rigging.

A good many of Porter's crew were killed during the first five minutes, before he could bring any guns to bear; but afterward he did not suffer much, and at 4. 20, after a quarter of an hour's fight between the three long 12's of the _Essex_, and the whole 36 broadside guns of the _Phoebe_ and _Cherub_, the latter were actually driven off.

They wore, and again began with their long guns; but, these producing no visible effect, both of the British ships hauled out of the fight at 4. 30. "Having lost the use of main-sail, jib, and main-stay, appearances looked a little inauspicious," writes Captain Hilyar.

But the damages were soon repaired, and his two ships stood back for the crippled foe.

Both stationed themselves on her port-quarter, the _Phoebe_ at anchor, with a spring, firing her broadside, while the _Cherub_ kept under way, using her long bow-chasers.

Their fire was very destructive, for they were out of reach of the _Essex's_ carronades, and not one of her long guns could be brought to bear on them.

Porter now cut his cable, at 5. 20, and tried to close with his antagonists.

After many ineffectual efforts sail was made.

The flying-jib halyards were the only serviceable ropes uncut.

That sail was hoisted, and the foretop-sail and fore-sail let fall, though the want of sheets and tacks rendered them almost useless.

Still the _Essex_ drove down on her assailants, and for the first time got near enough to use her carronades; for a minute or two the firing was tremendous, but after the first broadside the _Cherub_ hauled out of the fight in great haste, and during the remainder of the action confined herself to using her bow-guns from a distance.

Immediately afterward the _Phoebe_ also edged off, and by her superiority of sailing, her foe being now almost helpless, was enabled to choose her own distance, and again opened from her long 18's, out of range of Porter's carronades.

[Footnote: American writers often sneer at Hilyar for keeping away from the _Essex_, and out of reach of her short guns; but his conduct was eminently proper in this respect.

It was no part of his duty to fight the _Essex_ at the distance which best suited her; but, on the contrary, at that which least suited her.

He, of course, wished to win the victory with the least possible loss to himself, and acted accordingly.

His conduct in the action itself could not be improved upon.

] The carnage on board the _Essex_ had now made her decks look like shambles.

One gun was manned three times, fifteen men being slam at it; its captain alone escaped without a wound.

There were but one or two instances of flinching; the wounded, many of whom were killed by flying splinters while under the hands of the doctors, cheered on their comrades, and themselves worked at the guns like fiends as long as they could stand.

At one of the bow-guns was stationed a young Scotchman, named Bissly, who had one leg shot off close by the groin.

Using his handkerchief as a tourniquet, he said, turning to his American shipmates: "I left my own country and adopted the United States, to fight for her.