Naval War of 1812 — 13 Part 13

Nothing remained to be done, and at 6. 20 the _Essex_ surrendered and was taken possession of.

The _Phoebe_ had lost 4 men killed, including her first lieutenant, William Ingram, and 7 wounded; the _Cherub_, 1 killed, and 3, including Captain Tucker, wounded.

Total, 5 killed and 10 wounded.

[Footnote: James says that most of the loss was occasioned by the first three broadsides of the _Essex_; this is not surprising, as in all she hardly fired half a dozen, and the last were discharged when half of the guns had been disabled, and there were scarcely men enough to man the remainder.

Most of the time her resistance was limited to firing such of her six long guns as would bear.

] The difference in loss was natural, as, owing to their having long guns and the choice of position, the British had been able to fire ten shot to the Americans' one.

The conduct of the two English captains in attacking Porter as soon as he was disabled, in neutral waters, while they had been very careful to abstain from breaking the neutrality while he was in good condition, does not look well; at the best it shows that Hilyar had only been withheld hitherto from the attack by timidity, and it looks all the worse when it is remembered that Hilyar owed his ship's previous escape entirely to Porter's forbearance on a former occasion when the British frigate was entirely at his mercy, and that the British captain had afterward expressly said that he would not break the neutrality.

Still, the British in this war did not act very differently from the way we ourselves did on one or two occasions in the Civil War,--witness the capture of the _Florida_.

And after the battle was once begun the sneers which most of our historians, as well as the participators in the fight, have showered upon the British captains for not foregoing the advantages which their entire masts and better artillery gave them by coming to close quarters, are decidedly foolish.

Hilyar's conduct during the battle, as well as his treatment of the prisoners afterward, was perfect, and as a minor matter it may be mentioned that his official letter is singularly just and fair-minded.

Says Lord Howard Douglass: [Footnote: "Naval Gunnery," p. 149. ] "The action displayed all that can reflect honor on the science and admirable conduct of Captain Hilyar and his crew, which, without the assistance of the _Cherub_, would have insured the same termination.

Captain Porter's sneers at the respectful distance the _Phoebe_ kept are in fact acknowledgments of the ability with which Captain Hilyar availed himself of the superiority of his arms; it was a brilliant affair."

While endorsing this criticism, it may be worth while to compare it with some of the author's comments upon the other actions, as that between Decatur and the _Macedonian_.

To make the odds here as great against Garden as they were against Porter, it would be necessary to suppose that the _Macedonian_ had lost her main-top-mast, had but six long 18's to oppose to her antagonist's 24's, and that the latter was assisted by the corvette _Adams_; so that as a matter of fact Porter fought at fully double or treble the disadvantage Garden did, and, instead of surrendering when he had lost a third of his crew, fought till three fifths of his men were dead or wounded, and, moreover, inflicted greater loss and damage on his antagonists than Garden did.

If, then, as Lord Douglass says, the defence of the _Macedonian_ brilliantly upheld the character of the British navy for courage, how much more did that of the _Essex_ show for the American navy; and if Hilyar's conduct was "brilliant," that of Decatur was more so.

This was an action in which it is difficult to tell exactly how to award praise.

Captain Hilyar deserves it, for the coolness and skill with which he made his approaches and took his positions so as to destroy his adversary with least loss to himself, and also for the precision of his fire.

The Cherub's behavior was more remarkable for extreme caution than for any thing else.

As regards the mere fight, Porter certainly did every thing a man could do to contend successfully with the overwhelming force opposed to him, and the few guns that were available were served with the utmost precision.

As an exhibition of dogged courage it has never been surpassed since the time when the Dutch captain, Klaesoon, after fighting two long days, blew up his disabled ship, devoting himself and all his crew to death, rather than surrender to the hereditary foes of his race, and was bitterly avenged afterward by the grim "sea-beggars" of Holland; the days when Drake singed the beard of the Catholic king, and the small English craft were the dread and scourge of the great floating castles of Spain.

Any man reading Farragut's account is forcibly reminded of some of the deeds of "derring do" in that, the heroic age of the Teutonic navies.

Captain Hilyar in his letter says: "The defence of the _Essex_, taking into consideration our superiority of force and the very discouraging circumstances of her having lost her main-top-mast and being twice on fire, did honor to her brave defenders, and most fully evinced the courage of Captain Porter and those under his command.

Her colors were not struck until the loss in killed and wounded was so awfully great and her shattered condition so seriously bad as to render all further resistance unavailing."

[Footnote: James (p. 419) says: "The _Essex_, as far as is borne out by proof (the only safe way where an American is concerned), had 24 men killed and 45 wounded.

But Capt. Porter, thinking by exaggerating his loss to prop up his fame, talks of 58 killed and mortally wounded, 39 severely, 27 slightly," etc. , etc. This would be no more worthy of notice than any other of his falsifications, were it not followed by various British writers.

Hilyar states that he has 161 prisoners, has found 23 dead, that 3 wounded were taken off, between 20 and 30 reached the shore, and that the "remainder are either killed or wounded."

It is by wilfully preserving silence about this last sentence that James makes out his case.

It will be observed that Hilyar enumerates 161 + 23 + 3 + 25 (say) or 212, and says the remainder were either killed or wounded; Porter having 255 men at first, this remainder was 43. Hilyar stating that of his 161 prisoners, 42 were wounded, his account thus gives the Americans 111 killed and wounded.

James' silence about Hilyat's last sentence enables him to make the loss but 69, and his wilful omission is quite on a par with the other meannesses and falsehoods which utterly destroy the reliability of his work.

By Hilyar's own letter it is thus seen that Porter's loss in killed and wounded was certainly 111, perhaps 116, or if Porter had, as James says, 265 men, 126. There still remain some discrepancies between the official accounts, which can be compared in tabular form: Hilyar.

Porter.

Prisoners unwounded.

119 75 prisoners unwounded.

" wounded.

42 27 " slightly wounded, Taken away wounded.

3 39 " severely " Those who reached shore.

25 58 killed.

Remainder killed or wounded.

43 31 missing.

Killed.

23 25 reached shore.

------ ----- 255 255 The explanation probably is that Hilyar's "42 wounded" do not include Porter's "27 slightly wounded," and that his "161 prisoners" include Porter's "25 who reached shore," and his "25 who reached shore" comes under Porter's "31 missing."

This would make the accounts nearly tally.

At any rate in Porter's book are to be found the names of all his killed, wounded, and missing; and their relatives received pensions from the American government, which, if the returns were false, would certainly have been a most elaborate piece of deception.

It is far more likely that Hilyar was mistaken; or he may have counted in the _Essex Junior's_ crew, which would entirely account for the discrepancies.

In any event it must be remembered that he makes the American killed and wounded 111 (Porter, 124), and _not_ 69, as James says.

The latter's statement is wilfully false, as he had seen Hilyar's letter.

] He also bears very candid testimony to the defence of the _Essex_ having been effective enough to at one time render the result doubtful, saying: "Our first attack * * * produced no visible effect.

Our second * * * was not more successful;

and having lost the use of our main-sail, jib, and main-stay, appearances looked a little inauspicious."

Throughout the war no ship was so desperately defended as the _Essex_, taking into account the frightful odds against which she fought, which always enhances the merit of a defence.

The _Lawrence_, which suffered even more, was backed by a fleet; the _Frolic_ was overcome by an equal foe;

and the _Reindeer_ fought at far less of a disadvantage, and suffered less.

None of the frigates, British or American, were defended with any thing like the resolution she displayed.

But it is perhaps permissible to inquire whether Porter's course, after the accident to his top-mast occurred, was altogether the best that could have been taken.

On such a question no opinion could have been better than Farragut's, although of course his judgment was _ex post facto_, as he was very young at the time of the fight.

"In the first place, I consider our original and greatest error was in attempting to regain the anchorage; being greatly superior in sailing powers we should have borne up and run before the wind.

If we had come in contact with the _Phoebe_ we should have carried her by boarding; if she avoided us, as she might have done by her greater ability to manoeuvre, then we should have taken her fire and passed on, leaving both vessels behind until we had replaced our top-mast, by which time they would have been separated, as unless they did so it would have been no chase, the _Cherub_ being a dull sailer.

"Secondly, when it was apparent to everybody that we had no chance of success under the circumstances, the ship should have been run ashore, throwing her broadside to the beach to prevent raking, and fought as long as was consistent with humanity, and then set on fire.

But having determined upon anchoring we should have bent a spring on to the ring of the anchor, instead of to the cable, where it was exposed, and could be shot away as fast as put on."

But it must be remembered that when Porter decided to anchor near shore, in neutral water, he could not anticipate Hilyar's deliberate and treacherous breach of faith.

I do not allude to the mere disregard of neutrality.

Whatever international moralists may say, such disregard is a mere question of expediency.

If the benefits to be gained by attacking a hostile ship in neutral waters are such as to counterbalance the risk of incurring the enmity of the neutral power, why then the attack ought to be made.

Had Hilyar, when he first made his appearance off Valparaiso, sailed in with his two ships, the men at quarters and guns out, and at once attacked Porter, considering the destruction of the _Essex_ as outweighing the insult to Chili, why his behavior would have been perfectly justifiable.

In fact this is unquestionably what he intended to do, but he suddenly found himself in such a position, that in the even of hostilities, _his_ ship would be the captured one, and he owed his escape purely to Porter's over-forbearance, under great provocation Then he gave his word to Potter that he would not infringe on the neutrality; and he never dared to break it, until he saw Porter was disabled and almost helpless!

This may seem strong language to use about a British officer, but it is justly strong.

Exactly as any outsider must consider Warrington's attack on the British brig _Nautilus_ in 1815, as a piece of needless cruelty; so any outsider must consider Hilyar as having most treacherously broken faith with Porter.

After the fight Hilyar behaved most kindly and courteously to the prisoners; and, as already said, he fought his ship most ably, for it would have been quixotic to a degree to forego his advantages.

But previous to the battle his conduct had been over-cautious.

It was to be expected that the _Essex_ would make her escape as soon as practicable, and so he should have used every effort to bring her to action.

Instead of this he always declined the fight when alone; and he owed his ultimate success to the fact that the _Essex_ instead of escaping, as she could several times have done, stayed, hoping to bring the _Phoebe_ to action single-handed.

It must be remembered that the _Essex_ was almost as weak compared to the _Phoebe_, as the _Cherub_ was compared to the _Essex_.

The latter was just about midway between the British ships, as may be seen by the following comparison.

In the action the _Essex_ fought all six of her long 12's, and the _Cherub_ both her long 9's, instead of the corresponding broadside carronades which the ships regularly used.

This gives the _Essex_ a better armament than she would have had fighting her guns as they were regularly used; but it can be seen how great the inequality still was.

It must also be kept in mind, that while in the battles between the American 44's and British 38's, the short weight 24-pounders of the former had in reality no greater range or accuracy than the full weight 18's of their opponents, in this case the _Phoebe's_ full weight 18's had a very much greater range and accuracy than the short weight 12's of the _Essex_.

COMPARATIVE FORCE.

Men.

Broadside Guns.

Weight.

Total.

_Phoebe_, 320 13 long 18's 234 lbs.

1 " 12 12 " 1 " 9 9 " (255) 7 short 32's 224 " 1 " 18 18 " (242) __________ _____ 23 guns.

497 lbs.

_Cherub_, 180 2 long 9's 18 lbs.

(18) 2 short 18's 36 " 9 " 32's 288 " (342) ___________ ______ 13 guns.

342 lbs.

______________________________ ______ _____ 500 men.

36 guns.

839 lbs.

metal.

-+- 273 long.

-+- '- 566 short.

-' _Essex_, 255 6 long 12's 66 lbs.

-+- Taking 7 per 17 short 32's 504 " | cent off | for short '- weight.

____________ _____________ ________ _______________ 255 men, 32 guns, 570 lbs.

All accounts agree as to the armament of the _Essex_.

I have taken that of the _Phoebe_ and _Cherub_ from James; but Captain Porter's official letter, and all the other American accounts make the _Phoebe's_ broadside 15 long 18's and 8 short 32's, and give the _Cherub_, in all, 18 short 32's, 8 short 24's, and two long nines.

This would make their broadside 904 lbs.

, 288 long, 616 short.

I

would have no doubt that the American accounts were right if the question rested solely on James' veracity; but he probably took his figures from official sources.

At any rate, remembering the difference between long guns and carronades, it appears that the _Essex_ was really nearly intermediate in force between the _Phoebe_ and the _Cherub_.

The battle being fought, with a very trifling exception, at long range, it was in reality a conflict between a crippled ship throwing a broadside of 66 lbs.

of metal, and two ships throwing 273 lbs.

, who by their ability to manoeuvre could choose positions where they could act with full effect, while their antagonist could not return a shot.

Contemporary history does not afford a single instance of so determined a defence against such frightful odds.

The official letters of Captains Hilyar and Porter agree substantially in all respects; the details of the fight, as seen in the _Essex_, are found in the "Life of Farragut."

But although the British captain does full justice to his foe, British historians have universally tried to belittle Porter's conduct.

It is much to be regretted that we have no British account worth paying attention to of the proceedings before the fight, when the _Phoebe_ declined single combat with the _Essex_.

James, of course, states that the _Phoebe_ did not decline it, but he gives no authority, and his unsupported assertion would be valueless even if uncontradicted.

His account of the action is grossly inaccurate as he has inexcusably garbled Hilyar's report.

One instance of this I have already mentioned, as regards Hilyar's account of Porter's loss.

Again, Hilyar distinctly states that the _Essex_ was twice on fire, yet James (p. 418) utterly denies this, thereby impliedly accusing the British captain of falsehood.

There is really no need of the corroboration of Porter's letter, but he has it most fully in the "Life of Farragut," p. 37: "The men came rushing up from below, many with their clothes burning, which were torn from them as quickly as possible, and those for whom this could not be done were told to jump overboard and quench the flames.

* * * One man swam to shore with scarcely a square inch of his body which had not been burned, and, although he was deranged for some days, he ultimately recovered, and afterward served with me in the West Indies."

The third unfounded statement in James' account is that buckets of spirits were found in all parts of the main deck of the _Essex_, and that most of the prisoners were drunk.

No authority is cited for this, and there is not a shadow of truth in it.

He ends by stating that "few even in his own country will venture to speak well of Captain David Porter."

After these various paragraphs we are certainly justified in rejecting James' account _in toto_.

An occasional mistake is perfectly excusable, and gross ignorance of a good many facts does not invalidate a man's testimony with regard to some others with which he is acquainted; but a wilful and systematic perversion of the truth in a number of cases throws a very strong doubt on a historian's remaining statements, unless they are supported by unquestionable authority.

But if British historians have generally given Porter much less than his due, by omitting all reference to the inferiority of his guns, his lost top-mast, etc. , it is no worse than Americans have done in similar cases.

The latter, for example, will make great allowances in the case of the _Essex_ for her having carronades only, but utterly fail to allude to the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ as having suffered under the same disadvantage.

They should remember that the rules cut both ways.

The _Essex_ having suffered chiefly above the waterline, she was repaired sufficiently in Valparaiso to enable her to make the voyage to England, where she was added to the British navy.

The _Essex Junior_ was disarmed and the American prisoners embarked in her for New York, on parole.

But Lieutenant McKnight, Chaplain Adams, Midshipman Lyman, and 11 seamen were exchanged on the spot for some of the British prisoners on board the _Essex Junior_.

McKnight and Lyman accompanied the _Phoebe_ to Rio Janeiro, where they embarked on a Swedish vessel, were taken out of her by the _Wasp_, Captain Blakely, and were lost with the rest of the crew of that vessel.

The others reached New York in safety.

Of the prizes made by the _Essex_, some were burnt or sunk by the Americans, and some retaken by the British.

And so, after nearly two years' uninterrupted success, the career of the _Essex_ terminated amid disasters of all kinds.

But at least her officers and crew could reflect that they had afforded an example of courage in adversity that it would be difficult to match elsewhere.

The first of the new heavy sloops of war that got to sea was the _Frolic_, Master Commandant Joseph Bainbridge, which put out early in February.

Shortly afterward she encountered a large Carthagenian privateer, which refused to surrender and was sunk by a broadside, nearly a hundred of her crew being drowned.

Before daylight on the 20th of April, lat.

24° 12' N.

, long.

81° 25' W.

, she fell in with the British 36-gun frigate _Orpheus_, Capt. Pigot, and the 12-gun schooner _Shelburne_, Lieut.

Hope, both to leeward.

The schooner soon weathered the _Frolic_, but of course was afraid to close, and the American sloop continued beating to windward, in the effort to escape, for nearly 13 hours; the water was started, the anchors cut away, and finally the guns thrown overboard--a measure by means of which both the _Hornet_, the _Rattlesnake_, and the _Adams_ succeeded in escaping under similar circumstances,--but all was of no avail, and she was finally captured.

The court of inquiry honorably acquitted both officers and crew.

As was to be expected James considers the surrender a disgraceful one, because the guns were thrown overboard.

As I have said, this was a measure which had proved successful in several cases of a like nature; the criticism is a piece of petty meanness.

Fortunately we have Admiral Codrington's dictum on the surrender ("Memoirs," vol. 1, p. 310), which he evidently considered as perfectly honorable.

[Illustration: Master Commandant Lewis Warrington: a contemporary portrait by Rembrandt Peale.

(Courtesy Naval Historical Foundation)] A sister ship to the _Frolic_, the _Peacock_, Capt. Lewis Warrington, sailed from New York on March 12th, and cruised southward; on the 28th of April, at seven in the morning, lat.

17° 47' N.

, long.

80° 7' W.

, several sail were made to windward.

[Footnote: Official letter of Capt. Warrington, April 29. 1814. ] These were a small convoy of merchant-men, bound for the Bermudas, under the protection of the 18-gun brig-sloop _Epervier_, Capt. Wales, 5 days out of Havana, and with ,000 in specie on board.

[Footnote: James, vi, 424. ] The _Epervier_ when discovered was steering north by east, the wind being from the eastward; soon afterward the wind veered gradually round to the southward, and the _Epervier_ hauled up close on the port tack, while the convoy made all sail away, and the _Peacock_ came down with the wind on her starboard quarter.

At 10 A. M.

the vessels were within gun-shot, and the _Peacock_ edged away to get in a raking broadside, but the _Epervier_ frustrated this by putting her helm up until close on her adversary's bow, when she rounded to and fired her starboard guns, receiving in return the starboard broadside of the _Peacock_ at 10. 20 A.

M.

These first broadsides took effect aloft, the brig being partially dismantled, while the _Peacock's_ fore-yard was totally disabled by two round shot in the starboard quarter, which deprived the ship of the use of her fore-sail and fore-top-sail, and compelled her to run large.

However, the _Epervier_ eased away [Footnote: According to some accounts she at this time tacked.

] when abaft her foe's beam, and ran off alongside of her (using her port guns, while the American still had the starboard battery engaged) at 10. 35. The _Peacock's_ fire was now very hot, and directed chiefly at her adversary's hull, on which it told heavily, while she did not suffer at all in return.

The _Epervier_ coming up into the wind, owing somewhat to the loss of head-sail, Capt. Wales called his crew aft to try boarding, but they refused, saying "she's too heavy for us," [Footnote: James, "Naval Occurrences," p. 243. ] and then, at 11. 05 the colors were hauled down.

[Illustration of the action between _PEACOCK_ and _EPERVIER_ between 10. 10 and 11. 05. ] Except the injury to her fore-yard, the _Peacock's_ damages were confined to the loss of a few top-mast and top-gallant backstays, and some shot-holes through her sails.

Of her crew, consisting, all told, of 166 men and boys, [Footnote: "Niles' Register," vi.

196, says only 160; the above is taken from Warrington's letter of June 1st, preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval Archives.

The crew contained about 10 boys, was not composed of picked men, and did not number 185--_vide_ James.

] only two were wounded, both slightly.

The _Epervier_, on the other hand, had 45 shot-holes in her hull, 5 feet of water in her hold, main-top-mast over the side, main-mast nearly in two, main-boom shot away, bowsprit wounded severely, and most of the fore-rigging and stays shot away; and of her crew of 128 men (according to the list of prisoners given by Captain Warrington; James says 118, but he is not backed up by any official report) 9 were killed and mortally wounded, and 14 severely and slightly wounded.

Instead of two long sixes for bow-chasers, and a shifting carronade, she had two 18-pound carronades (according to the American prize-lists; [Footnote: American State Papers, vol. xiv, p. 427. ] Capt. Warrington says 32's).

Otherwise she was armed as usual.

She was, like the rest of her kind, very "tubby," being as broad as the _Peacock_, though 10 feet shorter on deck.

Allowing, as usual, 7 per cent, for short weight of the American shot, we get the COMPARATIVE FORCE.

Tons.

No. Broadside Guns.

Weight Metal.

Crew.

Loss.

_Peacock_ 509 11 315 166 2 _Epervier_ 477 9 274 128 23 That is, the relative force being as 12 is to 10, the relative execution done was as 12 is to 1, and the _Epervier_ surrendered before she had lost a fifth of her crew.

The case of the _Epervier_ closely resembles that of the _Argus_.

In both cases the officers behaved finely; in both cases, too, the victorious foe was heavier, in about the same proportion, while neither the crew of the _Argus_, nor the crew of the _Epervier_ fought with the determined bravery displayed by the combatants in almost every other struggle of the war.

But it must be added that the _Epervier_ did worse than the _Argus_, and the _Peacock_ (American) better than the _Pelican_.

The gunnery of the _Epervier_ was extraordinarily poor; "the most disgraceful part of the affair was that our ship was cut to pieces and the enemy hardly scratched."

[Footnote: "Memoirs of Admiral Codrington," i, 322. ] James states that after the first two or three broadsides several carronades became unshipped, and that the others were dismounted by the fire of the _Peacock_; that the men had not been exercised at the guns; and, most important of all, that the crew (which contained "several foreigners," but was chiefly British;

as the _Argus_ was chiefly American) was disgracefully bad.

The _Peacock_, on the contrary, showed skilful seamanship as well as excellent gunnery.

In 45 minutes after the fight was over the fore-yard had been sent down and fished, the fore-sail set up, and every thing in complete order again; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Warrington, April 29, 1814. ] the prize was got in sailing order by dark, though great exertions had to be made to prevent her sinking.

Mr. Nicholson, first of the _Peacock_, was put in charge as prize-master.

The next day the two vessels were abreast of Amelia Island, when two frigates were discovered in the north, to leeward.

Capt. Warrington at once directed the prize to proceed to St. Mary's, while he separated and made sail on a wind to the south, intending to draw the frigates after him, as he was confident that the _Peacock_, a very fast vessel, could outsail them.

[Footnote: Letter of Capt. Warrington, May 4, 1814. ] The plan succeeded perfectly, the brig reaching Savannah on the first of May, and the ship three days afterward.

The _Epervier_ was purchased for the U. S.

navy, under the same name and rate.

The _Peacock_ sailed again on June 4th, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Warrington, Oct.

30, 1814. ] going first northward to the Grand Banks, then to the Azores; then she stationed herself in the mouth of the Irish Channel, and afterward cruised off Cork, the mouth of the _Shannon_, and the north of Ireland, capturing several very valuable prizes and creating great consternation.

She then changed her station, to elude the numerous vessels that had been sent after her, and sailed southward, off Cape Ortegal, Cape Finisterre, and finally among the Barbadoes, reaching New York, Oct.

29th.

During this cruise she encountered no war vessel smaller than a frigate; but captured 14 sail of merchant-men, some containing valuable cargoes, and manned by 148 men.

On April 29th, H. M. S.

schooner _Ballahou_, 6, Lieut.

King, while cruising off the American coast was captured by the _Perry_, privateer, a much heavier vessel, after an action of 10 minutes' duration.

The general peace prevailing in Europe allowed the British to turn their energies altogether to America; and in no place was this increased vigor so much felt as in Chesapeake Bay where a great number of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and transports had assembled, in preparation for the assault on Washington and Baltimore.

The defence of these waters was confided to Capt. Joshua Barney, [Footnote: He was born at Baltimore, July 7, 1759; James, with habitual accuracy, calls him an Irishman.

He makes Decatur, by the way, commit the geographical solecism of being born in "Maryland, Virginia."

] with a flotilla of gun-boats.

These consisted of three or four sloops and schooners, but mainly of barges, which were often smaller than the ship's boats that were sent against them.

These gun-boats were manned by from 20 to 40 men each, and each carried, according to its size, one or two long 24-, 18-, or 12-pounders.

They were bad craft at best; and, in addition, it is difficult to believe that they were handled to the fullest advantage.

On June 1st Commodore Barney, with the block sloop _Scorpion_ and 14 smaller "gun-boats," chiefly row gallies, passed the mouth of the Patuxent, and chased the British schooner _St.

Lawrence_ and seven boats, under Captain Barrie, until they took refuge with the _Dragon_, 74, which in turn chased Barney's flotilla into the Patuxent, where she blockaded it in company with the _Albion_, 74. They were afterward joined by the _Loire_, 38, _Narcissus_, 32, and _Lasseur_, 18, and Commodore Barney moved two miles up St. Leonard's Creek, while the frigates and sloop blockaded its mouth.

A deadlock now ensued; the gunboats were afraid to attack the ships, and the ships' boats were just as afraid of the gun-boats.

On the 8th, 9th, and 11th skirmishes occurred; on each occasion the British boats came up till they caught sight of Barney's flotilla, and were promptly chased off by the latter, which, however, took good care not to meddle with the larger vessels.

Finally, Colonel Wadsworth, of the artillery, with two long 18-pounders, assisted by the marines, under Captain Miller, and a few regulars, offered to cooperate from the shore while Barney assailed the two frigates with the flotilla.

On the 26th the joint attack took place most successfully; the _Loire_ and _Narcissus_ were driven off, although not much damaged, and the flotilla rowed out in triumph, with a loss of but 4 killed and 7 wounded.

But in spite of this small success, which was mainly due to Colonel Wadsworth, Commodore Barney made no more attempts with his gun-boats.

The bravery and skill which the flotilla men showed at Bladensburg prove conclusively that their ill success on the water was due to the craft they were in, and not to any failing of the men.

At the same period the French gun-boats were even more unsuccessful, but the Danes certainly did very well with theirs.

Barney's flotilla in the Patuxent remained quiet until August 22d, and then was burned when the British advanced on Washington.

The history of this advance, as well as of the unsuccessful one on Baltimore, concerns less the American than the British navy, and will be but briefly alluded to here.

On August 20th Major-General Ross and Rear-Admiral Cockburn, with about 5,000 soldiers and marines, moved on Washington by land; while a squadron, composed of the _Seahorse_, 38, _Euryalus_, 36, bombs _Devastation_, _Aetna_, and _Meteor_, and rocket-ship _Erebus_, under Captain James Alexander Gordon, moved up the Potomac to attack Fort Washington, near Alexandria; and Sir Peter Parker, in the _Menelaus_, 38, was sent "to create a diversion" above Baltimore.

Sir Peter's "diversion" turned out most unfortunately for him: for, having landed to attack 120 Maryland militia, under Colonel Reade, he lost his own life, while fifty of his followers were placed _hors de combat_ and the remainder chased back to the ship by the victors, who had but three wounded.

The American army, which was to oppose Ross and Cockburn, consisted of some seven thousand militia, who fled so quickly that only about 1,500 British had time to become engaged.

The fight was really between these 1,500 British regulars and the American flotilla men.

These consisted of 78 marines, under Captain Miller, and 370 sailors, some of whom served under Captain Barney, who had a battery of two 18's and three 12's, while the others were armed with muskets and pikes, and acted with the marines.

Both sailors and marines did nobly, inflicting most of the loss the British suffered, which amounted to 256 men, and in return lost over a hundred of their own men, including the two captains, who were wounded and captured, with the guns.

[Footnote: The optimistic Cooper thinks that two regular regiments would have given the Americans this battle--which is open to doubt.

] Ross took Washington and burned the public buildings;

and the panic-struck Americans foolishly burned the _Columbia_, 44, and _Argus_, 18, which were nearly ready for service.

Captain Gordon's attack on Fort Washington was conducted with great skill and success.

Fort Washington was abandoned as soon as fired upon, and the city of Alexandria surrendered upon most humiliating conditions.

Captain Gordon was now joined by the _Fairy_, 18, Captain Baker, who brought him orders to return from Vice-Admiral Cochrane;

and the squadron began to work down the river, which was very difficult to navigate.

Commodore Rodgers, with some of the crew of the two 44's, _Guerrière_ and _Java_, tried to bar their progress, but had not sufficient means.

On September 1st an attempt was made to destroy the _Devastation_ by fire-ships, but it failed; on the 4th the attempt was repeated by Commodore Rodgers, with a party of some forty men, but they were driven off and attacked by the British boats, under Captain Baker, who in turn was repulsed with the loss of his second lieutenant killed, and some twenty-five men killed or wounded.

The squadron also had to pass and silence a battery of light field-pieces on the 5th, where they suffered enough to raise their total loss to seven killed and thirty-five wounded.

Gordon's inland expedition was thus concluded most successfully, at a very trivial cost; it was a most venturesome feat, reflecting great honor on the captains and crews engaged in it.

Baltimore was threatened actively by sea and land early in September.

On the 13th an indecisive conflict took place between the British regulars and American militia, in which the former came off with the honor, and the latter with the profit.

The regulars held the field, losing 350 men, including General Ross; the militia retreated in fair order with a loss of but 200. The water attack was also unsuccessful.

At 5 A. M.

on the 13th the bomb vessels _Meteor_, _Aetna_, _Terror_, _Volcano_, and _Devastation_, the rocket-ship _Erebus_, and the frigates _Severn_, _Euryalus_, _Havannah_, and _Hebrus_ opened on Fort McHenry, some of the other fortifications being occasionally fired at.

A furious but harmless cannonade was kept up between the forts and ships until 7 A. M.

on the 14th, when the British fleet and army retired.

I have related these events out of their natural order because they really had very little to do with our navy, and yet it is necessary to mention them in order to give an idea of the course of events.

The British and American accounts of the various gun-boat attacks differ widely; but it is very certain that the gun-boats accomplished little or nothing of importance.

On the other hand, their loss amounted to nothing, for many of those that were sunk were afterward raised, and the total tonnage of those destroyed would not much exceed that of the British barges captured by them from time to time or destroyed by the land batteries.

The purchased brig _Rattlesnake_, 16, had been cruising in the Atlantic with a good deal of success; but in lat.

40° N.

, long.

33° W.

, was chased by a frigate from which Lieutenant Renshaw, the brig's commander, managed to escape only by throwing overboard all his guns except two long nines; and on June 22d he was captured by the _Leander_, 50, Captain Sir George Ralph Collier, K. C. B.

The third of the new sloops to get to sea was the _Wasp_, 22, Captain Johnston Blakely, which left Portsmouth on May 1st, with a very fine crew of 173 men, almost exclusively New Englanders; there was said not to have been a single foreign seaman on board.

It is, at all events, certain that during the whole war no vessel was ever better manned and commanded than this daring and resolute cruiser.

The _Wasp_ slipped unperceived through the blockading frigates, and ran into the mouth of the English Channel, right in the thick of the English cruisers; here she remained several weeks, burning and scuttling many ships.

Finally, on June 28th, at 4 A. M.

, in lat.

48° 36' N.

, long.

11° 15' W.

, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. ] while in chase of two merchant-men, a sail was made on the weather-beam.

This was the British brig-sloop _Reindeer_, 18, Captain William Manners, [Footnote: James, vi, 429. ] with a crew of 118, as brave men as ever sailed or fought on the narrow seas.

Like the _Peacock_ (British) the _Reindeer_ was only armed with 24-pounders, and Captain Manners must have known well that he was to do battle with a foe heavier than himself; but there was no more gallant seaman in the whole British navy, fertile as it was in men who cared but little for odds of size or strength.

As the day broke, the _Reindeer_ made sail for the _Wasp_, then lying in the west-southwest.

The sky was overcast with clouds, and the smoothness of the sea was hardly disturbed by the light breeze that blew out of the northeast.

Captain Blakely hauled up and stood for his antagonist, as the latter came slowly down with the wind nearly aft, and so light was the weather that the vessels kept almost on even keels.

It was not till quarter past one that the _Wasp's_ drum rolled out its loud challenge as it beat to quarters, and a few minutes afterward the ship put about and stood for the foe, thinking to weather him; but at 1. 50 the brig also tacked and stood away, each of the cool and skilful captains being bent on keeping the weather-gage.

At half past two the _Reindeer_ again tacked, and, taking in her stay-sails, stood for the _Wasp_, who furled her royals; and, seeing that she would be weathered, at 2. 50, put about in her turn and ran off, with the wind a little forward the port beam, brailing up the mizzen, while the _Reindeer_ hoisted her flying-jib, to close, and gradually came up on the _Wasp's_ weather-quarter.

At 17 minutes past three, when the vessels were not sixty yards apart, the British opened the conflict, firing the shifting 12-pound carronade, loaded with round and grape.

To this the Americans could make no return, and it was again loaded and fired, with the utmost deliberation; this was repeated five times, and would have been a trying ordeal to a crew less perfectly disciplined than the _Wasp's_.

At 3. 26 Captain Blakely, finding his enemy did not get on his beam, put his helm a-lee and luffed up, firing his guns from aft forward as they bore.

For ten minutes the ship and the brig lay abreast, not twenty yards apart, while the cannonade was terribly destructive.

The concussion of the explosions almost deadened what little way the vessels had on, and the smoke hung over them like a pall.

The men worked at the guns with desperate energy, but the odds in weight of metal (3 to 2) were too great against the _Reindeer_, where both sides played their parts so manfully.

Captain Manners stood at his post, as resolute as ever, though wounded again and again.

A grape-shot passed through both his thighs, bringing him to the deck; but, maimed and bleeding to death, he sprang to his feet, cheering on the seamen.

The vessels were now almost touching, and putting his helm aweather, he ran the _Wasp_ aboard on her port [Footnote: Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. Cooper starboard: it is a point of little importance; all accounts agree as to the _relative_ positions of the craft.

] quarter, while the boarders gathered forward, to try it with the steel.

But the Carolina captain had prepared for this with cool confidence; the marines came aft;

close under the bulwarks crouched the boarders, grasping in their hands the naked cutlasses, while behind them were drawn up the pikemen.

As the vessels came grinding together the men hacked and thrust at one another through the open port-holes, while the black smoke curled up from between the hulls.

Then through the smoke appeared the grim faces of the British sea-dogs, and the fighting was bloody enough;

for the stubborn English stood well in the hard hand play.

But those who escaped the deadly fire of the topmen, escaped only to be riddled through by the long Yankee pikes; so, avenged by their own hands, the foremost of the assailants died, and the others gave back.

The attack was foiled, though the _Reindeer's_ marines kept answering well the American fire.

Then the English captain, already mortally wounded, but with the indomitable courage that nothing but death could conquer, cheering and rallying his men, himself sprang, sword in hand, into the rigging, to lead them on; and they followed him with a will.

At that instant a ball from the _Wasp's_ main-top crashed through his skull, and, still clenching in his right hand the sword he had shown he could wear so worthily, with his face to the foe, he fell back on his own deck dead, while above him yet floated the flag for which he had given his life.

No Norse Viking, slain over shield, ever died better.

As the British leader fell and his men recoiled, Captain Blakely passed the word to board; with wild hurrahs the boarders swarmed over the hammock nettings, there was a moment's furious struggle, the surviving British were slain or driven below, and the captain's clerk, _the highest officer left_, surrendered the brig, at 3. 44, just 27 minutes after the _Reindeer_ had fired the first gun, and just 18 after the _Wasp_ had responded.

[Illustration showing the action between the _WASP_ and the _REINDEER_ from 3. 17 to 3. 45. ] Both ships had suffered severely in the short struggle; but, as with the _Shannon_ and _Chesapeake_, the injuries were much less severe aloft than in the hulls.

All the spars were in their places.

The _Wasp's_ hull had received 6 round, and many grape; a 24-pound shot had passed through the foremast; and of her crew of 173, 11 were killed or mortally wounded, and 15 wounded severely or slightly.

The _Reindeer_ was completely cut to pieces in a line with her ports;

her upper works, boats, and spare spars being one entire wreck.

Of her crew of 118 men, 33 were killed outright or died later, and 34 were wounded, nearly all severely.

COMPARATIVE FORCE.

Broadside Weight No. Tons.

Guns.

Metal.

Men.

Loss _Wasp,_ 509 11 315 173 26 _Reindeer,_ 477 10 210 118 67 It is thus seen that the _Reindeer_ fought at a greater disadvantage than any other of the various British sloops that were captured in single action during the war; and yet she made a better fight than any of them (though the _Frolic_, and the _Frolic_ only, was defended with the same desperate courage); a pretty sure proof that heavy metal is not the only factor to be considered in accounting for the American victories.

"It is difficult to say which vessel behaved the best in this short but gallant combat."

[Footnote: Cooper, ii, 287. ] I doubt if the war produced two better single-ship commanders than Captain Blakely and Captain Manners; and an equal meed of praise attaches to both crews.