Naval War of 1812 — 18 Part 18

The three ships now proceeded to the Cape de Verds, and on March 10th anchored in the harbor of Porto Praya, Island of San Jago.

Here a merchant-brig was taken as a cartel, and a hundred of the prisoners were landed to help fit her for sea.

The next day the weather was thick and foggy, with fresh breezes.

[Footnote: Log of _Constitution_, March 11, 1815. ] The first and second lieutenants, with a good part of the people, were aboard the two prizes.

At five minutes past twelve, while Mr. Shubrick, the senior remaining lieutenant, was on the quarter-deck, the canvas of a large vessel suddenly loomed up through the haze, her hull being completely hidden by the fog-bank.

Her character could not be made out; but she was sailing close-hauled, and evidently making for the roads.

Mr. Shubrick at once went down and reported the stranger to Captain Stewart, when that officer coolly remarked that it was probably a British frigate or an Indiaman, and directed the lieutenant to return on deck, call all hands, and get ready to go out and attack her.

[Footnote: Cooper, ii, 459. ] At that moment the canvas of two other ships was discovered rising out of the fog astern of the vessel first seen.

It was now evident that all three were heavy frigates.

[Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 1815. ] In fact, they were the _Newcastle_, 50, Captain Lord George Stewart; _Leander_, 50, Captain Sir Ralph Collier, K. C. B.

, and _Acasta_, 40, Captain Robert Kerr, standing into Porto Praya, close-hauled on the starboard tack, the wind being light northeast by north.

[Footnote: Marshall's "Naval Biography," ii, 535. ] Captain Stewart at once saw that his opponents were far too heavy for a fair fight, and, knowing that the neutrality of the port would not be the slightest protection to him, he at once signalled to the prizes to follow, cut his cable, and, in less than ten minutes from the time the first frigate was seen, was standing out of the roads, followed by Hoffmann and Ballard.

Certainly a more satisfactory proof of the excellent training of both officers and men could hardly be given than the rapidity, skill, and perfect order with which every thing was done.

Any indecision on the part of the officers or bungling on the part of the men would have lost every thing.

The prisoners on shore had manned a battery and delivered a furious but ill-directed fire at their retreating conquerors.

The frigate, sloop, and corvette, stood out of the harbor in the order indicated, on the port tack, passing close under the east point, and a gunshot to windward of the British squadron, according to the American, or about a league, according to the British, accounts.

The Americans made out the force of the strangers correctly, and their own force was equally clearly discerned by the _Acasta_; but both the _Newcastle_ and _Leander_ mistook the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ for frigates, a mistake similar to that once made by Commodore Rodgers.

The _Constitution_ now crossed her top-gallant yards and set the foresail, main-sail, spanker, flying jib, and top-gallant sails; and the British ships, tacking, made all sail in pursuit.

The _Newcastle_ was on the _Constitution's_ lee quarter and directly ahead of the _Leander_, while the _Acasta_ was on the weather-quarter of the _Newcastle_.

All six ships were on the port tack.

The _Constitution_ cut adrift the boats towing astern, and her log notes that at 12. 50 she found she was sailing about as fast as the ships on her lee quarter, but that the _Acasta_ was luffing into her wake and dropping astern.

The log of the _Acasta_ says, "We had gained on the sloops, but the frigate had gained on us."

At 1. 10 the _Cyane_ had fallen so far astern and to leeward that Captain Stewart signalled to Lieutenant Hoffman to tack, lest he should be cut off if he did not.

Accordingly the lieutenant put about and ran off toward the northwest, no notice being taken of him by the enemy beyond an ineffectual broadside from the sternmost frigate.

At 2. 35 he was out of sight of all the ships and shaped his course for America, which he reached on April 10th.

[Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 1815. ] At 1. 45 the _Newcastle_ opened on the _Constitution_ firing by divisions, but the shot all fell short, according to the American statements, about 200 yards, while the British accounts (as given in Marshall's "Naval Biography") make the distance much greater; at any rate the vessels were so near that from the _Constitution_ the officers of the _Newcastle_ could be seen standing on the hammock nettings.

But, very strangely, both the 50-gun ships apparently still mistook the _Levant_, though a low, flush-decked sloop like the _Hornet_, for the "_President_, _Congress_, or _Macedonian_," Captain Collier believing that the _Constitution_ had sailed with two other frigates in company.

[Footnote: Marshal, ii, 533. ] By three o'clock the _Levant_ had lagged so as to be in the same position from which the _Cyane_ had just been rescued;

accordingly Captain Stewart signalled to her to tack, which she did, and immediately afterward all three British ships tacked in pursuit.

Before they did so, it must be remembered the _Acasta_ had weathered on the _Constitution_, though left considerably astern, while the _Newcastle_ and _Leander_ had about kept their positions on her lee or starboard quarter; so that if any ship had been detached after the _Levant_ it should have been the _Leander_, which had least chance of overtaking the American frigate.

The latter was by no means as heavily armed as either of the two 50's, and but little heavier than the _Acasta_; moreover, she was shorthanded, having manned her two prizes.

The _Acasta_, at any rate, had made out the force of the _Levant_, and, even had she been a frigate, it was certainly carrying prudence to an extreme to make more than one ship tack after her.

Had the _Newcastle_ and _Acasta_ kept on after the _Constitution_ there was a fair chance of overtaking her, for the _Acasta_ had weathered on her, and the chase could not bear up for fear of being cut off by the _Newcastle_.

At any rate the pursuit should not have been given up so early.

Marshall says there was a mistake in the signalling.

The British captains certainly bungled the affair; even James says (p. 558): "It is the most blundering piece of business recorded in these six volumes."

As for Stewart and his men, they deserve the highest credit for the cool judgment and prompt, skilful seamanship they had displayed.

The _Constitution_, having shaken off her pursuers, sailed to Maranham, where she landed her prisoners.

At Porto Rico she learned of the peace, and forthwith made sail for New York, reaching it about the middle of May.

As soon as he saw Captain Stewart's signal, Lieutenant Ballard had tacked, and at once made for the anchorage at Porto Prayo, which he reached, though pursued by all his foes, and anchored within 150 yards of a heavy battery.

[Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Ballard.

May 2, 1815. ] The wisdom of Captain Stewart's course in not trusting to the neutrality of the port, now became evident.

The _Acasta_ opened upon the sloop as soon as the latter had anchored, at 4. 30. [Footnote: _Newcastle's_ log, as given by Marshall and James.

] The _Newcastle_, as soon as she arrived, also opened, and so did the _Leander_, while the British prisoners on shore fired the guns of the battery.

Having borne this combined cannonade for 15 minutes, [Footnote: Ballard's letter.

] the colors of the _Levant_ were hauled down.

The unskilful firing of the British ships certainly did not redeem the blunders previously made by Sir George Collier, for the three heavy frigates during 15 minutes' broadside practice in smooth water against a stationary and unresisting foe, did her but little damage, and did not kill a man.

The chief effect of the fire was to damage the houses of the Portuguese town.

[Footnote: James, vi, 551. ] After the capture of the _President_, the _Peacock_, Captain Warrington, the _Hornet_, Captain Biddle, and _Tom Bowline_, brig, still remained in New York harbor.

On the 22d of January a strong northwesterly gale began to blow, and the American vessels, according to their custom, at once prepared to take advantage of the heavy weather and run by the blockaders.

They passed the bar by daylight, under storm canvas, the British frigates lying to in the southeast being plainly visible.

They were ignorant of the fate of the _President_, and proceeded toward Tristan d'Acunha, which was the appointed rendezvous.

A few days out the _Hornet_ parted company from the two others; these last reached Tristan d'Acunha about March 18th, but were driven off again by a gale.

The _Hornet_ reached the island on the 23d, and at half-past ten in the morning, the wind being fresh S. S.

W.

, when about to anchor off the north point, a sail was made in the southeast, steering west.

[Footnote: Letter from Captain Biddle to Commodore Decatur, Mar.

25, 1815. ] This was the British brig-sloop _Penguin_, Captain James Dickenson.

She was a new vessel, having left port for the first time in September, 1814. While at the Cape of Good Hope she had received from Vice-Admiral Tyler 12 marines from the _Medway_, 74, increasing her complement to 132; and was then despatched on special service against a heavy American privateer, the _Young Wasp_, which had been causing great havoc among the homeward-bound Indiamen.

[Illustration: Master Commandant James Biddle: a contemporary portrait by Jacob Eichholz painted after Biddle's promotion to captain (Courtesy U.

S.

Naval Academy Museum)] [Illustration: _Hornet_ vs. _Penguin_: a lithograph published in Liverpool, circa 1816. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.

S.

Naval Academy Museum)] [Illustration of the action between _PENGUIN_ and _HORNET_ from 1. 40 to 2. 02. ] When the strange sail was first seen Captain Biddle was just letting go his top-sail sheets; he at once sheeted them home, and the stranger being almost instantly shut out by the land, made all sail to the west, and again caught sight of her.

Captain Dickenson now, for the first time, saw the American sloop, and at once bore up for her.

The position of the two vessels was exactly the reverse of the _Wasp_ and _Frolic_, the Englishman being to windward.

The _Hornet_ hove to, to let her antagonist close; then she filled her maintop-sail and continued to yaw, wearing occasionally to prevent herself from being raked.

At forty minutes past one the _Penguin_, being within musket-shot, hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, hoisted a St. George's ensign and fired a gun.

The _Hornet_ luffed up on the same tack, hoisting American colors, and the action began with heavy broadsides.

The vessels ran along thus for 15 minutes, gradually coming closer together, and Captain Dickenson put his helm aweather, to run his adversary aboard.

At this moment the brave young officer received a mortal wound, and the command devolved on the first lieutenant, Mr. McDonald, who endeavored very gallantly to carry out his commander's intention, and at 1. 56 the _Penguin's_ bowsprit came in between the _Hornet's_ main- and mizzen-rigging on the starboard side.

The American seamen had been called away, and were at their posts to repel boarders, but as the British made no attempt to come on, the cutlass men began to clamber into the rigging to go aboard the brig.

Captain Biddle very coolly stopped them, "it being evident from the beginning that our fire was greatly superior both in quickness and effect."

There was a heavy sea running, and as the _Hornet_ forged ahead, the _Penguin's_ bowsprit carried away her mizzen shrouds, stern davits, and spanker boom; and the brig then hung on her starboard quarter, where only small arms could be used on either side.

An English officer now called out something which Biddle understood, whether correctly or not is disputed, to be the word of surrender; accordingly he directed his marines to cease firing, and jumped on the taffrail.

At that minute two of the marines on the _Penguin's_ forecastle, not 30 feet distant, fired at him, one of the balls inflicting a rather severe wound in his neck.

A discharge of musketry from the _Hornet_ at once killed both the marines, and at that moment the ship drew ahead.

As the vessels separated the _Penguin's_ foremast went overboard, the bowsprit breaking short off.

The _Hornet_ at once wore, to present a fresh broadside, while the _Penguin's_ disabled condition prevented her following suit, and having lost a third of her men killed and wounded (14 of the former and 28 of the latter), her hull being riddled through and through, her foremast gone, main-mast tottering, and most of the guns on the engaged side dismounted, she struck her colors at two minutes past two, twenty-two minutes after the first gun was fired.

Of the _Hornet's_ 150 men, 8 were absent in a prize.

By actual measurement she was two feet longer and slightly narrower than her antagonist.

Her loss was chiefly caused by musketry, amounting to 1 marine killed, 1 seaman mortally, Lieutenant Conner very severely, and Captain Biddle and seven seamen slightly, wounded.

Not a round shot struck the hull, nor was a mast or spar materially injured, but the rigging and sails were a good deal cut, especially about the fore and main top-gallant masts.

The _Hornet's_ crew had been suffering much from sickness, and 9 of the men were unable to be at quarters, thus reducing the vessels to an exact equality.

Counting in these men, and excluding the 8 absent in a prize, we get as COMPARATIVE FORCE.

No. Weight Tonnage.

Guns.

Metal.

Crew.

Loss.

_Hornet_ 480 10 279 142[1] 11 _Penguin_ 477 10 274 132 42 [Footnote 1: This number of men is probably too great; I have not personally examined the _Hornet's_ muster-roll for that period.

Lieutenant Emmons in his "History," gives her 132 men; but perhaps he did not include the nine sick, which would make his statement about the same as mine.

In response to my inquiries, I received a very kind letter from the Treasury Department (Fourth Auditor's office), which stated that the muster-roll of the _Hornet_ on this voyage showed "101 officers and crew (marines excepted)."

Adding the 20 marines would make but 121 in all.

I think there must be some mistake in this, and so have considered the _Hornet's_ crew as consisting originally of 150 men, the same as on her cruises in 1812. The _Penguin_ was in reality slightly larger than the _Hornet_, judging from the comparisons made in Biddle's letter (for the original of which see in the Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters," vol. 42, No. 112).

He says that the _Penguin_, though two feet shorter on deck than the _Hornet_, had a greater length of keel, a slightly greater breadth of beam, stouter sides, and higher bulwarks, with swivels on the capstan and tops, and that she fought both her "long 12's" on the same side.

I have followed James, however, as regards this;

he says her long guns were 6-pounders, and that but one was fought on a side.

] Or, the force being practically equal, the _Hornet_ inflicted fourfold the loss and tenfold the damage she suffered.

Hardly any action of the war reflected greater credit on the United States marine than this; for the cool, skilful seamanship and excellent gunnery that enabled the Americans to destroy an antagonist of equal force in such an exceedingly short time.

The British displayed equal bravery, but were certainly very much behind their antagonists in the other qualities which go to make up a first-rate man-of-warsman.

Even James says he "cannot offer the trifling disparity of force in this action as an excuse for the _Penguin's_ capture.

The chief cause is * * * the immense disparity between the two vessels in * * * the effectiveness of their crews."

[Footnote: After the action but one official account, that of Captain Biddle, was published; none of the letters of the defeated British commanders were published after 1813. As regards this action, every British writer has followed James, who begins his account thus: "Had the vessel in sight to windward been rigged with three masts instead of two, and had she proved to be a British cruiser, Captain Biddle would have marked her down in his log as a 'frigate,' and have made off with all the canvas he could possibly spread.

Had the ship overtaken the _Hornet_ and been in reality a trifle superior in force, Captain Biddle, we have no doubt, would have exhausted his eloquence in lauding the blessings of peace before he tried a struggle for the honors of war."

After this preface (which should be read in connection with the _Hornet's_ unaccepted challenge to the _Bonne Citoyenne_, a ship "a trifle superior in force") it can be considered certain that James will both extenuate and also set down a good deal in malice.

One instance of this has already been given in speaking of the _President's_ capture.

Again, he says, "the _Hornet_ received several round shot in her hull," which she did--a month after this action, from the _Cornwallis_, 74; James knew perfectly well that not one of the _Penguin's_ shot hit the _Hornet's_ hull.

The quotations I have given are quite enough to prove that nothing he says about the action is worth attending to.

The funniest part of his account is where he makes Captain Biddle get drunk, lose his "native cunning," and corroborate his (James') statements.

He does not even hint at the authority for this.

] The _Penguin_ was so cut up by shot that she had to be destroyed.

After the stores, etc. , had been taken out of her, she was thoroughly examined (Captain Biddle, from curiosity, taking her measurements in comparison with those of the _Hornet_).

Her destruction was hastened on account of a strange sail heaving in sight; but the latter proved to be the _Peacock_, with the _Tom Bowline_ in company.

The latter was now turned to account by being sent in to Rio de Janeiro as a cartel with the prisoners.

The _Peacock_ and _Hornet_ remained about the island till April 13th, and then, giving up all hopes of seeing the _President_, and rightly supposing she had been captured, started out for the East Indies.

On the 27th of the month, in lat.

38°30' S.

and long.

33° E.

,[Footnote: Letter of Captain Biddle, June 10th, and extracts from her log.

] the _Peacock_ signalled a stranger in the S. E.

, and both sloops crowded sail in chase.

The next morning they came down with the wind aft from the northwest, the studding-sails set on both sides.

The new 22-gun sloops were not only better war-vessels, but faster ones too, than any other ships of their rate;

and the _Peacock_ by afternoon was two leagues ahead of the _Hornet_, At 2 P. M.

the former was observed to manifest some hesitation about approaching the stranger, which instead of avoiding had rather hauled up toward them.

All on board the _Hornet_ thought her an Indiaman, and "the men began to wonder what they would do with the silks," when, a few minutes before four, the _Peacock_ signalled that it was a line-of-battle ship, which reversed the parts with a vengeance.

Warrington's swift ship was soon out of danger, while Biddle hauled close to the wind on the port tack, with the _Cornwallis_, 74, bearing the flag of Admiral Sir George Burleton, K. C. B.

, [Footnote: James, vi, 564. ] in hot pursuit, two leagues on his lee quarter.

The 74 gained rapidly on the _Hornet_, although she stopped to pick up a marine who had fallen overboard.

Finding he had to deal with a most weatherly craft, as well as a swift sailer, Captain Biddle, at 9 P. M.

, began to lighten the _Hornet_ of the mass of stores taken from the _Penguin_.

The _Cornwallis_ gained still, however, and at 2 A. M.

on the 29th was ahead of the _Hornet's_ lee or starboard beam, when the sloop put about and ran off toward the west.

Daylight showed the 74 still astern and to leeward, but having gained so much as to be within gunshot, and shortly afterward she opened fire, her shot passing over the Hornet.

The latter had recourse anew to the lightening process.

She had already hove overboard the sheet-anchor, several heavy spare spars, and a large quantity of shot and ballast; the remaining anchors and cables, more shot, six guns, and the launch now followed suit, and, thus relieved, the _Hornet_ passed temporarily out of danger; but the breeze shifted gradually round to the east, and the liner came looming up till at noon she was within a mile, a shorter range than that at which the _United States_ crippled and cut up the _Macedonian_; and had the _Cornwallis'_ fire been half as well aimed as that of the _States_, it would have been the last of the _Hornet_.

But the 74's guns were very unskilfully served, and the shot passed for the most part away over the chase, but three getting home.

Captain Biddle and his crew had no hope of ultimate escape, but no one thought of giving up.

All the remaining spare spars and boats, all the guns but one, the shot, and in fact every thing that could be got at, below or on deck, was thrown overboard.

This increased the way of the _Hornet_, while the _Cornwallis_ lost ground by hauling off to give broadsides, which were as ineffectual as the fire from the chase-guns had been.

The _Hornet_ now had gained a little, and managed to hold her own, and shortly afterward the pluck and skill of her crew [Footnote: It is perhaps worth noting that the accounts incidentally mention the fact that almost the entire crew consisted of native Americans, of whom _quite a number had served as impressed seamen on board British war-ships_.

James multiplies these threefold and sets them down as British.

] were rewarded.

The shift in the wind had been very much against them, but now it veered back again so as to bring them to windward; and every minute, as it blew fresher and fresher, their chances increased.

By dark the _Cornwallis_ was well astern, and during the night the wind kept freshening, blowing in squalls, which just suited the _Hornet_, and when day broke the liner was hull down astern.

Then, on the morning of the 30th, after nearly 48 hours' chase, she abandoned the pursuit.

The _Hornet_ was now of course no use as a cruiser, and made sail for New York, which she reached on June 9th.

This chase requires almost the same comments as the last chase of the _Constitution_.

In both cases the American captains and their crews deserve the very highest praise for plucky, skilful seamanship; but exactly as Stewart's coolness and promptitude might not have saved the _Constitution_ had it not been for the blunders made by his antagonists, so the _Hornet_ would have assuredly been taken, in spite of Biddle's stubbornness and resource, if the _Cornwallis_ had not shown such unskilful gunnery, which was all the more discreditable since she carried an admiral's flag.

The _Peacock_ was thus the only one left of the squadron originally prepared for the East Indies; however, she kept on, went round the Cape of Good Hope, and cruised across the Indian Ocean, capturing 4 great Indiamen, very valuable prizes, manned by 291 men.

Then she entered the Straits of Sunda, and on the 30th of June, off the fort of Anjier fell in with the East India Company's cruiser _Nautilus_, Lieut.

Boyce, a brig of 180 (American measurement over 200) tons, with a crew of 80 men, and 14 guns, 4 long 9's and ten 18-pound carronades.

[Footnote: "History of the Indian Navy," by Charles Rathbone Low (late lieutenant of the Indian Navy), London, 1877, p. 285. ] Captain Warrington did not know of the peace; one of the boats of the _Nautilus_, however, with her purser, Mr. Bartlett, boarded him.

Captain Warrington declares the latter made no mention of the peace, while Mr. Bartlett swears that he did before he was sent below.

As the _Peacock_ approached, Lieut.

Boyce hailed to ask if she knew peace had been declared.

Captain Warrington, according to his letter, regarded this as a ruse to enable the brig to escape under the guns of the fort, and commanded the lieutenant to haul down his colors, which the latter refused to do, and very gallantly prepared for a struggle with a foe of more than twice his strength.

According to Captain Warrington, one, or, by the deposition of Mr. Bartlett, [Footnote: As quoted by Low.

] two broadsides were then interchanged, and the brig surrendered, having lost 7 men, including her first lieutenant, killed and mortally wounded, and 8 severely or slightly wounded.

Two of her guns and the sheet-anchor were disabled, the bends on the starboard side completely shivered from aft to the forechains, the bulwarks from the chess-tree aft much torn, and the rigging cut to pieces.

[Footnote: Letter of Lieut.

Boyce to Company's Marine Board, as quoted by Low.

] The _Peacock_ did not suffer the slightest loss or damage.

Regarding the affair purely as a conflict between vessels of nations at war with each other, the criticism made by Lord Howard Douglass on the action between the _President_ and _Little Belt_ applies here perfectly.

"If a vessel meet an enemy of even greatly superior force, it is due to the honor of her flag to try the effect of a few rounds; but unless in this gallant attempt she leave marks of her skill upon the larger body, while she, the smaller body, is hit at every discharge, she does but salute her enemy's triumph and discredit her own gunnery."

[Footnote: "Naval Gunnery," p. 3. ] There could not have been a more satisfactory exhibition of skill than that given by Captain Warrington; but I regret to say that it is difficult to believe he acted with proper humanity.

It seems impossible that Mr. Bartlett did not mention that peace had been signed; and when the opposing force was so much less than his own it would have been safe at least to defer the order "haul down your flag" for a short time, while he could have kept the brig within half pistol-shot, until he could have inquired into the truth of the report.

Throughout this work I have wherever possible avoided all references to the various accusations and recriminations of some of the captains about "unfairness," "cruelty," etc. , as in most cases it is impossible to get at the truth, the accounts flatly contradicting one another.

In this case, however, there certainly seems some ground for the rather fervent denunciations of Captain Warrington indulged in by Lieut.

Low.

But it is well to remember that a very similar affair, with the parties reversed, had taken place but a few months before on the coast of America.

This was on Feb.

22d, after the boats of the _Erebus_, 20, and _Primrose_, 18, under Captains Bartholomew and Phillot, had been beaten off with a loss of 30 men (including both captains wounded), in an expedition up St. Mary's River, Ga.

The two captains and their vessels then joined Admiral Cockburn at Cumberland Island, and on the 25th of February were informed officially of the existence of peace.

Three weeks afterward the American gunboat, No. 168, Mr. Hurlburt, sailed from Tybee Bar, Ga.

, bearing despatches for the British admiral.

[Footnote: Letter from Com.

Campbell to Sec.

of Navy, Mar.

29, 1815. including one from Sailing-master John H. Hurlburt of Mar.

18, 1815, preserved in the Naval Archives, in vol. 43, No. 125, of "Captains' Letters."

See also "Niles' Register," viii, 104, 118, etc. ] On the same day in the afternoon she fell in with the _Erebus_, Captain Bartholomew.

Peace having been declared, and having been known to exist for over three weeks, no effort was made to avoid the British vessel; but when the gunboat neared the latter she was suddenly hailed and told to heave to.

Mr. Hurlburt answered that he had dispatches for Admiral Cockburn, to which Captain Bartholomew responded, with many oaths, that he did not care, he would sink her if she did not send a boat aboard.

When Mr. Hurlburt attempted to answer some muskets were discharged at him, and he was told to strike.

He refused, and the _Erebus_ immediately opened fire from her great guns; the gunboat had gotten so far round that her pivot-gun would not bear properly, but it was discharged across the bows of the _Erebus_, and then Mr. Hurlburt struck his colors.

Although he had lain right under the foe's broadside, he had suffered no loss or damage except a few ropes cut, and some shot-holes in the sails.

Afterward Captain Bartholomew apologized, and let the gunboat proceed.

This attack was quite as wanton and unprovoked as Warrington's, and Bartholomew's foe was relatively to himself even less powerful;

moreover, while the _Peacock's_ crew showed great skill in handling their guns, the crew of the _Erebus_ most emphatically did not.

The intent in both cases was equally bad, only the British captain lacked the ability to carry his out.

Summary.

The concluding operations of the war call for much the same comments as those of the preceding years.

The balance of praise certainly inclines toward the Americans.

Captain John Hayes' squadron showed great hardihood, perseverance and judgment, which were rewarded by the capture of the _President_; and Decatur's surrender seems decidedly tame.

But as regards the action between the _President_ and _Endymion_ (taking into account the fact that the former fought almost under the guns of an overwhelming force, and was therefore obliged to expose herself far more than she otherwise would have), it showed nearly as great superiority on the side of the Americans as the frigate actions of 1812 did--in fact, probably quite as much as in the case of the _Java_.

Similarly, while the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ did well, the _Constitution_ did better; and Sir George Collier's ships certainly did not distinguish themselves when in chase of _Old Ironsides_.

So with the _Hornet_ in her two encounters; no one can question the pluck with which the _Penguin_ was fought, but her gunnery was as bad as that of the _Cornwallis_ subsequently proved.

And though the skirmish between the _Peacock_ and _Nautilus_ is not one to which an American cares to look back, yet, regarding it purely from a fighting stand-point, there is no question which crew was the best trained and most skilful.

LIST OF SHIPS BUILT IN 1815.

Name.

Rate.

Where Built.

Cost.

_Washington_ 74 Portsmouth ,861. 00 _Independence_ 74 Boston 421,810. 41 _Franklin_ 74 Philadelphia 438,149. 40 _Guerrière_ 44 " 306,158. 56 _Java_ 44 Baltimore 232,767. 38 _Fulton_ 30 New York 320,000. 00 _Torpedo_ " These ships first put to sea in this year.

For the first time in her history the United States possessed line-of-battle ships; and for the first time in all history, the steam frigate appeared on the navy list of a nation.

The _Fulton_, with her clumsy central wheel, concealed from shot by the double hull, with such thick scantling that none but heavy guns could harm her, and relying for offensive weapons not on a broadside of thirty guns of small calibre, but on two pivotal 100-pounder columbiads, or, perhaps, if necessary, on blows from her hog snout,--the _Fulton_ was the true prototype of the modern steam ironclad, with its few heavy guns and ram.

Almost as significant is the presence of the _Torpedo_.

I have not chronicled the several efforts made by the Americans to destroy British vessels with torpedoes; some very nearly succeeded, and although they failed it must not be supposed that they did no good.

On the contrary, they made the British in many cases very cautious about venturing into good anchorage (especially in Long Island Sound and the Chesapeake), and by the mere terror of their name prevented more than one harrying expedition.

The _Fulton_ was not got into condition to be fought until just as the war ended; had it continued a few months, it is more than probable that the deeds of the _Merrimac_ and the havoc wrought by the Confederate torpedoes would have been forestalled by nearly half a century.

As it was, neither of these engines of war attracted much attention.

For ten or fifteen years the _Fulton_ was the only war-vessel of her kind in existence, and then her name disappears from our lists.

The torpedoes had been tried in the Revolutionary War, but their failure prevented much notice from being taken of them, and, besides, at that time there was a strong feeling that it was dishonorable to blow a ship up with a powder-can concealed _under_ the water, though highly laudable to burn her by means of a fire-raft floating _on_ the water--a nice distinction in naval ethics that has since disappeared.

[Footnote: James fairly foams at the mouth at the mere mention of torpedoes.

] AMERICAN VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC.

By Ocean Cruisers.

Name.

Guns.

Tonnage.

Remarks.

_President_ 52 1,576 captured by squadron.

--- ----- 52 guns 1,576 tons.

BRITISH VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC.

a. --By Privateers.

Name.

Guns.

Tonnage.

Remarks.

_Chasseur_ 12 240 by privateer _St.

Lawrence_.

b. --By Ocean Cruisers _Cyane_ 34 659 by _Constitution_.

_Levant_ 20 500 retaken.

_Penguin_ 19 477 by _Hornet_.

--- ----- 85 guns 1,876 tons.

20 500 (subtracting _Levant_).

65 guns, 1,376 tons.

In summing up the results of the struggle on the ocean it is to be noticed that very little was attempted, and nothing done, by the American Navy that could _materially_ affect the result of the war.

Commodore Rodgers' expedition after the Jamaica Plate fleet failed;

both the efforts to get a small squadron into the East Indian waters also miscarried; and otherwise the whole history of the struggle on the ocean is, as regards the Americans, only the record of individual cruises and fights.

The material results were not very great, at least in their effect on Great Britain, whose enormous navy did not feel in the slightest degree the loss of a few frigates and sloops.

But morally the result was of inestimable benefit to the United States.

The victories kept up the spirits of the people, cast down by the defeats on land; practically decided in favor of the Americans the chief question in dispute--Great Britain's right of search and impressment--and gave the navy, and thereby the country, a world-wide reputation.

I doubt if ever before a nation gained so much honor by a few single-ship duels.

For there can be no question which side came out of the war with the greatest credit.

The damage inflicted by each on the other was not very unequal in amount, but the balance was certainly in favor of the United States, as can be seen by the following tables, for the details of which reference can be made to the various years: AMERICAN LOSS.

BRITISH LOSS.

Caused: Tonnage.

Guns.

Tonnage.

[1] Guns.

By Ocean Cruisers 5,984 278 8,451 351 On the Lakes 727 37 4,159 212 By the Army 3,007 116 500 22 By Privateers -- -- 402 20 ------ ---- ------ ---- Total, 9,718 431 13,512 605 [Footnote 1: The tonnage can only be given approximately, as that of the vessels on Lake Champlain is not exactly known, although we know about what the two fleets tonned relatively to one another.

] In addition we lost 4 revenue-cutters, mounting 24 guns, and, in the aggregate, of 387 tons, and also, 25 gun-boats, with 71 guns, and, in the aggregate, of nearly 2,000 tons.

This would swell our loss to 12,105 tons, and 526 guns; [Footnote: This differs greatly from the figures given by James in his "Naval Occurrences" (App.

ccxv).

He makes the American loss 14,844 tons, and 660 guns.

His list includes, for example, the "_Growler_ and _Hamilton_, upset in carrying sail to avoid Sir James' fleet"; it would be quite reasonable to put down the loss of the _Royal George_ to the credit of the French.

Then he mentions the _Julia_ and _Growler_, which were recaptured; the _Asp_, which was also recaptured; the "_New York_, 46, destroyed at Washington," which was _not_ destroyed or harmed in any way, and which, moreover, was a condemned hulk; the "_Boston_, 42 (in reality 32), destroyed at Washington," which had been a condemned hulk for ten years, and had no guns or anything else in her, and was as much a loss to our navy as the fishing up and burning of an old wreck would have been;

and 8 gun-boats whose destruction was either mythical, or else which were not national vessels.

By deducting all these we reduce James' total by 120 guns, and 2,600 tons; and a few more alterations (such as excluding the swivels in the _President's_ tops, which he counts, etc. ), brings his number down to that given above--and also affords a good idea of the value to be attached to his figures and tables.

The British loss he gives at but 530 guns and 10,273 tons.

He omits the 24-gun ship burnt by Chauncy at York, although including the frigate and corvette burnt by Ross at Washington; if the former is excluded the two latter should be, which would make the balance still more in favor of the Americans.

He omits the guns of the _Gloucester_, because they had been taken out of her and placed in battery on the shore, bur he includes those of the _Adams_, which had been served in precisely the same way.

He omits all reference to the British 14-gun schooner burnt on Ontario, and to all 3 and 4-gun sloops and schooners captured there, although including the corresponding American vessels.

The reason that he so much underestimates the tonnage, especially on the lakes, I have elsewhere discussed.

His tables of the relative loss in men are even more erroneous, exaggerating that of the Americans, and greatly underestimating that of the British;

but I have not tabulated this on account of the impossibility of getting fair estimates of the killed and wounded in the cutting-out expeditions, and the difficulty of enumerating the prisoners taken in descents, etc. Roughly, about 2,700 Americans and 3,800 British were captured; the comparative loss in killed and wounded stood much more in our favor.

I have excluded from the British loss the brigs _Detroit_ and _Caledonia_, and schooner _Nancy_ (aggregating 10 guns and about 500 tons), destroyed on the upper lakes, because I hardly know whether they could be considered national vessels; the schooner _Highflyer_, of 8 guns, 40 men, and 209 tons, taken by Rodgers, because she seems to have been merely a tender; and the _Dominica_, 15, of 77 men, and 270 tons, because her captor, the privateer _Decatur_, though nominally an American, was really a French vessel.

Of course both tables are only approximately exact; but at any rate the balance of damage and loss was over 4 to 3 in our favor.

] but the loss of the revenue-cutters and gun-boats can fairly be considered to be counterbalanced by the capture or destruction of the various British Royal Packets (all armed with from 2 to 10 guns), tenders, barges, etc. , which would be in the aggregate of at least as great tonnage and gun force, and with more numerous crews.

But the comparative material loss gives no idea of the comparative honor gained.

The British navy, numbering at the onset a thousand cruisers, had accomplished less than the American, which numbered but a dozen.

Moreover, most of the loss suffered by the former was in single fight, while this had been but twice the case with the Americans, who had generally been overwhelmed by numbers.

The _President_ and _Essex_ were both captured by more than double their force simply because they were disabled before the fight began, otherwise they would certainly have escaped.

With the exceptions of the _Chesapeake_ and _Argus_ (both of which were taken fairly, because their antagonists, though of only equal force, were better fighters), the remaining loss of the Americans was due to the small cruisers stumbling from time to time across the path of some one of the innumerable British heavy vessels.

Had Congressional forethought been sufficiently great to have allowed a few line-of-battle ships to have been in readiness some time previous to the war, results of weight might have been accomplished.

But the only activity ever exhibited by Congress in materially increasing the navy previous to the war, had been in partially carrying out President Jefferson's ideas of having an enormous force of very worthless gun-boats--a scheme whose wisdom was about on a par with some of that statesman's political and military theories.

Of the twelve [Footnote: Not counting the last action of the _Constitution_, the _President's_ action, or the capture of the _Essex_, on account of the difficulty of fairly estimating the amount of credit due to each side.

In both the first actions, however, the American ships seem to have been rather more ably fought than their antagonists, and, taking into account the overwhelming disadvantages under which the _Essex_ labored, her defence displayed more desperate bravery than did that of any other ship during the war.

] single-ship actions, two (those of the _Argus_ and _Chesapeake_) undoubtedly redounded most to the credit of the British, in two (that of the _Wasp_ with the _Reindeer_, and that of the _Enterprise_ with the _Boxer_), the honors were nearly even, and in the other eight the superiority of the Americans was very manifest.

In three actions (those with the _Penguin_, _Frolic_, and _Shannon_) the combatants were about equal in strength, the Americans having slightly the advantage; in all the others but two, the victors combined superiority of force with superiority of skill.

In but two cases, those of the _Argus_ and _Epervier_, could any lack of courage be imputed to the vanquished.

The second year alone showed to the advantage of the British; the various encounters otherwise were as creditable to the Americans at the end as at the beginning of the war.

This is worth attending to, because many authors speak as if the successes of the Americans were confined to the first year.

It is true that no frigate was taken after the first year, but this was partly because the strictness of the blockade kept the American frigates more in port, while the sloops put out to sea at pleasure, and partly because after that year the British 18-pounder frigates either cruised in couples, or, when single, invariably refused, by order of the Board of Admiralty, an encounter with a 24-pounder; and though much of the American success was unquestionably to be attributed to more men and heavier guns, yet much of it was not.

The war itself gives us two instances in which defeat was owing solely, it may be said, to inferiority of force, courage and skill being equal.

The _Wasp_ was far heavier than the _Reindeer_, and, there being nothing to choose between them in any thing else, the damage done was about proportionate to this difference.

It follows, as a matter of course, that the very much greater disproportion in loss in the cases of the _Avon_, _Epervier_, etc. , where the disproportion in force was much less (they mounting 32's instead of 24's, and the victors being all of the same class), is only to be explained by the inferiority in skill on the part of the vanquished.

These remarks apply just as much to the _Argus_.

The _Reindeer_, with her 24's, would have been almost exactly on a par with her, and yet would have taken her with even greater ease than the _Peacock_ did with her 32's. In other words, the only effect of our superiority in metal, men, and tonnage was to increase somewhat the disparity in loss.

Had the _Congress_ and _Constellation_, instead of the _United States_ and _Constitution_, encountered the _Macedonian_ and _Java_, the difference in execution would have been less than it was, but the result would have been unchanged, and would have been precisely such as ensued when the _Wasp_ met the _Frolic_, or the _Hornet_ the _Penguin_.

On the other hand, had the _Shannon_ met the _Constitution_ there would have been a repetition of the fight between the _Wasp_ and _Reindeer_; for it is but fair to remember that great as is the honor that Broke deserves, it is no more than that due to Manners.

The Republic of the United States owed a great deal to the excellent make and armament of its ships, but it owed still more to the men who were in them.

The massive timbers and heavy guns of _Old Ironsides_ would have availed but little had it not been for her able commanders and crews.

Of all the excellent single-ship captains, British or American, produced by the war, the palm should be awarded to Hull.

[Footnote: See "Naval Tactics," by Commander J. H.

Ward, and "Life of Commodore Tatnall," by Charles C. Jones, Jr. ] The deed of no other man (excepting Macdonough) equalled his escape from Broke's five ships, or surpassed his half-hour's conflict with the _Guerrière_.

After him, almost all the American captains deserve high praise--Decatur, Jones, Blakely, Biddle, Bainbridge, Lawrence, Burrows, Allen, Warrington, Stewart, Porter.