Naval War of 1812 — 20 Part 20

But Packenham was all the while steadily preparing for his last and greatest stroke.

He had determined to make an assault in force as soon as the expected reinforcements came up; nor, in the light of his past experience in conflict with foes of far greater military repute than those now before him, was this a rash resolve.

He had seen the greatest of Napoleon's marshals, each in turn, defeated once and again, and driven in headlong flight over the Pyrenees by the Duke of Wellington; now he had under him the flower of the troops who had won those victories; was it to be supposed for a moment that such soldiers [Footnote: Speaking of Soult's overthrow a few months previous to this battle, Napier says (v, 209): "He was opposed to one of the greatest generals of the world, at the head of unconquerable troops.

For what Alexander's Macedonians were at Arbela, Hannibal's Africans at Cannae, Caesar's Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon's Guards at Austerlitz--such were Wellington's British soldiers at this period....

Six years of uninterrupted success had engrafted on their natural strength and fierceness a confidence that made them invincible."

] who, in a dozen battles, had conquered the armies and captured the forts of the mighty French emperor, would shrink at last from a mud wall guarded by rough backwoodsmen?

That there would be loss of life in such an assault was certain; but was loss of life to daunt men who had seen the horrible slaughter through which the stormers moved on to victory at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian?

At the battle of Toulouse an English army, of which Packenham's troops then formed part, had driven Soult from a stronger position than was now to be assailed, though he held it with a veteran infantry.

Of a surety, the dashing general who had delivered the decisive blow on the stricken field of Salamanca, [Footnote: It was about 5 o'clock when Packenham fell upon Thomieres....

From the chief to the lowest soldier, all [of the French] felt that they were lost, and in an instant Packenham, the most frank and gallant of men, commenced the battle.

The British columns formed lines as they marched, and the French gunners, standing up manfully for the honor of their country, sent showers of grape into the advancing masses, while a crowd of light troops poured in a fire of musketry, under cover of which the main body endeavored to display a front.

But, bearing onwards through the skirmishers with the might of a giant, Packenham broke the half-formed lines into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon the advancing supports...

Packenham, bearing onwards with conquering violence,...

formed one formidable line two miles in advance of where Packenham had first attacked; and that impetuous officer, with unmitigated strength, still pressed forward, spreading terror and disorder on the enemy's left.

(Napier, iv, 57, 58. 59. )] who had taken part in the rout of the ablest generals and steadiest soldiers of Continental Europe, was not the man to flinch from a motley array of volunteers, militia, and raw regulars, led by a grizzled old bush-fighter, whose name had never been heard of outside of his own swamps, and there only as the savage destroyer of some scarcely more savage Indian tribes.

Moreover, Packenham was planning a flank attack.

Under his orders a canal was being dug from the head of the bayou up which the British had come, across the plain to the Mississippi.

This was to permit the passage of a number of ships' boats, on which one division was to be ferried to the opposite bank of the river, where it was to move up, and, by capturing the breastworks and water-battery on the west side, flank Jackson's main position on the east side.

[Footnote: "A particular feature in the assault was our cutting a canal into the Mississippi...

to convey a force to the right bank, which...

might surprise the enemy's batteries on that side.

I do not know how far this measure was relied on by the general, but, as he ordered and made his assault at daylight, I imagine he did not place much dependence upon it."

(Codrington, i, 335. ) ] When this canal was nearly finished the expected reinforcements, two thousand strong, under General Lambert, arrived, and by the evening of the 7th all was ready for the attack, which was to be made at daybreak on the following morning.

Packenham had under him nearly 10,000 [Footnote: James (ii, 373) says the British "rank and file" amounted to 8,153 men, including 1,200 seamen and marines.

The only other place where he speaks of the latter is in recounting the attack on the right bank, when he says "about 200" were with Thornton, while both the admirals, Cochrane and Codrington, make the number 300; so he probably underestimates their number throughout, and at least 300 can be added, making 1,500 sailors and marines, and a total of 8,453. This number is corroborated by Major McDougal.

the officer who received Sir Edward's body in his arms when was killed; he says (as quoted in the "Memoirs of British Generals Distinguished During the Peninsular War," by John William Cole, London.

1856, vol. ii, p. 364) that after the battle and the loss of 2,036 men, "we had still an effective force of 6,400," making a total before the attack of 8,436 rank and file.

Calling it 8,450, and adding (see ante, note 10) 13. 3 per cent, for the officers, sergeants, and trumpeters, we get about 9,600 men.

] fighting men; 1,500 of these, under Colonel Thornton were to cross the river and make the attack on the west bank.

Packenham himself was to superintend the main assault, on the east bank, which was to be made by the British right under General Gibbs, while the left moved forward under General Keane, and General Lambert commanded the reserve.

[Footnote: Letter of Major-General John Lambert to Earl Bathurst, Jan.

10, 1815. ] Jackson's [Footnote: 4,698 on the east bank, according to the official report of Adjutant-General Robert Butler, for the morning of January 8th.

The details are as follow: At batteries.....................................................

154 Command of Col. Ross (671 regulars and 742 Louisiana militia)...

1413 Command of General Carroll (Tennesseeans, and somewhat under 500 Kentuckians)....................................................

1562 General Coffee's command (Tennesseeans, and about 250 Louisiana militia)........................................................

813 Major Hind's dragoons...........................................

230 Col. Slaughter's command........................................

526 _____ Total, 4,698 These figures tally almost exactly with those given by Major Latour, except that he omits all reference to Col. Slaughter's command, thus reducing the number to about 4,100. Nor can I anywhere find any allusion to Slaughter's command as taking part in the battle; and it is possible that these troops were the 500 Kentuckians ordered across the river by Jackson; in which case his whole force but slightly exceeded 5,000 men.

On the west bank there were 546 Louisiana militia--260 of the First regiment, 176 of the Second, and 110 of the Sixth.

Jackson had ordered 500 Kentucky troops to be sent to reinforce them; only 400 started, of whom but 180 had arms.

Seventy more received arms from the Naval Arsenal; and thus a total of 250 armed men were added to the 546 already on the west bank.

] position was held by a total of 5,500 men.

[Footnote: Two thousand Kentucky militia had arrived, but in wretched plight; only 500 had arms, though pieces were found for about 250 more;

and thus Jackson's army received an addition of 750 very badly disciplined soldiers.

"Hardly one third of the Kentucky troops, so long expected, are armed, and the arms they have are not fit for use."

(Letter of Gen. Jackson to the Secretary of War, Jan.

3d.

) Having kept a constant watch on the British, Jackson had rightly concluded that they would make the main attack on the east bank, and had, accordingly, kept the bulk of his force on that side.

His works consisted simply of a mud breastwork, with a ditch in front of it, which stretched in a straight line from the river on his right across the plain, and some distance into the morass that sheltered his left.

There was a small, unfinished redoubt in front of the breastworks on the river bank.

Thirteen pieces of artillery were mounted on the works.

[Footnote: Almost all British writers underestimate their own force and enormously magnify that of the Americans.

Alison, for example, quadruples Jackson's _relative_ strength, writing: "About 6,000 combatants were on the British side;

a slender force to attack double their number, intrenched to the teeth in works bristling with bayonets and loaded with heavy artillery."

Instead of double, he should have said half; the bayonets only "bristled" metaphorically, as less than a quarter of the Americans were armed with them; and the British breaching batteries had a heavier "load" of artillery than did the American lines.

Gleig says that "to come nearer the truth" he "will choose a middle course, and suppose their whole force to be about 25,000 men," (p. 325).

Gleig, by the way, in speaking of the battle itself, mentions one most startling evolution of the Americans, namely, that "without so much as lifting their faces above the ramparts, they swung their firelocks by one arm over the wall and discharged them" at the British.

If any one will try to perform this feat, with a long, heavy rifle held in one hand, and with his head hid behind a wall, so as not to see the object aimed at, he will get a good idea of the likelihood of any man in his senses attempting it.

] On the right was posted the Seventh regular infantry, 430 strong; then came 740 Louisiana militia (both French Creoles and men of color, and comprising 30 New Orleans riflemen, who were Americans), and 240 regulars of the Forty-fourth regiment;

while the rest of the line was formed by nearly 500 Kentuckians and over 1,600 Tennesseeans, under Carroll and Coffee, with 250 creole militia in the morass on the extreme left, to guard the head of a bayou.

In the rear were 230 dragoons, chiefly from Mississippi, and some other troops in reserve; making in all 4,700 men on the east bank.

The works on the west bank were farther down stream, and were very much weaker.

Commodore Patterson had thrown up a water-battery of nine guns, three long 24's and six long 12's, pointing across the river, and intended to take in flank any foe attacking Jackson.

This battery was protected by some strong earthworks, mounting three field-pieces, which were thrown up just below it, and stretched from the river about 200 yards into the plain.

The line of defence was extended by a ditch for about a quarter of a mile farther, when it ended, and from there to the morass, half a mile distant, there were no defensive works at all.

General Morgan, a very poor militia officer, [Footnote: He committed every possible fault, except showing lack of courage.

He placed his works at a very broad instead of a narrow part of the plain, against the advice of Latour, who had Jackson's approval (Latour, 167).

He continued his earthworks but a very short distance inland, making them exceedingly strong in front, and absolutely defenceless on account of their flanks being unprotected.

He did not mount the lighter guns of the water-battery on his lines, as he ought to have done.

Having a force of 800 men, too weak anyhow, he promptly divided it; and, finally, in the fight itself, he stationed a small number of absolutely raw troops in a thin line on the open, with their flank in the air; while a much larger number of older troops were kept to defend a much shorter line, behind a strong breastwork, with their flanks covered.

] was in command, with a force of 550 Louisiana militia, some of them poorly armed; and on the night before the engagement he was reinforced by 250 Kentuckians, poorly armed, undisciplined, and worn out with fatigue.

[Footnote: Latour, 170. ] All through the night of the 7th a strange, murmurous clangor arose from the British camp, and was borne on the moist air to the lines of their slumbering foes.

The blows of pickaxe and spade as the ground was thrown up into batteries by gangs of workmen, the rumble of the artillery as it was placed in position, the measured tread of the battalions as they shifted their places or marched off under Thornton,--all these and the thousand other sounds of warlike preparation were softened and blended by the distance into one continuous humming murmur, which struck on the ears of the American sentries with ominous foreboding for the morrow.

By midnight Jackson had risen and was getting every thing in readiness to hurl back the blow that he rightly judged was soon to fall on his front.

Before the dawn broke his soldiery was all on the alert.

The bronzed and brawny seamen were grouped in clusters around the great guns.

The creole soldiers came of a race whose habit it has ever been to take all phases of life joyously; but that morning their gayety was tempered by a dark undercurrent of fierce anxiety.

They had more at stake than any other men on the field.

They were fighting for their homes;

they were fighting for their wives and their daughters.

They well knew that the men they were to face were very brave in battle and very cruel in victory [Footnote: To prove this, it is only needful to quote from the words of the Duke of Wellington himself; referring, it must be remembered, to their conduct in a friendly, not a hostile country.

"It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages committed by the troops.

They are never out of sight of their officers, I might almost say, out of sight of the commanding officers of the regiments that outrages are not committed...

There is not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received them as friends."

"I really believe that more plunder and outrages have been committed by this army than by any other that ever was in the field."

"A detachment seldom marches...

that a murder, or a highway robbery, or some act of outrage is not committed by the British soldiers composing it.

They have killed eight people since the army returned to Portugal."

"They really forget every thing when plunder or wine is within reach."

]; they well knew the fell destruction and nameless woe that awaited their city should the English take it at the sword's point.

They feared not for themselves;

but in the hearts of the bravest and most careless there lurked a dull terror of what that day might bring upon those they loved.

[Footnote: That these fears were just can be seen by the following quotations, from the works of a British officer, General Napier, who was an eye-witness of what he describes.

It must be remembered that Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian were friendly towns, only the garrisons being hostile.

"Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness which tarnished the lustre of the soldiers' heroism.

All, indeed, were not alike, for hundreds risked and many lost their lives in striving to stop the violence; but the madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders here, all the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed.

Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of Badajos.

On the third, when the city was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the tumult rather subsided than was quelled."

(Vol. iii, 377).

And again: "This storm seemed to be a signal from hell for the perpetration of villainy which would have shamed the most ferocious barbarians of antiquity.

At Rodrigo intoxication and plunder had been the principal object; at Badajos lust and murder were joined to rapine and drunkenness; but at San Sebastian the direst, the most revolting cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes--one atrocity, of which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by its enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity...

a Portuguese adjutant, who endeavored to prevent some wickedness, was put to death in the market-place, not with sudden violence from a single ruffian, but deliberately, by a number of English soldiers....

and the disorder continued until the flames, following the steps of the plunderer, put an end to his ferocity by destroying the whole town."

Packenham himself would have certainly done all in his power to prevent excesses, and has been foully slandered by many early American writers.

Alluding to these, Napier remarks, somewhat caustically: "Pre-eminently distinguished for detestion of inhumanity and outrage, he has been, with astounding falsehood, represented as instigating his troops to the most infamous excesses; but from a people holding millions of their fellow-beings in the most horrible slavery, while they prate and vaunt of liberty until all men turn in loathing from the sickening folly, what can be expected?"

(Vol. v, p. 31. ) Napier possessed to a very eminent degree the virtue of being plain-spoken.

Elsewhere (iii, 450), after giving a most admirably fair and just account of the origin of the Anglo-American war, he alludes, with a good deal of justice, to the Americans of 1812, as "a people who (notwithstanding the curse of black slavery which clings to them, adding the most horrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mercantile spirit, and rendering their republican vanity ridiculous) do, in their general government, uphold civil institutions which have startled the crazy despotisms of Europe."

] The Tennesseeans were troubled by no such misgivings.

In saturnine, confident silence they lolled behind their mud walls, or, leaning on their long rifles, peered out into the gray fog with savage, reckless eyes.

So, hour after hour, the two armies stood facing each other in the darkness, waiting for the light of day.

At last the sun rose, and as its beams struggled through the morning mist they glinted on the sharp steel bayonets of the English, where their scarlet ranks were drawn up in battle array, but four hundred yards from the American breastworks.

There stood the matchless infantry of the island king, in the pride of their strength and the splendor of their martial glory; and as the haze cleared away they moved forward, in stern silence, broken only by the angry, snarling notes of the brazen bugles.

At once the American artillery leaped into furious life; and, ready and quick, the more numerous cannon of the invaders responded from their hot, feverish lips.

Unshaken amid the tumult of that iron storm the heavy red column moved steadily on toward the left of the American line, where the Tennesseeans were standing in motionless, grim expectancy.

Three fourths of the open space was crossed, and the eager soldiers broke into a run.

Then a fire of hell smote the British column.

From the breastwork in front of them the white smoke curled thick into the air, as rank after rank the wild marksmen of the backwoods rose and fired, aiming low and sure.

As stubble is withered by flame, so withered the British column under that deadly fire; and, aghast at the slaughter, the reeling files staggered and gave back.

Packenham, fit captain for his valorous host, rode to the front, and the troops, rallying round him, sprang forward with ringing cheers.

But once again the pealing rifle-blast beat in their faces; and the life of their dauntless leader went out before its scorching and fiery breath.

With him fell the other general who was with the column, and all of the men who were leading it on; and, as a last resource, Keane brought up his stalwart Highlanders; but in vain the stubborn mountaineers rushed on, only to die as their comrades had died before them, with unconquerable courage, facing the foe, to the last.

Keane himself was struck down; and the shattered wrecks of the British column, quailing before certain destruction, turned and sought refuge beyond reach of the leaden death that overwhelmed their comrades.

Nor did it fare better with the weaker force that was to assail the right of the American line.

This was led by the dashing Colonel Rennie, who, when the confusion caused by the main attack was at its height, rushed forward with impetuous bravery along the river bank.

With such headlong fury did he make the assault, that the rush of his troops took the outlying redoubt, whose defenders, regulars and artillerymen, fought to the last with their bayonets and clubbed muskets, and were butchered to a man.

Without delay Rennie flung his men at the breastworks behind, and, gallantly leading them, sword in hand, he, and all around him, fell, riddled through and through by the balls of the riflemen.

Brave though they were, the British soldiers could not stand against the singing, leaden hail, for if they stood it was but to die.

So in rout and wild dismay they fled back along the river bank, to the main army.

For some time afterward the British artillery kept up its fire, but was gradually silenced; the repulse was entire and complete along the whole line;

nor did the cheering news of success brought from the west bank give any hope to the British commanders, stunned by their crushing overthrow.

[Footnote: According to their official returns the British loss was 2,036; the American accounts, of course, make it much greater.

Latour is the only trustworthy American contemporary historian of this war, and even he at times absurdly exaggerates the British force and loss.

Most of the other American "histories" of that period were the most preposterously bombastic works that ever saw print.

But as regards this battle, none of them are as bad as even such British historians as Alison; the exact reverse being the case in many other battles, notably Lake Erie.

The devices each author adopts to lessen the seeming force of his side are generally of much the same character.

For instance, Latour says that 800 of Jackson's men were employed on works at the rear, on guard duty, etc. , and deducts them; James, for precisely similar reasons, deducts 853 men: by such means one reduces Jackson's total force to 4,000, and the other gives Packenham but 7,300. Only 2,000 Americans were actually engaged on the east banks.

] Meanwhile Colonel Thornton's attack on the opposite side had been successful, but had been delayed beyond the originally intended hour.

The sides of the canal by which the boats were to be brought through to the Mississippi caved in, and choked the passage, [Footnote: Codrington, i, 386. ] so that only enough got through to take over a half of Thornton's force.

With these, seven hundred in number, [Footnote: James says 298 soldiers and about 200 sailors; but Admiral Cochrane in his letter (Jan.

18th) says 600 men, half sailors; and Admiral Codrington also (p. 335) gives this number, 300 being sailors: adding 13 1/3 per cent.

for the officers, sergeants, and trumpeters, we get 680 men.

] he crossed, but as he did not allow for the current, it carried him down about two miles below the proper landing-place.

Meanwhile General Morgan, having under him eight hundred militia [Footnote: 796. (Latour, 164-172. )] whom it was of the utmost importance to have kept together, promptly divided them and sent three hundred of the rawest and most poorly armed down to meet the enemy in the open.

The inevitable result was their immediate rout and dispersion; about one hundred got back to Morgan's lines.

He then had six hundred men, all militia, to oppose to seven hundred regulars.

So he stationed the four hundred best disciplined men to defend the two hundred yards of strong breastworks, mounting three guns, which covered his left; while the two hundred worst disciplined were placed to guard six hundred yards of open ground on his right, with their flank resting in air, and entirely unprotected.

[Footnote: Report of Court of Inquiry, Maj.

-Gen. Wm.

Carroll presiding.

] This truly phenomenal arrangement ensured beforehand the certain defeat of his troops, no matter how well they fought; but, as it turned out, they hardly fought at all.

Thornton, pushing up the river, first attacked the breastwork in front, but was checked by a hot fire;

deploying his men he then sent a strong force to march round and take Morgan on his exposed right flank.

[Footnote: Letter of Col. W.

Thornton, Jan.

8. 1815. ] There, the already demoralized Kentucky militia, extended in thin order across an open space, outnumbered, and taken in flank by regular troops, were stampeded at once, and after firing a single volley they took to their heels.

[Footnote: Letter of Commodore Patterson, Jan.

13, 1815. ] This exposed the flank of the better disciplined creoles, who were also put to flight; but they kept some order and were soon rallied.

[Footnote: Alison outdoes himself in recounting this feat.

Having reduced the British force to 340 men, he says they captured the redoubt, "though defended by 22 guns and 1,700 men."

Of course, it was physically impossible for the water-battery to take part in the defence; so there were but 3 guns, and by halving the force on one side and trebling it on the other, he makes the relative strength of the Americans just sixfold what it was,--and is faithfully followed by other British writers.

] In bitter rage Patterson spiked the guns of his water-battery and marched off with his sailors, unmolested.

The American loss had been slight, and that of their opponents not heavy, though among their dangerously wounded was Colonel Thornton.

This success, though a brilliant one, and a disgrace to the American arms, had no effect on the battle.

Jackson at once sent over reinforcements under the famous French general, Humbert, and preparations were forthwith made to retake the lost position.

But it was already abandoned, and the force that had captured it had been recalled by Lambert, when he found that the place could not be held without additional troops.

[Footnote: The British Col. Dickson, who had been sent over to inspect, reported that 2,000 men would be needed to hold the battery; so Lambert ordered the British to retire.

(Lambert's letter, Jan.

10th.

)] The total British loss on both sides of the river amounted to over two thousand men, the vast majority of whom had fallen in the attack on the Tennesseeans, and most of the remainder in the attack made by Colonel Rennie.

The Americans had lost but seventy men, of whom but thirteen fell in the main attack.

On the east bank, neither the creole militia nor the Forty-fourth regiment had taken any part in the combat.

The English had thrown for high stakes and had lost every thing, and they knew it.

There was nothing to hope for left.

Nearly a fourth of their fighting men had fallen; and among the officers the proportion was far larger.

Of their four generals, Packenham was dead, Gibbs dying, Keane disabled, and only Lambert left.

Their leader, the ablest officers, and all the flower of their bravest men were lying, stark and dead, on the bloody plain before them;

and their bodies were doomed to crumble into mouldering dust on the green fields where they had fought and had fallen.

It was useless to make another trial.

They had learned to their bitter cost, that no troops, however steady, could advance over open ground against such a fire as came from Jackson's lines.

Their artillerymen had three times tried conclusions with the American gunners, and each time they had been forced to acknowledge themselves worsted.

They would never have another chance to repeat their flank attack, for Jackson had greatly strengthened and enlarged the works on the west bank, and had seen that they were fully manned and ably commanded.

Moreover, no sooner had the assault failed, than the Americans again began their old harassing warfare.

The heaviest cannon, both from the breastwork and the water-battery, played on the British camp, both night and day, giving the army no rest, and the mounted riflemen kept up a trifling, but incessant and annoying, skirmishing with their pickets and outposts.

The British could not advance, and it was worse than useless for them to stay where they were, for though they, from time to time, were reinforced, yet Jackson's forces augmented faster than theirs, and every day lessened the numerical inequality between the two armies.

There was but one thing left to do, and that was to retreat.

They had no fear of being attacked in turn.

The British soldiers were made of too good stuff to be in the least cowed or cast down even by such a slaughtering defeat as that they had just suffered, and nothing would have given them keener pleasure than to have had a fair chance at their adversaries in the open; but this chance was just what Jackson had no idea of giving them.

His own army, though in part as good as an army could be, consisted also in part of untrained militia, while not a quarter of his men had bayonets; and the wary old chief, for all his hardihood, had far too much wit to hazard such a force in fight with a superior number of seasoned veterans, thoroughly equipped, unless on his own ground and in his own manner.

So he contented himself with keeping a sharp watch on Lambert; and on the night of January 18th the latter deserted his position, and made a very skilful and rapid retreat, leaving eighty wounded men and fourteen pieces of cannon behind him.

[Footnote: Letter of General Jackson, Jan.

19th, and of General Lambert, Jan.

28th.

] A few stragglers were captured on land, and, while the troops were embarking, a number of barges, with over a hundred prisoners, were cut out by some American seamen in row-boats; but the bulk of the army reached the transports unmolested.

At the same time, a squadron of vessels, which had been unsuccessfully bombarding Fort Saint Philip for a week or two, and had been finally driven off when the fort got a mortar large enough to reach them with, also returned;

and the whole fleet set sail for Mobile.

The object was to capture Fort Bowyer, which contained less than four hundred men, and, though formidable on its sea-front, [Footnote: "Towards the sea its fortifications are respectable enough; but on the land side it is little better than a block-house.

The ramparts being composed of sand not more than three feet in thickness, and faced with plank, are barely cannon-proof; while a sand hill, rising within pistol-shot of the ditch, completely commands it.

Within, again, it is as much wanting in accommodation as it is in strength.

There are no bomb-proof barracks, nor any hole or arch under which men might find protection from shells; indeed, so deficient is it in common-lodging rooms, that great part of the garrison sleep in tents ...

With the reduction of this trifling work all hostilities ended."

(Gleig, 357. ) General Jackson impliedly censures the garrison for surrendering so quickly; but in such a fort it was absolutely impossible to act otherwise, and not the slightest stain rests upon the fort's defenders.

] was incapable of defence when regularly attacked on its land side.

The British landed, February 8th, some 1,500 men, broke ground, and made approaches; for four days the work went on amid a continual fire, which killed or wounded 11 Americans and 31 British; by that time the battering guns were in position and the fort capitulated, February 12th, the garrison marching out with the honors of war.

Immediately afterward the news of peace arrived and all hostilities terminated.

In spite of the last trifling success, the campaign had been to the British both bloody and disastrous.

It did not affect the results of the war; and the decisive battle itself was a perfectly useless shedding of blood, for peace had been declared before it was fought.

Nevertheless, it was not only glorious but profitable to the United States.

Louisiana was saved from being severely ravaged, and New Orleans from possible destruction; and after our humiliating defeats in trying to repel the invasions of Virginia and Maryland, the signal victory of New Orleans was really almost a necessity for the preservation of the national honor.

This campaign was the great event of the war, and in it was fought the most important battle as regards numbers that took place during the entire struggle; and the fact that we were victorious, not only saved our self-respect at home, but also gave us prestige abroad which we should otherwise have totally lacked.

It could not be said to entirely balance the numerous defeats that we had elsewhere suffered on land--defeats which had so far only been offset by Harrison's victory in 1813 and the campaign in Lower Canada in 1814--but it at any rate went a long way toward making the score even.

Jackson is certainly by all odds the most prominent figure that appeared during this war, and stands head and shoulders above any other commander, American or British, that it produced.

It will be difficult, in all history, to show a parallel to the feat that he performed.

In three weeks' fighting, with a force largely composed of militia, he utterly defeated and drove away an army twice the size of his own, composed of veteran troops, and led by one of the ablest of European generals.

During the whole campaign he only erred once, and that was in putting General Morgan, a very incompetent officer, in command of the forces on the west bank.

He suited his movements admirably to the various exigencies that arose.

The promptness and skill with which he attacked, as soon as he knew of the near approach of the British, undoubtedly saved the city;

for their vanguard was so roughly handled that, instead of being able to advance at once, they were forced to delay three days, during which time Jackson entrenched himself in a position from which he was never driven.

But after this attack the offensive would have been not only hazardous, but useless, and accordingly Jackson, adopting the mode of warfare which best suited the ground he was on and the troops he had under him, forced the enemy always to fight him where he was strongest, and confined himself strictly to the pure defensive--a system condemned by most European authorities, [Footnote: Thus Napier says (vol. v, p. 25): "Soult fared as most generals will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want of numbers or of hardiness in the troops.

Against rude commanders and undisciplined soldiers, lines may avail; seldom against accomplished commanders, never when the assailants are the better soldiers."

And again (p. 150), "Offensive operations must be the basis of a good defensive system."

] but which has at times succeeded to admiration in America, as witness Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Kenesaw Mountain, and Franklin.

Moreover, it must be remembered that Jackson's success was in no wise owing either to chance or to the errors of his adversary.

[Footnote: The reverse has been stated again and again with very great injustice, not only by British, but even by American writers (as e. g. , Prof. W.

G.

Sumner, in his "Andrew Jackson as a Public Man," Boston, 1882).

The climax of absurdity is reached by Major McDougal, who says (as quoted by Cole in his "Memoirs of British Generals," ii, p. 364): "Sir Edward Packenham fell, not after an utter and disastrous defeat, but at the very moment when the arms of victory were extended towards him"; and by James, who says (ii, 388): "The premature fall of a British general saved an American city."

These assertions are just on a par with those made by American writers, that only the fall of Lawrence prevented the _Chesapeake_ from capturing the _Shannon_.

British writers have always attributed the defeat largely to the fact that the 44th regiment, which was to have led the attack with fascines and ladders, did not act well.

I doubt if this had any effect on the result.

Some few of the men with ladders did reach the ditch, but were shot down at once, and their fate would have been shared by any others who had been with them; the bulk of the column was never able to advance through the fire up to the breastwork, and all the ladders and fascines in Christendom would not have helped it.

There will always be innumerable excuses offered for any defeat;

but on this occasion the truth is simply that the British regulars found they could not advance in the open against a fire more deadly than they had ever before encountered.

] As far as fortune favored either side, it was that of the British [Footnote: E. g. : The unexpected frost made the swamps firm for them to advance through;

the river being so low when the levee was cut, the bayous were filled, instead of the British being drowned out; the Carolina was only blown up because the wind happened to fail her; bad weather delayed the advance of arms and reinforcements, etc. , etc. ]; and Packenham left nothing undone to accomplish his aim, and made no movements that his experience in European war did not justify his making.

There is not the slightest reason for supposing that any other British general would have accomplished more or have fared better than he did.

[Footnote: "He was the next man to look to after Lord Wellington" (Codrington, i, 339).

] Of course Jackson owed much to the nature of the ground on which he fought; but the opportunities it afforded would have been useless in the hands of any general less ready, hardy, and skilful than Old Hickory.

A word as to the troops themselves.

The British infantry was at that time the best in Europe, the French coming next.

Packenham's soldiers had formed part of Wellington's magnificent peninsular army, and they lost nothing of their honor at New Orleans.

Their conduct throughout was admirable.

Their steadiness in the night battle, their patience through the various hardships they had to undergo, their stubborn courage in action, and the undaunted front they showed in time of disaster (for at the very end they were to the full as ready and eager to fight as at the beginning), all showed that their soldierly qualities were of the highest order.

As much cannot be said of the British artillery, which, though very bravely fought was clearly by no means as skilfully handled as was the case with the American guns.

The courage of the British officers of all arms is mournfully attested by the sadly large proportion they bore to the total on the lists of the killed and wounded.

An even greater meed of praise is due to the American soldiers, for it must not be forgotten that they were raw troops opposed to veterans;

and indeed, nothing but Jackson's tireless care in drilling them could have brought them into shape at all.

The regulars were just as good as the British, and no better.

The Kentucky militia, who had only been 48 hours with the army and were badly armed and totally undisciplined, proved as useless as their brethren of New York and Virginia, at Queenstown Heights and Bladensburg, had previously shown themselves to be.

They would not stand in the open at all, and even behind a breastwork had to be mixed with better men.

The Louisiana militia, fighting in defence of their homes, and well trained, behaved excellently, and behind breastworks were as formidable as the regulars.

The Tennesseeans, good men to start with, and already well trained in actual warfare under Jackson, were in their own way unsurpassable as soldiers.

In the open field the British regulars, owing to their greater skill in manoeuvring, and to their having bayonets, with which the Tennesseeans were unprovided, could in all likelihood have beaten them; but in rough or broken ground the skill of the Tennesseeans, both as marksmen and woodsmen, would probably have given them the advantage; while the extreme deadliness of their fire made it far more dangerous to attempt to storm a breastwork guarded by these forest riflemen than it would have been to attack the same work guarded by an equal number of the best regular troops of Europe.

The American soldiers deserve great credit for doing so well; but greater credit still belongs to Andrew Jackson, who, with his cool head and quick eye, his stout heart and strong hand, stands out in history as the ablest general the United States produced, from the outbreak of the Revolution down to the beginning of the Great Rebellion.

Appendix A TONNAGE OF THE BRITISH

AND AMERICAN MEN-OF-WAR

IN 1812-15

According to Act of Congress (quoted in "Niles' Register," iv, 64), the way of measuring double-decked or war-vessels was as follows: "Measure from fore-part of main stem to after-part of stern port, above the upper deck; take the breadth thereof at broadest part above the main wales, one half of which breadth shall be accounted the depth.

Deduct from the length three fifths of such breadth, multiply the remainder by the breadth and the product by the depth;

divide by 95; quotient is tonnage."

(_i.

e. _, if length = x, and breadth = y;

(x - 3/5 y) X y X 1/2 y Tonnage = ----------------------- .

) 95 Niles states that the British mode, as taken from Steele's "Shipmaster's Assistant," was this: Drop plumb-line over stem of ship and measure distance between such line and the after part of the stern port at the load water-mark; then measure from top of said plumb-line in parallel direction with the water to perpendicular point immediately over the load water-mark of the fore part of main stem; subtract from such admeasurement the above distance; the remainder is ship's extreme length, from which deduct 3 inches for every foot of the load-draught of water for the rake abaft, and also three fifths of the ship's breadth for the rake forward; remainder is length of keel for tonnage.

Breadth shall be taken from outside to outside of the plank in broadest part of the ship either above or below the main wales, exclusive of all manner of sheathing or doubling.

Depth is to be considered as one half the length.

Tonnage will then be the length into the depth into breadth, divided by 94. Tonnage was thus estimated in a purely arbitrary manner, with no regard to actual capacity or displacement; and, moreover, what is of more importance, the British method differed from the American so much that a ship measured in the latter way would be nominally about 15 per cent.

larger than if measured by British rules.

This is the exact reverse of the statement made by the British naval historian, James.

His mistake is pardonable, for great confusion existed on the subject at that time, even the officers not knowing the tonnage of their own ships.

When the _President_ was captured, her officers stated that she measured about 1,400 tons; in reality she tonned 1,576, American measure.

Still more singular was the testimony of the officers of the _Argus_, who thought her to be of about 350 tons, while she was of 298, by American, or 244, by British measurement.

These errors were the more excusable as they occurred also in higher quarters.

The earliest notice we have about the three 44-gun frigates of the _Constitution's_ class, is in the letter of Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddart, on Dec.

24, 1798, [Footnote: "American State Papers," xiv, 57. ] where they are expressly said to be of 1,576 tons; and this tonnage is given them in every navy list that mentions it for 40 years afterward; yet Secretary Paul Hamilton in one of his letters incidentally alludes to them as of 1,444 tons.

Later, I think about the year 1838, the method of measuring was changed, and their tonnage was put down as 1,607. James takes the American tonnage from Secretary Hamilton's letter as 1,444, and states (vol. vi, p. 5), that this is equivalent to 1,533 tons, English.

But in reality, by American measurement, the tonnage was 1,576; so that even according to James' own figures the British way of measurement made the frigate 43 tons smaller than the American way did; actually the difference was nearer 290 tons.

James' statements as to the size of our various ships would seem to have been largely mere guesswork, as he sometimes makes them smaller and sometimes larger than they were according to the official navy lists.

Thus, the _Constitution_, _President_, and _United States_, each of 1,576, he puts down as of 1,533; the _Wasp_, of 450, as of 434; the _Hornet_, of 480, as of 460;

and the _Chesapeake_, of 1,244, as of 1,135 tons.

On the other hand the _Enterprise_, of 165 tons, he states to be of 245; the _Argus_ of 298, he considers to be of 316, and the _Peacock_, _Frolic_, etc. , of 509 each, as of 539. He thus certainly adopts different standards of measurement, not only for the American as distinguished from the British vessels, but even among the various American vessels themselves.

And there are other difficulties to be encountered; not only were there different ways of casting tonnage from given measurements, but also there were different ways of getting what purported to be the same measurement.

A ship, that, according to the British method of measurement was of a certain length, would, according to the American method, be about 5 per cent.

longer; and so if two vessels were the same size, the American would have the greatest nominal tonnage.

For example, James in his "Naval Occurrences" (p. 467) gives the length of the _Cyane's_ main deck as 118 feet 2 inches.

This same _Cyane_ was carefully surveyed and measured, under orders from the United States navy department, by Lieut.

B.

F.

Hoffman, and in his published report [Footnote: "American State Papers," xiv, p. 417. ] he gives, among the other dimensions: "Length of spar-deck, 124 feet 9 inches," and "length of gun-deck 123 feet 3 inches."

With such a difference in the way of taking measurements, as well as of computing tonnage from the measurements when taken, it is not surprising that according to the American method the _Cyane_ should have ranked as of about 659 tons, instead of 539. As James takes no account of any of these differences I hardly know how to treat his statements of comparative tonnage.

Thus he makes the _Hornet_ 460 tons, and the _Peacock_ and _Penguin_, which she at different times captured, about 388 each.

As it happens both Captain Lawrence and Captain Biddle, who commanded the _Hornet_ in her two successful actions, had their prizes measured.

The _Peacock_ sank so rapidly that Lawrence could not get very accurate measurements of her; he states her to be four feet shorter and half a foot broader than the _Hornet_.

The British naval historian, Brenton (vol. v, p. 111), also states that they were of about the same tonnage.

But we have more satisfactory evidence from Captain Biddle.

He stayed by his prize nearly two days, and had her thoroughly examined in every way; and his testimony is, of course, final.

He reports that the _Penguin_ was by actual measurement two feet shorter, and somewhat broader than the _Hornet_, and with thicker scantling.

She tonned 477, compared to the _Hornet's_ 480--a difference of about one half of one per cent.

This testimony is corroborated by that of the naval inspectors who examined the _Epervier_ after she was captured by the _Peacock_.

Those two vessels were respectively of 477 and 509 tons, and as such they ranked on the navy lists.