Naval War of 1812 — 03 Part 03

One of the standard statements made by the British historians about this war is that our ships were mainly or largely manned by British sailors.

This, if true, would not interfere with the lessons which it teaches; and, besides that, it is _not_ true.

In this, as in every thing else, all the modern writers have merely followed James or Brenton, and I shall accordingly confine myself to examining their assertions.

The former begins (vol. iv, p. 470) by diffidently stating that there is a "similarity" of language between the inhabitants of the two countries--an interesting philological discovery that but few will attempt to controvert.

In vol. vi, p. 154, he mentions that a number of blanks occur in the American Navy List in the column "Where Born"; and in proof of the fact that these blanks are there because the men were not Americans, he says that their names "are all English and Irish."

[Footnote: For example, James writes: "Out of the 32 captains one only, Thomas Tingey, had England marked as his birthplace....

Three blanks occur, and we consider it rather creditable to Captains John Shaw, Daniel S. Patterson, and John Ord Creighton, that they were ashamed to tell where they were born."

I have not been able to find out the latter's birth-place, but Captain Shaw was born in New York, and I have seen Captain Patterson incidentally alluded to as "born and bred in America."

Generally, whenever I have been able to fill up the vacancies in the column "Where Born," I have found that it was in America.

From these facts it would appear that James was somewhat hasty in concluding that the omission of the birth-place proved the owner of the name to be a native of Great Britain.

] They certainly are; and so are all the other names in the list.

It could not well be otherwise, as the United States Navy was not officered by Indians.

In looking over this same Navy List (of 1816) it will be seen that but a little over 5 per cent, of the officers were born abroad--a smaller proportion by far than would exist in the population of the country at large--and most of these had come to America when under ten years of age.

On p. 155 James adds that the British sailors composed "one third in number and one half in point of effectiveness" of the American crews.

Brenton in his "Naval History" writes: "It was said, and I have no reason to doubt the fact, that there were 200 British seamen aboard the _Constitution_."

[Footnote: New edition, London, 1837, vol. ii, p. 456. ] These statements are mere assertions unsupported by proof, and of such a loose character as to be difficult to refute.

As our navy was small, it may be best to take each ship in turn.

The only ones of which the British could write authoritatively were, of course, those which they captured.

The first one taken was the _Wasp_.

James says many British were discovered among her crew, instancing especially one sailor named Jack Lang; now Jack Lang was born in the town of Brunswick, New Jersey, _but had been impressed and forced to serve in the British Navy_.

The same was doubtless true of the rest of the "many British" seamen of her crew; at any rate, as the only instance James mentions (Jack Lang) was an American, he can hardly be trusted for those whom he does not name.

Of the 95 men composing the crew of the _Nautilus_ when she was captured, "6 were detained and sent to England to await examination as being suspected of being British subjects."

[Footnote: Quoted from letter of Commodore Rodgers of September 12, 1812 (in Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters," vol xxv, No. 43), enclosing a "List of American prisoners of war discharged out of custody of Lieutenant William Miller, agent at the port of Halifax," in exchange for some of the British captured by Porter.

This list, by the way, shows the crew of the _Nautilus_ (counting the six men detained as British) to have been 95 in number, instead of 106, as stated by James.

Commodore Rodgers adds that he has detained 12 men of the _Guerrière's_ crew as an offset to the 6 men belonging to the _Nautilus_.

] Of the other small brigs, the _Viper_, _Vixen_, _Rattlesnake_, and _Syren_, James does not mention the composition of the crew, and I do not know that any were claimed as British.

Of the crew of the _Argus_ "about 10 or 12 were believed to be British subjects; the American officers swore the crew contained none" (James, "Naval Occurrences," p. 278).

From 0 to 10 per cent can be allowed.

When the _Frolic_ was captured "her crew consisted of native Americans" (_do_, p. 340).

James speaks ("History," p. 418) of "a portion of the British subjects on board the _Essex_," but without giving a word of proof or stating his grounds of belief.

One man was claimed as a deserter by the British, but he turned out to be a New Yorker.

There were certainly a certain number of British aboard, but the number probably did not exceed thirty.

Of the _President's_ crew he says ("Naval Occurrences," p. 448): "In the opinion of several British officers there were among them many British seamen" but Commodore Decatur, Lieutenant Gallagher, and the other officers swore that there were none.

Of the crew of the _Chesapeake_, he says, "about 32" were British subjects, or about 10 per cent.

One or two of these were afterward shot, and some 25, together with a Portuguese boatswain's mate, entered into the British service.

So that of the vessels captured by the British, the _Chesapeake_ had the largest number of British (about 10 per cent.

of her crew) on board, the others ranging from that number down to none at all, as in the case of the _Wasp_.

As these eleven ships would probably represent a fair average, this proportion, of 0 to 10 per cent.

, should be taken as the proper one.

James, however, is of the opinion that those ships manned by Americans were more apt to be captured than those manned by the braver British; which calls for an examination of the crews of the remaining vessels.

Of the American sloop _Peacock_, James says ("Naval Occurrences," p. 348) that "several of her men were recognized as British seamen";

even if this were true, "several" could not probably mean more than sixteen, or 10 per cent.

Of the second _Wasp_ he says, "Captain Blakely was a native of Dublin, and, along with some English and Scotch, did not, it may be certain, neglect to have in his crew a great many Irish."

Now Captain Blakely left Ireland when he was but 16 months old, and the rest of James' statement is avowedly mere conjecture.

It was asserted positively in the American newspapers that the _Wasp_, which sailed from Portsmouth, was manned exclusively by New Englanders, except a small draft of men from a Baltimore privateer, and that there was not a foreigner in her crew.

Of the _Hornet_ James states that "some of her men were natives of the United Kingdom"; but he gives no authority, and the men he refers to were in all probability those spoken of in the journal of one of the _Hornet's_ officers, which says that "Many of our men (Americans) had been impressed in the British service."

As regards the gun-boats, James asserts that they were commanded by "Commodore Joshua Barney, a native of Ireland."

This officer, however, was born at Baltimore on July 6, 1759. As to the _Constitution_, Brenton, as already mentioned, supposes the number of British sailors in her crew to have been 200; James makes it less, or about 150. Respecting this, the only definite statements I can find in British works are the following: In the "Naval Chronicle," vol. xxix, p. 452, an officer of the _Java_ states that most of the _Constitution's_ men were British, many being from the _Guerrière_; which should be read in connection with James' statement (vol. vi, p. 156) that but eight of the _Guerrière's_ crew deserted, and but two shipped on board the _Constitution_.

Moreover, as a matter of fact, these eight men were all impressed Americans.

In the "Naval Chronicle" it is also said that the _Chesapeake's_ surgeon was an Irishman, formerly of the British navy; he was born in Baltimore, and was never in the British navy in his life.

The third lieutenant "was supposed to be an Irishman" (Brenton, ii, 456).

The first lieutenant "was a native of Great Britain, we have been informed" (James, vi, 194); he was Mr. George Parker, born and bred in Virginia.

The remaining three citations, if true, prove nothing.

"One man had served under Mr. Kent" of the _Guerrière_ (James, vi, p. 153).

"One had been in the _Achille_" and "one in the _Eurydice_" (Brenton, ii, 456).

These three men were most probably American seamen who had been impressed on British ships.

From Cooper (in "Putnam's Magazine," vol. I, p. 593) as well as from several places in the _Constitution's_ log, [Footnote: See her log-book (vol. ii, Feb.

1, 1812 to Dec.

13, 1813); especially on July 12th, when twelve men were discharged.

In some of Hull's letters he alludes to the desire of the British part of the crew to serve on the gun boats or in the ports; and then writes that "in accordance with the instructions sent him by the Secretary of the Navy," he had allowed the British-born portion to leave the ship.

The log-books are in the Bureau of Navigation.

] we learn that several of the crew who were British deserters were discharged from the _Constitution_ before she left port, as they were afraid to serve in a war against Great Britain.

That this fear was justifiable may be seen by reading James, vol. iv, p. 483. Of the four men taken by the _Leopard_ from the _Chesapeake_, as deserters, one was hung and three scourged.

In reality the crew of the _Constitution_ probably did not contain a dozen British sailors;

in her last cruises she was manned almost exclusively by New Englanders.

The only remainder vessel is the _United States_, respecting whose crew some remarkable statements have been made.

Marshall (vol. ii, p. 1019) writes that Commodore Decatur "declared there was not a seaman in his ship who had not served from 5 to 12 years in a British man-of-war," from which he concludes that they were British themselves.

It may be questioned whether Decatur ever made such an assertion; or if he did, it is safe to assume again that his men were long-impressed Americans.

[Footnote: At the beginning of the war there were on record in the American State Department 6,257 cases of impressed American seamen.

These could represent but a small part of the whole, which must have amounted to 20,000 men, or more than sufficient to man our entire navy five times over.

According to the British Admiralty Report to the House of Commons, February 1, 1815, 2,548 impressed American seamen, who refused to serve against their country, were imprisoned in 1812. According to Lord Castlereagh's speech in the House, February 18, 1813, 3,300 men claiming to be American subjects were serving in the British navy in January, 1811, and he certainly did not give any thing like the whole number.

In the American service the term of enlistment extended for two years, and the frigate, _United States_, referred to, had not had her crew for any very great length of time as yet.

If such a crew were selected at random from American sailors, among them there would be, owing to the small number serving in our own navy and the enormous number impressed into the British navy, probably but one of the former to two of the latter.

As already mentioned the American always left a British man-of-war as soon as he could, by desertion or discharge; but he had no unwillingness to serve in the home navy, where the pay was larger, and the discipline far more humane, not to speak of motives of patriotism.

Even if the ex-British man-of-war's man kept out of service for some time, he would be very apt to enlist when a war broke out, which his country undertook largely to avenge his own wrongs.

] Of the _Carolina's_ crew of 70 men, five were British.

This fact was not found out till three deserted, when an investigation was made and the two other British discharged.

Captain Henly, in reporting these facts, made no concealment of his surprise that there should be any British at all in his crew.

[Footnote: See his letter in "Letters of Masters' Commandant," 1814, I. No. 116. ] From these facts and citations we may accordingly conclude that the proportion of British seamen serving on American ships _after the war broke out_, varied between none, as on the _Wasp_ and _Constitution_, to ten per cent.

, as on the _Chesapeake_ and _Essex_.

On the average, nine tenths of each of our crews were American seamen, and about one twentieth British, the remainder being a mixture of various nationalities.

On the other hand, it is to be said that the British frigate _Guerrière_ had ten Americans among her crew, who were permitted to go below during action, and the _Macedonian_ eight, who were not allowed that privilege, three of them being killed.

Three of the British sloop _Peacock's_ men were Americans, who were forced to fight against the _Hornet_: one of them was killed.

Two of the _Epervier's_ men were Americans, who were also forced to fight.

When the crew of the _Nautilus_ was exchanged, a number of other American prisoners were sent with them; among these were a number of American seamen who had been serving in the _Shannon_, _Acasta_, _Africa_, and various other vessels.

So there was also a certain proportion of Americans among the British crews, although forming a smaller percentage of them than the British did on board the American ships.

In neither case was the number sufficient to at all affect the result.

The crews of our ships being thus mainly native Americans, it may be interesting to try to find out the proportions that were furnished by the different sections of the country.

There is not much difficulty about the officers.

The captains, masters commandant, lieutenants, marine officers, whose birthplaces are given in the Navy List of 1816,--240 in all,--came from the various States as follows: .

- N.

H..

5-.

| Mass..

20 | New England -| R. I.

11 |- 42 '- Conn..

6-' .

- N.

Y..

17-.

| N.

J..

22 | Middle States-| Penn..

35 |- 78 '- Del..

4-' District of Columbia -[D. C..

4]- 4 .

- Md..

46-.

| Va..

42 | | N.

C..

4 | Southern States-| S. C..

16 |-116 | Ga..

2 | | La..

4 | '- Ky..

2-' --------- Total of given birthplaces 240 Thus, Maryland furnished, both absolutely and proportionately, the greatest number of officers, Virginia, then the most populous of all the States, coming next; four fifths of the remainder came from the Northern States.

It is more difficult to get at the birthplaces of the sailors.

Something can be inferred from the number of privateers and letters of marque fitted out.

Here Baltimore again headed the list; following closely came New York, Philadelphia, and the New England coast towns, with, alone among the Southern ports, Charleston, S. C. A

more accurate idea of the quotas of sailors furnished by the different sections can be arrived at by comparing the total amount of tonnage the country possessed at the outbreak of the war.

Speaking roughly, 44 per cent, of it belonged to New England, 32 per cent, to the Middle States, and 11 per cent, to Maryland.

This makes it _probable_ (but of course not certain) that three fourths of the common sailors hailed from the Northern States, half the remainder from Maryland, and the rest chiefly from Virginia and South Carolina.

Having thus discussed somewhat at length the character of our officers and crews, it will now be necessary to present some statistical tables to give a more accurate idea of the composition of the navy; the tonnage, complements, and armaments of the ships, etc. At the beginning of the war the Government possessed six navy-yards (all but the last established in 1801) as follows: [Footnote: Report of Naval Secretary Jones, Nov.

30. 1814. ] Place Original Cost.

Minimum number of men employed.

1. Portsmouth.

N.

H.

, $ 5,500 10 2. Charleston, Mass.

, 39,214 20 3. New York, 40,000 102 4. Philadelphia, 37,000 13 5. Washington, 4,000 36 6. Gosport, 12,000 16 In 1812 the following was the number of officers in the navy: [Footnote: "List of Vessels" etc. , by Gen. H Preble U. S.

N (1874)]

12 captains 10 masters commandant 73 lieutenants 53 masters 310 midshipmen 42 marine officers ----- 500 At the opening of the year, the number of seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys in service was 4,010, and enough more were recruited to increase it to 5,230, of whom only 2,346 were destined for the cruising war vessels, the remainder being detailed for forts, gun-boats, navy yards, the lakes, etc. [Footnote: Report of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb.

21, 1812. ] The marine corps was already ample, consisting of 1,523 men.

[Footnote: _Ibid_.

] No regular navy lists were published till 1816, and I have been able to get very little information respecting the increase in officers and men during 1813 and 1814; but we have full returns for 1815, which may be summarized as follows: [Footnote: Seybert's "Statistical Annals," p. 676 (Philadelphia, 1818)] 30 captains, 25 masters commandant, 141 lieutenants, 24 commanders, 510 midshipmen, 230 sailing-masters, 50 surgeons, 12 chaplains, 50 pursers, 10 coast pilots, 45 captain's clerks, 80 surgeon's mates, 530 boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sailmakers, 268 boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, etc. , 1,106 quarter gunners, etc. , 5,000 able seamen, 6,849 ordinary seamen and boys.

Making a total of 14,960, with 2,715 marines.

[Footnote: Report of Secretary B. W.

Crowninshield, April 18, 1816. ] Comparing this list with the figures given before, it can be seen that during the course of the war our navy grew enormously, increasing to between three and four times its original size.

At the beginning of the year 1812, the navy of the United States on the ocean consisted of the following vessels, which either were, or could have been, made available during the war.

[Footnote: Letter of Secretary Benjamin Stoddart to Fifth Congress, Dec.

24, 1798; Letter of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb.

21, 1812; "American State Papers," vol. xix, p. 149. See also The "History of the Navy of the United States," by Lieut.

G.

E.

Emmons, U. S.

N.

(published in Washington, MDCCCLIII, under the authority of the Navy Department.

)] Rate When (Guns).

Name.

Where Built.

Built.

Tonnage.

Cost.

44 _United States_, Philadelphia, 1797 1576 ,336 44 _Constitution_, Boston, 1797 1576 302,718 44 _President_, New York, 1800 1576 220,910 38 _Constellation_, Baltimore, 1797 1265 314,212 38 _Congress_, Portsmouth, 1799 1268 197,246 38 _Chesapeake_, Norfolk, 1799 1244 220,677 32 _Essex_, Salem, 1799 860 139,362 28 _Adams_, New York, 1799 560 76,622 18 _Hornet_, Baltimore, 1805 480 52,603 18 _Wasp_, Washington, 1806 450 40,000 16 _Argus_, Boston, 1803 298 37,428 16 _Syren_, Philadelphia, 1803 250 32,521 14 _Nautilus_, Baltimore, 1803 185 18,763 14 _Vixen_, Baltimore, 1803 185 20,872 12 _Enterprise_, Baltimore, 1799 165 16,240 12 _Viper_, Purchased, 1810 148 There also appeared on the lists the _New York_, 36, _Boston_, 28, and _John Adams_, 28. The two former were condemned hulks; the latter was entirely rebuilt after the war.

The _Hornet_ was originally a brig of 440 tons, and 18 guns; having been transformed into a ship, she was pierced for 20 guns, and in size was of an intermediate grade between the _Wasp_ and the heavy sloops, built somewhat later, of 509 tons.

Her armament consisted of 32-pound carronades, with the exception of the two bow-guns, which were long 12's. The whole broadside was in nominal weight just 300 pounds; in actual weight about 277 pounds.

Her complement of men was 140, but during the war she generally left port with 150. [Footnote: In the _Hornet's_ log of Oct.

25, 1812, while in port, it is mentioned that she had 158 men; four men who were sick were left behind before she started.

(See, in the Navy Archives, the Log-book, _Hornet_, _Wasp_, and _Argus_, July 20, 1809, to Oct.

6, 1813. )] The _Wasp_ had been a ship from the beginning, mounted the number of guns she rated (of the same calibres as the _Hornet's_) and carried some ten men less.

She was about the same length as the British 18-gun brig-sloop, but, being narrower, measured nearly 30 tons less.

The _Argus_ and _Syren_ were similar and very fine brigs, the former being the longer.

Each carried two more guns than she rated; and the _Argus_, in addition, had a couple thrust through the bridle-ports.

The guns were 24-pound carronades, with two long 12's for bow-chasers.

The proper complement of men was 100, but each sailed usually with about 125. The four smaller craft were originally schooners, armed with the same number of light long guns as they rated, and carrying some 70 men apiece;

but they had been very effectually ruined by being changed into brigs, with crews increased to a hundred men.

Each was armed with 18-pound carronades, carrying two more than she rated.

The _Enterprise_, in fact, mounted 16 guns, having two long nines thrust through the bridle-ports.

These little brigs were slow, not very seaworthy, and overcrowded with men and guns; they all fell into the enemy's hands without doing any good whatever, with the single exception of the _Enterprise_, which escaped capture by sheer good luck, and in her only battle happened to be pitted against one of the corresponding and equally bad class of British gun-brigs.

The _Adams_ after several changes of form finally became a flush-decked corvette.

The _Essex_ had originally mounted twenty-six long 12's on her main-deck, and sixteen 24-pound carronades on her spar-deck;

but official wisdom changed this, giving her 46 guns, twenty-four 32-pound carronades, and two long 12's on the main-deck, and sixteen 32-pound carronades with four long 12's on the spar-deck.

When Captain Porter had command of her he was deeply sensible of the disadvantages of an armament which put him at the mercy of any ordinary antagonist who could choose his distance; accordingly he petitioned several times, but always without success, to have his long 12's returned to him.

The American 38's were about the size of the British frigates of the same rate, and armed almost exactly in the same way, each having 28 long 18's on the main-deck and 20 32-pound carronades on the spar-deck.

The proper complement was 300 men, but each carried from 30 to 80 more.

[Footnote: The _Chesapeake_, by some curious mistake, was frequently rated as a 44, and this drew in its train a number of attendant errors.

When she was captured, James says that in one of her lockers was found a letter, dated in February, 1811, from Robert Smith, the Secretary of War, to Captain Evans, at Boston, directing him to open houses of rendezvous for manning the _Chesapeake_, and enumerating her crew at a total of 443. Naturally this gave British historians the idea that such was the ordinary complement of our 38-gun frigates.

But the ordering so large a crew was merely a mistake, as may be seen by a letter from Captain Bainbridge to the Secretary of the Navy, which is given in full in the "Captains' Letters," vol. xxv.

No. 19 (Navy Archives).

In it he mentions the extraordinary number of men ordered for the _Chesapeake_, saying, "There is a mistake in the crew ordered for the _Chesapeake_, as it equals in number the crews of our 44-gun frigates, whereas the _Chesapeake_ is of the class of the _Congress_ and _Constellation_."

] Our three 44-gun ships were the finest frigates then afloat (although the British possessed some as heavy, such as the _Egyptienne_, 44).

They were beautifully modelled, with very thick scantling, extremely stout masts, and heavy cannon.

Each carried on her main-deck thirty long 24's, and on her spar-deck two long bow-chasers, and twenty or twenty-two carronades--42-pounders on the _President_ and _United States_, 32-pounders on the _Constitution_.

Each sailed with a crew of about 450 men--50 in excess of the regular complement.

[Footnote: The _President_ when in action with the _Endymion_ had 450 men aboard, as sworn by Decatur; the muster-roll of the _Constitution_, a few days before her action with the _Guerrière_ contains 464 names (including 51 marines); 8 men were absent in a prize, so she had aboard in the action 456. Her muster-roll just before the action with the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ shows 461 names.

] It may be as well to mention here the only other class of vessels that we employed during the war.

This was composed of the ship-sloops built in 1813, which got to sea in 1814. They were very fine vessels, measuring 509 tons apiece, [Footnote: The dimensions were 117 feet 11 inches upon the gun-deck, 97 feet 6 inches keel for tonnage, measuring from one foot before the forward perpendicular and along the base line to the front of the rabbet of the port, deducting 3/5 of the moulded breadth of the beam, which is 31 feet 6 inches;

making 509 21/95 tons.

(See in Navy Archives, "Contracts," vol. ii.

p. 137. )] with very thick scantling and stout masts and spars.

Each carried twenty 32-pound carronades and two long 12's with a crew nominally of 160 men, but with usually a few supernumeraries.

[Footnote: The _Peacock_ had 166 men, as we learn from her commander Warrington's letter of June 1st (Letter No. 140 in "Masters' Commandant Letters," 1814, vol. i).

The _Frolic_ took aboard "10 or 12 men beyond her regular complement" (see letter of Joseph Bainbridge, No. 51, in same vol. ).

Accordingly when she was captured by the _Orpheus_, the commander of the latter, Captain Hugh Pigot, reported the number of men aboard to be 171. The _Wasp_ left port with 173 men, with which she fought her first action; she had a much smaller number aboard in her second.

] The British vessels encountered were similar, but generally inferior, to our own.

The only 24-pounder frigate we encountered was the _Endymion_ of about a fifth less force than the _President_.

Their 38-gun frigates were almost exactly like ours, but with fewer men in crew as a rule.

They were three times matched against our 44-gun frigates, to which they were inferior about as three is to four.

Their 36-gun frigates were larger than the _Essex_, with a more numerous crew, but the same number of guns; carrying on the lower deck, however, long 18's instead of 32-pound carronades,--a much more effective armament.

The 32-gun frigates were smaller, with long 12's on the main-deck.

The largest sloops were also frigate-built, carrying twenty-two 32-pound carronades on the main-deck, and twelve lighter guns on the quarter-deck and forecastle, with a crew of 180. The large flush-decked ship-sloops carried 21 or 23 guns, with a crew of 140 men.

But our vessels most often came in contact with the British 18-gun brig-sloop;

this was a tubby craft, heavier than any of our brigs, being about the size of the _Hornet_.

The crew consisted of from 110 to 135 men;

ordinarily each was armed with sixteen 32-pound carronades, two long 6's, and a shifting 12-pound carronade; often with a light long gun as a stern-chaser, making 20 in all.

The _Reindeer_ and _Peacock_ had only 24-pound carronades; the _Epervier_ had but eighteen guns, all carronades.

[Footnote: The _Epervier_ was taken into our service under the same name and rate.

Both Preble and Emmons describe her as of 477 tons.

Warrington, her captor, however, says: "The surveyor of the port has just measured the _Epervier_ and reports her 467 tons."

(In the Navy Archives, "Masters' Commandant Letters," 1814, i. No. 125. ) For a full discussion of tonnage, see Appendix, A. ] Among the stock accusations against our navy of 1812, were, and are, statements that our vessels were rated at less than their real force, and in particular that our large frigates were "disguised line-of-battle ships."

As regards the ratings, most vessels of that time carried more guns than they rated; the disparity was less in the French than in either the British or American navies.

Our 38-gun frigates carried 48 guns, the exact number the British 38's possessed.

The worst case of underrating in our navy was the _Essex_, which rated 32, and carried 46 guns, so that her real was 44 per cent, in excess of her nominal force; but this was not as bad as the British sloop _Cyane_, which was rated a 20 or 22, and carried 34 guns, so that she had either 55 or 70 per cent, greater real than nominal force.

At the beginning of the war we owned two 18-gun ship-sloops, one mounting 18 and the other 20 guns; the 18-gun brig-sloops they captured mounted each 19 guns, so the average was the same.

Later we built sloops that rated 18 and mounted 22 guns, but when one was captured it was also put down in the British navy list as an 18-gun ship-sloop.

During all the combats of the war there were but four vessels that carried as few guns as they rated.

Two were British, the _Epervier_ and _Levant_, and two American, the _Wasp_ and _Adams_.

One navy was certainly as deceptive as another, as far as underrating went.

The force of the statement that our large frigates were disguised line-of-battle ships, of course depends entirely upon what the words "frigate" and "line-of-battle ship" mean.

When on the 10th of August, 1653, De Ruyter saved a great convoy by beating off Sir George Ayscough's fleet of 38 sail, the largest of the Dutch admiral's "33 sail of the line" carried but 30 guns and 150 men, and his own flag-ship but 28 guns and 134 men.

[Footnote: La Vie et les Actions Memorables du Sr. Michel de Ruyter, à Amsterdam, Chez Henry et Theodore Boom.

MDCLXXVII.

The work is by Barthelemy Pielat, a surgeon in de Ruyter's fleet, and personally present during many of his battles.

It is written in French, but is in tone more strongly anti-French than anti-English.

] The Dutch book from which this statement is taken speaks indifferently of frigates of 18, 40, and 58 guns.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century the terms had crystallized.

Frigate then meant a so-called single-decked ship;

it in reality possessed two decks, the main- or gun-deck, and the upper one, which had no name at all, until our sailors christened it spar-deck.

The gun-deck possessed a complete battery, and the spar-deck an interrupted one, mounting guns on the forecastle and quarter-deck.

At that time all "two-decked" or "three-decked" (in reality three- and four-decked) ships were liners.

But in 1812 this had changed somewhat; as the various nations built more and more powerful vessels, the lower rates of the different divisions were dropped.

Thus the British ship _Cyane_, captured by the _Constitution_, was in reality a small frigate, with a main-deck battery of 22 guns, and 12 guns on the spar-deck; a few years before she would have been called a 24-gun frigate, but she then ranked merely as a 22-gun sloop.

Similarly the 50- and 64-gun ships that had fought in the line at the Doggerbank, Camperdown, and even at Aboukir, were now no longer deemed fit for the purpose, and the 74 was the lowest line-of-battle ship.

The _Constitution_, _President_, and _States_ must then be compared with the existing European vessels that were classed as frigates.

The French in 1812 had no 24-pounder frigates, for the very good reason that they had all fallen victims to the English 18-pounder's;

but in July of that year a Danish frigate, the _Nayaden_, which carried long 24's, was destroyed by the English ship _Dictator_, 64. The British frigates were of several rates.

The lowest rated 32, carrying in all 40 guns, 26 long 12's on the main-deck and 14 24-pound carronades on the spar-deck--a broadside of 324 pounds.

[Footnote: In all these vessels there were generally two long 6's or 9's substituted for the bow-chase carronades.

] The 36-gun frigates, like the _Phoebe_, carried 46 guns, 26 long 18's on the gun-deck and 32-pound carronades above.

The 38-gun frigates, like the _Macedonian_, carried 48 or 49 guns, long 18's below and 32-pound carronades above.

The 32-gun frigates, then, presented in broadside 13 long 12's below and 7 24-pound carronades above; the 38-gun frigates, 14 long 18's below and 10 32-pound carronades above; so that a 44-gun frigate would naturally present 15 long 24's and 12 42-pound carronades above, as the _United States_ did at first.

The rate was perfectly proper, for French, British, and Danes already possessed 24-pounder frigates; and there was really less disparity between the force and rate of a 44 that carried 54 guns than there was in a 38 that carried 49, or, like the _Shannon_, 52. Nor was this all.

Two of our three victories were won by the _Constitution_, which only carried 32-pound carronades, and once 54 and once 52 guns; and as two thirds of the work was thus done by this vessel, I shall now compare her with the largest British frigates.

Her broadside force consisted of 15 long 24's on the main-deck, and on the spar-deck one long 24, and in one case 10, in the other 11 32-pound carronades--a broadside of 704 or 736 pounds.

[Footnote: Nominally; in reality about 7 per cent, less on account of the short weight in the metal.

] There was then in the British navy the _Acasta_, 40, carrying in broadside 15 long 18's and 11 32-pound carronades; when the spar-deck batteries are equal, the addition of 90 pounds to the main-deck broadside (which is all the superiority of the _Constitution_ over the _Acasta_) is certainly not enough to make the distinction between a frigate and a disguised 74. But not considering the _Acasta_, there were in the British navy three 24-pounder frigates, the _Cornwallis_, _Indefatigable_, and _Endymion_.

We only came in contact with the latter in 1815, when the _Constitution_ had but 52 guns.

The _Endymion_ then had an armament of 28 long 24's, 2 long 18's, and 20 32-pound carronades, making a broadside of 674 pounds, [Footnote: According to James 664 pounds; he omits the chase guns for no reason.

] or including a shifting 24-pound carronade, of 698 pounds--just _six pounds_, or 1 per cent, less than the force of that "disguised line-of-battle ship" the _Constitution_!

As the _Endymion_ only rated as a 40, and the _Constitution_ as a 44, it was in reality the former and not the latter which was underrated.

I have taken the _Constitution_, because the British had more to do with her than they did with our other two 44's taken together.

The latter were both of heavier metal than the _Constitution_, carrying 42-pound carronades.

In 1812 the _United States_ carried her full 54 guns, throwing a broadside of 846 pounds; when captured, the _President_ carried 53, having substituted a 24-pound carronade for two of her 42's, and her broadside amounted to 828 pounds, or 16 per cent _nominal_, and, on account of the short weight of her shot, 9 per cent, _real_ excess over the _Endymion_.

If this difference made her a line-of-battle ship, then the _Endymion_ was doubly a line-of-battle ship compared to the _Congress_ or _Constellation_.

Moreover, the American commanders found their 42-pound carronades too heavy; as I have said the _Constitution_ only mounted 32's, and the _United States_ landed 6 of her guns.

When, in 1813, she attempted to break the blockade, she carried but 48 guns, throwing a broadside of 720 pounds--just 3 per cent more than the _Endymion_.

[Footnote: It was on account of this difference of 3 per cent that Captain Hardy refused to allow the _Endymion_ to meet the _States_ (James, vi.

p. 470).

This was during the course of some challenges and counter-challenges which ended in nothing, Decatur in his turn being unwilling to have the _Macedonian_ meet the _Statira_, unless the latter should agree not to take on a picked crew.

He was perfectly right in this; but he ought never to have sent the challenge at all, as two ships but an hour or two out of port would be at a frightful disadvantage in a fight.

] If our frigates were line-of-battle ships the disguise was certainly marvellously complete, and they had a number of companions equally disguised in the British ranks.

The 44's were thus _true frigates_, with one complete battery of long guns and one interrupted one of carronades.

That they were better than any other frigates was highly creditable to our ingenuity and national skill.

We cannot, perhaps, lay claim to the invention and first use of the heavy frigate, for 24-pounder frigates were already in the service of at least three nations, and the French 36-pound carronnade, in use on their spar-decks, threw a heavier ball than our 42-pounder.

But we had enlarged and perfected the heavy frigate, and were the first nation that ever used it effectively.

The French _Forte_ and the Danish _Nayaden_ shared the fate of ships carrying guns of lighter calibre; and the British 24-pounders, like the _Endymion_, had never accomplished any thing.

Hitherto there had been a strong feeling, especially in England, that an 18-pound gun was as effective as a 24- in arming a frigate; we made a complete revolution in this respect.

England had been building only 18-pounder vessels when she ought to have been building 24-pounders.

It was greatly to our credit that our average frigate was superior to the average British frigate;

exactly as it was to our discredit that the _Essex_ was so ineffectively armed.

Captain Porter owed his defeat chiefly to his ineffective guns, but also to having lost his topmast, to the weather being unfavorable, and, still more, to the admirable skill with which Hilyar used his superior armament.

The _Java_, _Macedonian_, and _Guerrière_ owed their defeat partly to their lighter guns, but much more to the fact that their captains and seamen did not display either as good seamanship or as good gunnery as their foes.

Inferiority in armament was a factor to be taken into account in all the four cases, but it was more marked in that of the _Essex_ than in the other three; it would have been fairer for Porter to say that he had been captured by a line-of-battle ship, than for the captain of the _Java_ to make that assertion.

In this last case the forces of the two ships compared almost exactly as their rates.

A 44 was matched against a 38; it was not surprising that she should win, but it _was_ surprising that she should win with ease and impunity.

The long 24's on the _Constitution's_ gun-deck no more made her a line-of-battle ship than the 32-pound carronades mounted on an English frigate's quarter-deck and forecastle made _her_ a line-of-battle ship when opposed to a Frenchman with only 8's and 6's on his spar-deck.

When, a few years before, the English _Phoebe_ had captured the French _Nereide_, their broadsides were respectively 407 and 258 pounds, a greater disparity than in any of our successful fights;

yet no author thought of claiming that the _Phoebe_ was any thing but a frigate.

So with the _Clyde_, throwing 425 lbs.

, which took the _Vestale_, throwing but 246. The facts were that 18-pounder frigates had captured 12-pounders, exactly as our 24-pounders in turn captured the 18-pounders.

Shortly before Great Britain declared war on us, one of her 18-pounder frigates, the _San Florenzo_, throwing 476 lbs.

in a broadside, captured the 12-pounder French frigate _Psyché_, whose broadside was only 246 lbs.

The force of the former was thus almost double that of the latter, yet the battle was long and desperate, the English losing 48 and the French 124 men.

This conflict, then, reflected as much credit on the skill and seamanship of the defeated as of the victorious side; the difference in loss could fairly be ascribed to the difference in weight of metal.

But where, as in the famous ship-duels of 1812, the difference in force is only a fifth, instead of a half and yet the slaughter, instead of being as five is to two, is as six to one, then the victory is certainly to be ascribed as much to superiority in skill as to superiority in force.

But, on the other hand, it should always be remembered that there was a very decided superiority in force.

It is a very discreditable feature of many of our naval histories that they utterly ignore this superiority, seeming ashamed to confess that it existed.

In reality it was something to be proud of.

It was highly to the credit of the United States that her frigates were of better make and armament than any others; it always speaks well for a nation's energy and capacity that any of her implements of warfare are of superior kind.

This is a perfectly legitimate reason for pride.

It spoke well for the Prussians in 1866 that they opposed breech-loaders to the muzzle-loaders of the Austrians; but it would be folly to give all the credit of the victory to the breech-loaders and none to Moltke and his lieutenants.

Thus, it must remembered that two things contributed to our victories.

One was the excellent make and armament of our ships; the other was the skilful seamanship, excellent discipline, and superb gunnery of the men who were in them.

British writers are apt only to speak of the first, and Americans only of the last, whereas both should be taken into consideration.