Naval War of 1812 — 04 Part 04

To sum up: the American 44-gun frigate was a true frigate, in build and armament, properly rated, stronger than a 38-gun frigate just about in the proportion of 44 to 38, and not exceeding in strength an 18-pounder frigate as much as the latter exceeded one carrying 12-pounders.

They were in no way whatever line-of-battle ships;

but they were superior to any other frigates afloat, and, what is still more important, they were better manned and commanded than the _average_ frigate of any other navy.

Lord Codrington says ("Memoirs," i, p. 310): "But I well know the system of favoritism and borough corruption prevails so very much that many people are promoted and kept in command that should be dismissed the service, and while such is the case the few Americans chosen for their merit may be expected to follow up their successes except where they meet with our best officers on even terms."

[Footnote: To show that I am not quoting an authority biassed in our favor I will give Sir Edward Codrington's opinion of our rural better class (i, 318).

"It is curious to observe the animosity which prevails here among what is called the better order of people, which I think is more a misnomer here than in any other country I have ever been.

Their _whig_ and _tory_ are democrat and federalist, and it would seem for the sake of giving vent to that bitterness of hatred which marks the Yankee character, every gentleman (God save the term) who takes possession of a property adopts the opposite political creed to that of his nearest neighbor."

] The small size of our navy was probably to a certain extent effective in keeping it up to a high standard; but this is not the only explanation, as can be seen by Portugal's small and poor navy.

On the other hand, the champions or pick of a large navy _ought_ to be better than the champions of a small one.

[Footnote: In speaking of tonnage I wish I could have got better authority than James for the British side of the question.

He is so bitter that it involuntarily gives one a distrust of his judgment.

Thus, in speaking of the _Penguin's_ capture, he, in endeavoring to show that the _Hornet's_ loss was greater than she acknowledged, says, "several of the dangerously wounded were thrown overboard because the surgeon was afraid to amputate, owing to his want of experience" ("Naval Occurrences," 492).

Now what could persuade a writer to make such a foolish accusation?

No matter how utterly depraved and brutal Captain Biddle might be, he would certainly not throw his wounded over alive because he feared they might die.

Again, in vol. vi, p. 546, he says: "Captain Stewart had caused the _Cyane_ to be painted to resemble a 36-gun frigate.

The object of this was to aggrandize his exploit in the eyes of the gaping citizens of Boston."

No matter how skilful an artist Captain Stewart was, and no matter how great the gaping capacities of the Bostonians, the _Cyane_ (which by the way went to New York and not Boston) could no more be painted to look like a 36-gun frigate than a schooner could be painted to look like a brig.

Instances of rancor like these two occur constantly in his work, and make it very difficult to separate what is matter of fact from what is matter of opinion.

I always rely on the British official accounts when they can be reached, except in the case of the _Java_, which seem garbled.

That such was sometimes the case with British officials is testified to by both James (vol. iv, p. 17) and Brenton (vol. ii, p. 454, note).

From the "Memoir of Admiral Broke" we learn that his public letter was wrong in a number of particulars.

See also any one of the numerous biographies of Lord Dundonald, the hero of the little _Speedy's_ fight.

It is very unfortunate that the British stopped publishing official accounts of their defeats; it could not well help giving rise to unpleasant suspicions.

It may be as well to mention here, again, that James' accusations do not really detract from the interest attaching to the war, and its value for purposes of study.

If, as he says, the American commanders were cowards, and their crews renegades, it is well worth while to learn the lesson that good training will make such men able to beat brave officers with loyal crews.

And why did the British have such bad average crews as he makes out?

He says, for instance, that the Java's was unusually bad; yet Brenton says (vol. ii, p. 461) it was like "the generality of our crews."

It is worth while explaining the reason that such a crew was generally better than a French and worse than an American one.

] Again, the armaments of the American as well as of the British ships were composed of three very different styles of guns.

The first, or long gun, was enormously long and thick-barrelled in comparison to its bore, and in consequence very heavy; it possessed a very long range, and varied in calibre from two to forty-two pounds.

The ordinary calibres in our navy were 6, 9, 12, 18, and 24. The second style was the carronade, a short, light gun of large bore; compared to a long gun of the same weight it carried a much heavier ball for a much shorter distance.

The chief calibres were 9, 12, 18, 24, 32, 42, and 68-pounders, the first and the last being hardly in use in our navy.

The third style was the columbiad, of an intermediate grade between the first two.

Thus it is seen that a gun of one style by no means corresponds to a gun of another style of the same calibre.

As a rough example, a long 12, a columbiad 18, and a 32-pound carronade would be about equivalent to one another.

These guns were mounted on two different types of vessel.

The first was flush-decked; that is, it had a single straight open deck on which all the guns were mounted.

This class included one heavy corvette, (the _Adams_), the ship-sloops, and the brig-sloops.

Through the bow-chase port, on each side, each of these mounted a long gun; the rest of their guns were carronades, except in the case of the _Adams_, which had all long guns.

Above these came the frigates, whose gun-deck was covered above by another deck; on the fore and aft parts (forecastle and quarter-deck) of this upper, open deck were also mounted guns.

The main-deck guns were all long, except on the _Essex_, which had carronades; on the quarter-deck were mounted carronades, and on the forecastle also carronades, with two long bow-chasers.

Where two ships of similar armament fought one another, it is easy to get the comparative force by simply comparing the weight in broadsides, each side presenting very nearly the same proportion of long guns to carronades.

For such a broadside we take half the guns mounted in the ordinary way; and all guns mounted on pivots or shifting.

Thus Perry's force in guns was 54 to Barclay's 63;

yet each presented 34 in broadside.

Again, each of the British brig-sloops mounted 19 guns, presenting 10 in broadside.

Besides these, some ships mounted bow-chasers run through the bridle-ports, or stern-chasers, neither of which could be used in broadsides.

Nevertheless, I include them, both because it works in about an equal number of cases against each navy, and because they were sometimes terribly effective.

James excludes the _Guerrière's_ bow-chaser; in reality he ought to have included both it and its fellow, as they worked more damage than all the broadside guns put together.

Again, he excludes the _Endymion's_ bow-chasers, though in her action they proved invaluable.

Yet he includes those of the _Enterprise_ and _Argus_, though the former's were probably not fired.

So I shall take the half of the fixed, plus all the movable guns aboard, in comparing broadside force.

But the chief difficulty appears when guns of one style are matched against those of another.

If a ship armed with long 12's, meets one armed with 32-pound carronades, which is superior in force?

At long range the first, and at short range the second; and of course each captain is pretty sure to insist that "circumstances" forced him to fight at a disadvantage.

The result would depend largely on the skill or luck of each commander in choosing position.

One thing is certain; long guns are more formidable than carronades of the same calibre.

There are exemplifications of this rule on both sides; of course, American writers, as a rule, only pay attention to one set of cases, and British to the others.

The _Cyane_ and _Levant_ threw a heavier broadside than the _Constitution_ but were certainly less formidably armed; and the _Essex_ threw a heavier broadside than the _Phoebe_, yet was also less formidable.

On Lake Ontario the American ship _General Pike_ threw less metal at a broadside than either of her two chief antagonists, but neither could be called her equal; while on Lake Champlain a parallel case is afforded by the British ship _Confiance_.

Supposing that two ships throw the same broadside weight of metal, one from long guns, the other from carronades, at short range they are equal; at long, one has it all her own way.

Her captain thus certainly has a great superiority of force, and if he does not take advantage of it it is owing to his adversary's skill or his own mismanagement.

As a mere approximation, it may be assumed, in comparing the broadsides of two vessels or squadrons, that long guns count for at least twice as much as carronades of the same calibre.

Thus on Lake Champlain Captain Downie possessed an immense advantage in his long guns, which Commodore Macdonough's exceedingly good arrangements nullified.

Sometimes part of the advantage may be willingly foregone, so as to acquire some other.

Had the _Constitution_ kept at long bowls with the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ she could have probably captured one without any loss to herself, while the other would have escaped;

she preferred to run down close so as to insure the capture of both, knowing that even at close quarters long guns are somewhat better than short ones (not to mention her other advantages in thick scantling, speed, etc. ).

The British carronades often upset in action; this was either owing to their having been insufficiently secured, and to this remaining undiscovered because the men were not exercised at the guns, or else it was because the unpractised sailors would greatly overcharge them.

Our better-trained sailors on the ocean rarely committed these blunders, but the less-skilled crews on the lakes did so as often as their antagonists.

But while the Americans thus, as a rule, had heavier and better-fitted guns, they labored under one or two disadvantages.

Our foundries were generally not as good as those of the British, and our guns, in consequence, more likely to burst; it was an accident of this nature which saved the British _Belvidera_; and the _General Pike_, under Commodore Chauncy, and the new American frigate _Guerrière_ suffered in the same way; while often the muzzles of the guns would crack.

A more universal disadvantage was in the short weight of our shot.

When Captain Blakely sunk the _Avon_ he officially reported that her four shot which came aboard weighed just 32 pounds apiece, a pound and three quarters more than his _heaviest_;

this would make his average shot about 2 1/2 pounds less, or rather over 7 per cent.

Exactly similar statements were made by the officers of the _Constitution_ in her three engagements.

Thus when she fought the _Java_, she threw at a broadside, as already stated, 704 pounds; the _Java_ mounted 28 long 18's, 18 32-pound carronades, 2 long 12's, and one shifting 24-pound carronade, a broadside of 576 pounds.

Yet by the actual weighing of all the different shot on both sides it was found that the difference in broadside force was only about 77 pounds, or the _Constitution's_ shot were about 7 per cent, short weight.

The long 24's of the _United States_ each threw a shot but 4 1/4 pounds heavier than the long 18's of the _Macedonian_; here again the difference was about 7 per cent.

The same difference existed in favor of the _Penguin_ and _Epervier_ compared with the _Wasp_ and _Hornet_.

Mr. Fenimore Cooper [Footnote: See "Naval History," i, p. 380. ] weighed a great number of shot some time after the war.

The later castings, even weighed nearly 5 per cent, less than the British shot, and some of the older ones, about 9 per cent.

The average is safe to take at 7 per cent.

less, and I shall throughout make this allowance for ocean cruisers.

The deficit was sometimes owing to windage, but more often the shot was of full size but defective in density.

The effect of this can be gathered from the following quotation from the work of a British artillerist: "The greater the density of shot of like calibres, projected with equal velocity and elevation, the greater the range, accuracy, and penetration."

[Footnote: "Heavy Ordnance," Captain T. F.

Simmons, R.

A.

, London, 1837. James supposes that the "Yankee captains" have in each case hunted round till they could get particularly small American shot to weigh; and also denies that short weight is a disadvantage.

The last proposition carried out logically would lead to some rather astonishing results.

] This defectiveness in density might be a serious injury in a contest at a long distance, but would make but little difference at close quarters (although it may have been partly owing to their short weight that so many of the Chesapeake's shot failed to penetrate the _Shannon's_ hull).

Thus in the actions with the _Macedonian_ and _Java_ the American frigates showed excellent practice when the contest was carried on within fair distance, while their first broadsides at long range went very wild; but in the case of the _Guerrière_, the _Constitution_ reserved her fire for close quarters, and was probably not at all affected by the short weight of her shot.

As to the officers and crew of a 44-gun frigate, the following was the regular complement established by law: [Footnote: See State Papers, vol. xiv, 159 (Washington, 1834).

] 1 captain, 4 lieutenants, 2 lieutenants of marines, 2 sailing-masters, 2 master's mates, 7 midshipmen, 1 purser, 1 surgeon, 2 surgeon's mates, 1 clerk, 1 carpenter, 2 carpenter's mates, 1 boatswain, 2 boatswain's mates, 1 yeoman of gun-room, 1 gunner, 11 quarter gunners, 1 coxswain, 1 sailmaker, 1 cooper, 1 steward, 1 armorer, 1 master of arms, 1 cook, 1 chaplain.

__ 50 120 able seamen, 150 ordinary seamen, 30 boys, 50 marines.

___ 400 in all.

An 18-gun ship had 32 officers and petty officers, 30 able seamen, 46 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 20 marines--140 in all.

Sometimes ships put to sea without their full complements (as in the case of the first _Wasp_), but more often with supernumeraries aboard.

The weapons for close quarters were pikes, cutlasses, and a few axes; while the marines and some of the topmen had muskets, and occasionally rifles.

In comparing the forces of the contestants I have always given the number of men in crew; but this in most cases was unnecessary.

When there were plenty of men to handle the guns, trim the sails, make repairs, act as marines, etc. , any additional number simply served to increase the slaughter on board.

The _Guerrière_ undoubtedly suffered from being short-handed, but neither the _Macedonian_ nor _Java_ would have been benefited by the presence of a hundred additional men.

Barclay possessed about as many men as Perry, but this did not give him an equality of force.

The _Penguin_ and _Frolic_ would have been taken just as surely had the _Hornet_ and _Wasp_ had a dozen men less apiece than they did.

The principal case where numbers would help would be in a hand-to-hand fight.

Thus the _Chesapeake_ having fifty more men than the _Shannon_ ought to have been successful; but she was not, because the superiority of her crew in numbers was more than counterbalanced by the superiority of the _Shannon's_ crew in other respects.

The result of the battle of Lake Champlain, which was fought at anchor, with the fleets too far apart for musketry to reach, was not in the slightest degree affected by the number of men on either side, as both combatants had amply enough to manage the guns and perform every other service.

In all these conflicts the courage of both parties is taken for granted: it was not so much a factor in gaining the victory, as one which if lacking was fatal to all chances of success.

In the engagements between regular cruisers, not a single one was gained by superiority in courage.

The crews of both the _Argus_ and _Epervier_ certainly flinched; but had they fought never so bravely they were too unskilful to win.

The _Chesapeake's_ crew could hardly be said to lack courage; it was more that they were inferior to their opponents in discipline as well as in skill.

There was but one conflict during the war where the victory could be said to be owing to superiority in pluck.

This was when the _Neufchatel_ privateer beat off the boats of the _Endymion_.

The privateersmen suffered a heavier proportional loss than their assailants, and they gained the victory by sheer ability to stand punishment.

For convenience in comparing them I give in tabulated form the force of the three British 38's taken by American 44's (allowing for short weight of metal of latter).

CONSTITUTION.

GUERRIÈRE.

30 long 24's, 30 long 18's, 2 long 24's, 2 long 12's, 22 short 32's. 16 short 32's, ___________________________ 1 short 18. Broadside, nominal, 736 lbs.

__________________ real.

684 lbs.

Broadside, 556 lbs.

UNITED STATES MACEDONIAN

30 long 24's, 28 long 18's, 2 long 24's, 2 long 12's, 22 short 42's. 2 long 9's, ___________________________ 16 short 32's, Broadside, nominal, 846 lbs.

1 short 18. real, 786 lbs.

___________________ Broadside, 547 lbs.

CONSTITUTION JAVA

30 long 24's, 28 long 18's, 2 long 24's, 2 long 12's, 20 short 32's. 18 short 32's, ____________________________ 1 short 24. Broadside, nominal, 704 lbs.

___________________ real.

654 lbs.

Broadside.

576 lbs.

The smallest line-of-battle ship, the 74, with only long 18's on the second deck, was armed as follows: 28 long 32's, 28 " 18's, 6 " 12's. 14 short 32's 7 " 18's or a broadside of 1,032 lbs.

, 736 from long guns, 296 from carronades; while the _Constitution_ threw (in reality) 684 lbs.

, 356 from long guns, and 328 from her carronades, and the _United States_ 102 lbs.

more from her carronades.

Remembering the difference between long guns and carronades, and considering sixteen of the 74's long 18's as being replaced by 42-pound carronades [Footnote: That this change would leave the force about as it was, can be gathered from the fact that the _Adams_ and _John Adams_ both of which had been armed with 42 pound carronades (which were sent to Sackett's Harbor), had them replaced by long and medium 18 pounders, these being considered to be formidable: so that the substitution of 42-pound carronades would, if any thing, reduce the force of the 74] (so as to get the metal on the ships distributed in similar proportions between the two styles of cannon), we get as the 74's broadside 592 lbs from long guns, and 632 from carronades.

The _United States_ threw nominally 360 and 486, and the _Constitution_ nominally 360 and 352; so the 74 was superior even to the former nominally about as three is to two; while the _Constitution_, if "a line-of-battle ship," was disguised to such a degree that she was in reality of but little more than _one half_ the force of one of the smallest _true_ liners England possessed!

Chapter III

1812 ON THE OCEAN

_Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of the_ Belvidera--_Cruise of the _Essex--_Captain Hull's cruise, and escape from the squadron of Commodore Broke_--Constitution _captures_ Guerrière--Wasp _captures_ Frolic--_Second unsuccessful cruise of Commodore Rodgers_--United States _captures_ Macedonian--Constitution _captures_ Java--Essex _starts on a cruise--Summary_ At the time of the declaration of war, June 18, 1812, the American navy was but partially prepared for effective service.

The _Wasp_, 18, was still at sea, on her return voyage from France; the _Constellation_, 38, was lying in the Chesapeake river, unable to receive a crew for several months to come; the _Chesapeake_, 38, was lying in a similar condition in Boston harbor; the _Adams_, 28, was at Washington, being cut down and lengthened from a frigate into a corvette.

These three cruisers were none of them fit to go to sea till after the end of the year.

The _Essex_, 32, was in New York harbor, but, having some repairs to make, was not yet ready to put out.

The _Constitution_, 44, was at Annapolis, without all of her stores, and engaged in shipping a new crew, the time of the old one being up.

The _Nautilus_, 14, was cruising off New Jersey, and the other small brigs were also off the coast.

The only vessels immediately available were those under the command of Commodore Rodgers, at New York, consisting of his own ship, the _President_, 44, and of the _United States_, 44, Commodore Decatur, _Congress_, 38, Captain Smith, _Hornet_, 18, Captain Lawrence, and _Argus_, 16, Lieut.

Sinclair.

It seems marvellous that any nation should have permitted its ships to be so scattered, and many of them in such an unfit condition, at the beginning of hostilities.

The British vessels cruising off the coast were not at that time very numerous or formidable, consisting of the _Africa_, 64, _Acasta_, 40, _Shannon_, 38, _Guerrière_, 38, _Belvidera_, 36, _Aeolus_, 32, _Southampton_, 32, and _Minerva_, 32, with a number of corvettes and sloops; their force was, however, strong enough to render it impossible for Commodore Rodgers to make any attempt on the coast towns of Canada or the West Indies.

But the homeward bound plate fleet had sailed from Jamaica on May 20th, and was only protected by the _Thalia_, 36, Capt. Vashon, and _Reindeer_, 18, Capt. Manners.

Its capture or destruction would have been a serious blow, and one which there seemed a good chance of striking, as the fleet would have to pass along the American coast, running with the Gulf Stream.

Commodore Rodgers had made every preparation, in expectation of war being declared, and an hour after official intelligence of it, together with his instructions, had been received, his squadron put to sea, on June 21st, and ran off toward the south-east [Footnote: Letter of Commodore John Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept.

1, 1812. ] to get at the Jamaica ships.

Having learned from an American brig that she had passed the plate fleet four days before in lat.

36° N.

, long.

67° W.

, the Commodore made all sail in that direction.

At 6 A. M.

on June 23d a sail was made out in the N. E.

, which proved to be the British frigate _Belvidera_, 36, Capt. Richard Byron.

[Footnote: Brenton, v. 46. ] The latter had sighted some of Commodore Rodgers' squadron some time before, and stood toward them, till at 6. 30 she made out the three largest ships to be frigates.

Having been informed of the likelihood of war by a New York pilot boat, the _Belvidera_ now stood away, going N. E.

by E. , the wind being fresh from the west.

The Americans made all sail in chase, the _President_, a very fast ship off the wind, leading, and the _Congress_ coming next.

At noon the _President_ bore S. W.

, distant 2 3/4 miles from the _Belvidera_, Nantucket shoals bearing 100 miles N. and 48 miles E [Footnote: Log of _Belvidera_, June 23, 1812. ].

The wind grew lighter, shifting more toward the south-west, while the ships continued steadily in their course, going N. E.

by E. As the _President_ kept gaining, Captain Byron cleared his ship for action, and shifted to the stern ports two long eighteen-pounders on the main-deck and two thirty-two pound carronades on the quarter-deck.

At 4:30 [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 151. According to James, vi, 117, the _President_ was then 600 yards distant from the _Belvidera_, half a point on her weather or port quarter.

] the _President's_ starboard forecastle bowgun was fired by Commodore Rodgers himself;

the corresponding main-deck gun was next discharged, and then Commodore Rodgers fired again.

These three shots all struck the stern of the _Belvidera_, killing and wounding nine men,--one of them went through the rudder coat, into the after gun-room, the other two into the captain's cabin.

A few more such shots would have rendered the _Belvidera's_ capture certain, but when the _President's_ main-deck gun was discharged for the second time it burst, blowing up the forecastle deck and killing and wounding 16 men, among them the Commodore himself, whose leg was broken.

This saved the British frigate.

Such an explosion always causes a half panic, every gun being at once suspected.

In the midst of the confusion Captain Byron's stern-chasers opened with spirit and effect, killing or wounding six men more.

Had the _President_ still pushed steadily on, only using her bow-chasers until she closed abreast, which she could probably have done, the _Belvidera_ could still have been taken; but, instead, the former now bore up and fired her port broadside, cutting her antagonist's rigging slightly, but doing no other damage, while the _Belvidera_ kept up a brisk and galling fire, although the long bolts, breeching-hooks, and breechings of the guns now broke continually, wounding several of the men, including Captain Byron.

The _President_ had lost ground by yawing, but she soon regained it, and, coming up closer than before, again opened from her bow-chasers a well-directed fire, which severely wounded her opponent's main-top mast, cross-jack yard, and one or two other spars; [Footnote: James, vi, 119. He says the _President_ was within 400 yards.

] but shortly afterward she repeated her former tactics and again lost ground by yawing to discharge another broadside, even more ineffectual than the first.

Once more she came up closer than ever, and once more yawed;

the single shots from her bow-chasers doing considerable damage, but her raking broadsides none.

[Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass, "Naval Gunnery," p. 419 (third edition).

] Meanwhile the active crew of the _Belvidera_ repaired every thing as fast as it was damaged, while under the superintendence of Lieutenants Sykes, Bruce, and Campbell, no less than 300 shot were fired from her stern guns.

[Footnote: James, vi, 118. ] Finding that if the _President_ ceased yawing she could easily run alongside, Captain Byron cut away one bower, one stream, and two sheet anchors, the barge, yawl, gig, and jolly boat, and started 14 tons of water.

The effect of this was at once apparent, and she began to gain;

meanwhile the damage the sails of the combatants had received had enabled the _Congress_ to close, and when abreast of his consort Captain Smith opened with his bow-chasers, but the shot fell short.

The _Belvidera_ soon altered her course to east by south, set her starboard studding-sails, and by midnight was out of danger; and three days afterward reached Halifax harbor.

Lord Howard Douglass' criticisms on this encounter seem very just.

He says that the President opened very well with her bow-chasers (in fact the Americans seem to have aimed better and to have done more execution with these guns than the British with their stern-chasers); but that she lost so much ground by yawing and delivering harmless broadsides as to enable her antagonist to escape.

Certainly if it had not been for the time thus lost to no purpose, the Commodore would have run alongside his opponent, and the fate of the little 36 would have been sealed.

On the other hand it must be remembered that it was only the bursting of the gun on board the _President_, causing such direful confusion and loss, and especially harmful in disabling her commander, that gave the _Belvidera_ any chance of escape at all.

At any rate, whether the American frigate does, or does not, deserve blame, Captain Byron and his crew do most emphatically deserve praise for the skill with which their guns were served and repairs made, the coolness with which measures to escape were adopted, and the courage with which they resisted so superior a force.

On this occasion Captain Byron showed himself as good a seaman and as brave a man as he subsequently proved a humane and generous enemy when engaged in the blockade of the Chesapeake.

[Footnote: Even Niles, unscrupulously bitter as he is toward the British, does justice to the humanity of Captains Byron and Hardy--which certainly shone in comparison to some of the rather buccaneering exploits of Cockburn's followers in Chesapeake Bay.

] This was not a very auspicious opening of hostilities for America.

The loss of the _Belvidera_ was not the only thing to be regretted, for the distance the chase took the pursuers out of their course probably saved the plate fleet.

When the _Belvidera_ was first made out, Commodore Rodgers was in latitude 39° 26' N. , and longitude 71° 10' W. ; at noon the same day the _Thalia_ and her convoy were in latitude 39° N. , longitude 62° W. Had they not chased the _Belvidera_ the Americans would probably have run across the plate fleet.

The American squadron reached the western edge of the Newfoundland Banks on June 29th, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept.

1st.

] and on July 1st, a little to the east of the Banks, fell in with large quantities of cocoa-nut shells, orange peels, etc. , which filled every one with great hopes of overtaking the quarry.

On July 9th, the _Hornet_ captured a British privateer, in latitude 45° 30' N.

, and longitude 23° W. , and her master reported that he had seen the Jamaica-men the previous evening; but nothing further was heard or seen of them, and on July 13th, being within twenty hours' sail of the English Channel, Commodore Rodgers reluctantly turned southward, reaching Madeira July 21st.

Thence he cruised toward the Azores and by the Grand Banks home, there being considerable sickness on the ships.

On August 31st he reached Boston after a very unfortunate cruise, in which he had made but seven prizes, all merchant-men, and had recaptured one American vessel.

On July 3d the _Essex_, 32, Captain David Porter, put out of New York.

As has been already explained she was most inefficiently armed, almost entirely with carronades.

This placed her at the mercy of any frigate with long guns which could keep at a distance of a few hundred yards; but in spite of Captain Porter's petitions and remonstrances he was not allowed to change his armament.

On the 11th of July at 2 A. M.

, latitude 33° N. , longitude 66° W. , the _Essex_ fell in with the _Minerva_, 32, Captain Richard Hawkins, convoying seven transports, each containing about 200 troops, bound from Barbadoes to Quebec.

The convoy was sailing in open order, and, there being a dull moon, the _Essex_ ran in and cut out transport No. 299, with 197 soldiers aboard.

Having taken out the soldiers, Captain Porter stood back to the convoy, expecting Captain Hawkins to come out and fight him; but this the latter would not do, keeping the convoy in close order around him.

The transports were all armed and still contained in the aggregate 1,200 soldiers.

As the _Essex_ could only fight at close quarters these heavy odds rendered it hopeless for her to try to cut out the _Minerva_.

Her carronades would have to be used at short range to be effective, and it would of course have been folly to run in right among the convoy, and expose herself to the certainty of being boarded by five times as many men as she possessed.

The _Minerva_ had three less guns a side, and on her spar-deck carried 24-pound carronades instead of 32's, and, moreover, had fifty men less than the _Essex_, which had about 270 men this cruise; on the other hand, her main-deck was armed with long 12's, so that it is hard to say whether she did right or not in refusing to fight.

She was of the same force as the _Southampton_ whose captain, Sir James Lucas Yeo, subsequently challenged Porter, but never appointed a meeting-place.

In the event of a meeting, the advantage, in ships of such radically different armaments, would have been with that captain who succeeded in outmanoeuvring the other and in making the fight come off at the distance best suited to himself.

At long range either the _Minerva_ or _Southampton_ would possess an immense superiority; but if Porter could have contrived to run up within a couple of hundred yards, or still better, to board, his superiority in weight of metal and number of men would have enabled him to carry either of them.

Porter's crew was better trained for boarding than almost any other American commander's; and probably none of the British frigates on the American station, except the _Shannon_ and _Tenedos_, would have stood a chance with the _Essex_ in a hand-to-hand struggle.

Among her youngest midshipmen was one, by name David Glasgow Farragut, then but thirteen years old, who afterward became the first and greatest admiral of the United States.

His own words on this point will be read with interest.

"Every day," he says, [Footnote: "Life of Farragut" (embodying his journal and letters), p. 31. By his son, Loyall Farragut, New York.

1879. ] "the crew were exercised at the great guns, small arms, and single stick.

And I may here mention the fact that I have never been on a ship where the crew of the old _Essex_ was represented but that I found them to be the best swordsmen on board.

They had been so thoroughly trained as boarders that every man was prepared for such an emergency, with his cutlass as sharp as a razor, a dirk made by the ship's armorer out of a file, and a pistol."

[Footnote: James says: "Had Captain Porter really endeavored to bring the _Minerva_ to action we do not see what could have prevented the _Essex_ with her superiority of sailing, from coming alongside of her.

But no such thought, we are sure, entered into Captain Porter's head."

What "prevented the _Essex_" was the _Minerva's_ not venturing out of the convoy.

Farragut, in his journal writes: "The captured British officers were very anxious for us to have a fight with the _Minerva_, as they considered her a good match for the _Essex_, and Captain Porter replied that he should gratify them with pleasure if his majesty's commander was of their taste.

So we stood toward the convoy and when within gunshot hove to, and awaited the _Minerva_, but she tacked and stood in among the convoy, to the utter amazement of our prisoners, who denounced the commander as a base coward, and expressed their determination to report him to the Admiralty."

An incident of reported "flinching" like this is not worth mentioning; I allude to it only to show the value of James' sneers.

] On August 13th a sail was made out to windward, which proved to be the British ship-sloop _Alert_, 16, Captain T. L. O.

Laugharne, carrying 20 eighteen-pound carronades and 100 men.

[Footnote: James (History, vi, p. 128) says "86 men."

In the Naval Archives at Washington in the "Captains' Letters" for 1812 (vol. n. No. 182) can be found enclosed in Porter's letter the parole of the officers and crew of the _Alert_ signed by Captain Laugharne; it contains either 100 or 101 names of the crew of the _Alert_ besides those of a number of other prisoners sent back in the same cartel.

] As soon as the _Essex_ discovered the _Alert_ she put out drags astern, and led the enemy to believe she was trying to escape by sending a few men aloft to shake out the reefs and make sail.

Concluding the frigate to be a merchant-man, the _Alert_ bore down on her; while the Americans went to quarters and cleared for action, although the tompions were left in the guns, and the ports kept closed.

[Footnote: "Life of Farragut," p. 16. ] The _Alert_ fired a gun and the _Essex_ hove to, when the former passed under her stern, and when on her lee quarter poured in a broadside of grape and canister; but the sloop was so far abaft the frigate's beam that her shot did not enter the ports and caused no damage.

Thereupon Porter put up his helm and opened as soon as his guns would bear, tompions and all.

The _Alert_ now discovered her error and made off, but too late, for in eight minutes the _Essex_ was along side, and the _Alert_ fired a musket and struck, three men being wounded and several feet of water in the hold.

She was disarmed and sent as a cartel into St. Johns.

It has been the fashion among American writers to speak of her as if she were "unworthily" given up, but such an accusation is entirely groundless.

The _Essex_ was four times her force, and all that could possibly be expected of her was to do as she did--exchange broadsides and strike, having suffered some loss and damage.

The _Essex_ returned to New York on September 7th, having made 10 prizes, containing 423 men.

[Footnote: Before entering New York the _Essex_ fell in with a British force which, in both Porter's and Farragut's works, is said to have been composed of the _Acasta_ and _Shannon_, each of fifty guns, and _Ringdove_, of twenty.

James says it was the _Shannon_, accompanied by a merchant vessel.

It is not a point of much importance, as nothing came of the meeting, and the _Shannon_, alone, with her immensely superior armament, ought to have been a match twice over for the _Essex_: although, if James is right, as seems probable, it gives rather a comical turn to Porter's account of his "extraordinary escape."

] The _Belvidera_, as has been stated, carried the news of the war to Halifax.

On July 5th Vice-Admiral Sawyer despatched a squadron to cruise against the United States, commanded by Philip Vere Broke, of the _Shannon_, 38, having under him the _Belvidera_, 36, Captain Richard Byron, _Africa_, 64, Captain John Bastard, and _Aeolus_.

32, Captain Lord James Townsend.

On the 9th, while off Nantucket, they were joined by the _Guerrière_, 38, Captain James Richard Dacres.

On the 16th the squadron fell in with and captured the United States brig _Nautilus_, 14, Lieutenant Crane, which, like all the little brigs, was overloaded with guns and men.

She threw her lee guns overboard and made use of every expedient to escape, but to no purpose.

At 3 P. M.

of the following day, when the British ships were abreast of Barnegat, about four leagues off shore, a strange sail was seen and immediately chased, in the south by east, or windward quarter, standing to the northeast.

This was the United States frigate _Constitution_, 44, Captain Isaac Hull.

[Footnote: For the ensuing chase I have relied mainly on Cooper; see also "Memoir of Admiral Broke," p. 240; James, vi, 133: and Marshall's "Naval Biography" (London, 1825), ii.

625. ] When the war broke out he was in the Chesapeake River getting a new crew aboard.

Having shipped over 450 men (counting officers), he put out of harbor on the 12th of July.

His crew was entirely new, drafts of men coming on board up to the last moment.

[Footnote: In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy ("Captains' Letters."

1812. ii, No. 85), Hull, after speaking of the way his men were arriving, says: "The crew are as yet unacquainted with a ship of war, as many have but lately joined and have never been on an armed ship before.

* * * We are doing all that we can to make them acquainted with their duty, and in a few days we shall have nothing to fear from any single-decked ship."

] On the 17th, at 2 P.

M.

, Hull discovered four sail, in the northern board, heading to the westward.

At 3, the wind being very light, the _Constitution_ made sail and tacked, in 18-1/2 fathoms.

At 4, in the N. E.

, a fifth sail appeared, which afterward proved to be the _Guerrière_, The first four ships bore N. N.

W.

, and were all on the starboard tack; while by 6 o'clock the fifth bore E. N.

E.

At 6. 15 the wind shifted and blew lightly from the south, bringing the American ship to wind-ward.

She then wore round with her head to the eastward, set her light studding-sails and stay-sails, and at 7. 30 beat to action, intending to speak the nearest vessel, the _Guerrière_.

The two frigates neared one another gradually and at 10 the _Constitution_ began making signals, which she continued for over an hour.

At 3. 30 A.

M.

on the 18th the _Guerrière_, going gradually toward the _Constitution_ on the port tack, and but one half mile distant, discovered on her lee beam the _Belvidera_ and the other British vessels, and signalled to them.

They did not answer the signals, thinking she must know who they were--a circumstance which afterward gave rise to sharp recriminations among the captains--and Dacres, concluding them to be Commodore Rodgers' squadron, tacked, and then wore round and stood away from the _Constitution_ for some time before discovering his mistake.

[Illustration: Captain Isaac Hull: a miniature by an unknown artist, circa 1807-1812. (Courtesy The New-York Historical Society)] At 5 A. M.

Hull had just enough steerage way on to keep his head to the east, on the starboard tack; on his lee quarter, bearing N.

E.

by N. , were the _Belvidera_ and _Guerrière_ and astern the _Shannon_, _Aeolus_, and _Africa_.

At 5. 30 it fell entirely calm, and Hull put out his boats to tow the ship, always going southward.

At the same time he whipped up a 24 from the main-deck, and got the forecastlechaser aft, cutting away the taffrail to give the two guns more freedom to work in and also running out, through the cabin windows, two of the long main-deck 24's. The British boats were towing also.

At 6 A. M.

a light breeze sprang up, and the _Constitution_ set studding-sails and stay-sails; the _Shannon_ opened at her with her bow guns, but ceased when she found she could not reach her.

At 6. 30, the wind having died away, the _Shannon_ began to gain, almost all the boats of the squadron towing her.

Having sounded in 26 fathoms, Lieutenant Charles Morris suggested to Hull to try kedging.

All the spare rope was bent on to the cables, payed out into the cutters, and a kedge run out half a mile ahead and let go; then the crew clapped on and walked away with the ship, overrunning and tripping the kedge as she came up with the end of the line.

Meanwhile, fresh lines and another kedge were carried ahead, and the frigate glided away from her pursuers.

At 7. 30 A.

M.

a little breeze sprang up, when the _Constitution_ set her ensign and fired a shot at the _Shannon_.

It soon fell calm again and the _Shannon_ neared.

At 9. 10 a light air from the southward struck the ship, bringing her to windward.

As the breeze was seen coming, her sails were trimmed, and as soon as she obeyed her helm she was brought close up on the port tack.

The boats dropped in alongside; those that belonged to the davits were run up, while the others were just lifted clear of water, by purchases on the spare spars, stowed outboard, where they could be used again at a minute's notice.

Meanwhile, on her lee beam, the _Guerrière_ opened fire; but her shot fell short, and the Americans paid not the slightest heed to it.