Naval War of 1812 — 06 Part 06

On the other hand, the American crew, even according to James, were as fine a set of men as ever were seen on shipboard.

Though not one fourth were British by birth, yet many of them had served on board British ships of war, in some cases voluntarily, but much more often because they were impressed.

They had been trained at the guns with the greatest care by Lieutenant Allen.

And finally Commodore Decatur handled his ship with absolute faultlessness.

To sum up: a brave and skilful crew, ably commanded, was matched against an equally brave but unskilful one, with an incompetent leader; and this accounts for the disparity of loss being so much greater than the disparity in force.

At the outset of this battle the position of the parties was just the reverse of that in the case of the _Constitution_ and _Guerrière_: the Englishman had the advantage of the wind, but he used it in a very different manner from that in which Captain Hull had done.

The latter at once ran down to close, but manoeuvred so cautiously that no damage could be done him till he was within pistol shot.

Captain Carden did not try to close till after fatal indecision, and then made the attempt so heedlessly that he was cut to pieces before he got to close quarters.

Commodore Decatur, also, manoeuvred more skilfully than Captain Dacres, although the difference was less marked between these two.

The combat was a plain cannonade; the _States_ derived no advantage from the superior number of her men, for they were not needed.

The marines in particular had nothing whatever to do, while they had been of the greatest service against the _Guerrière_.

The advantage was simply in metal, as 10 is to 7. Lord Howard Douglass' criticisms on these actions seem to me only applicable in part.

He says (p. 524): "The Americans would neither approach nor permit us to join in close battle until they had gained some extraordinary advantage from the superior faculties of their long guns in distant cannonade, and from the intrepid, uncircumspect, and often very exposed approach of assailants who had long been accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring.

Our vessels were crippled in distant cannonade from encountering rashly the serious disadvantage of making direct attacks; the uncircumspect gallantry of our commanders led our ships unguardedly into the snares which wary caution had spread."

These criticisms are very just as regards the _Macedonian_, and I fully agree with them (possibly reserving the right to doubt Captain Carden's gallantry, though readily admitting his uncircumspection).

But the case of the _Guerrière_ differed widely.

There the American ship made the attack, while the British at first avoided close combat; and, so far from trying to cripple her adversary by a distant cannonade, the _Constitution_ hardly fired a dozen times until within pistol shot.

This last point is worth mentioning, because in a work on "Heavy Ordnance," by Captain T. F.

Simmons, R.

A.

(London, 1837), it is stated that the _Guerrière_ received her injuries _before_ the closing, mentioning especially the "thirty shot below the water-line"; whereas, by the official accounts of both commanders, the reverse was the case.

Captain Hull, in his letter, and Lieutenant Morris, (in his autobiography) say they only fired a few guns before closing; and Captain Dacres, in his letter, and Captain Brenton, in his "History," say that not much injury was received by the _Guerrière_ until about the time the mizzen-mast fell, which was three or four minutes after close action began.

Lieutenant Allen was put aboard the _Macedonian_ as prize-master;

he secured the fore- and main-masts and rigged a jury mizzen-mast, converting the vessel into a bark.

Commodore Decatur discontinued his cruise to convoy his prize back to America; they reached New London Dec.

4th.

Had it not been for the necessity of convoying the _Macedonian_, the _States_ would have continued her cruise, for the damage she suffered was of the most trifling character.

Captain Garden stated (in Marshall's "Naval Biography") that the _States_ measured 1,670 tons, was manned by 509 men, suffered so from shot under water that she had to be pumped out every watch, and that two eighteen-pound shot passed in a horizontal line through her main-masts; all of which statements were highly creditable to the vividness of his imagination.

The _States_ measured but 1,576 tons (and by English measurement very much less), had 478 men aboard, had not been touched by a shot under water-line, and her lower masts were unwounded.

James states that most of her crew were British, which assertion I have already discussed; and that she had but one boy aboard, and that he was seventeen years old,--in which case 29 others, some of whom (as we learn from the "Life of Decatur") were only twelve, must have grown with truly startling rapidity during the hour and a half that the combat lasted.

During the twenty years preceding 1812 there had been almost incessant warfare on the ocean, and although there had been innumerable single conflicts between French and English frigates, there had been but one case in which the French frigate, single-handed, was victorious.

This was in the year 1805 when the _Milan_ captured the _Cleopatra_.

According to Troude, the former threw at a broadside 574 pounds (actual), the latter but 334; and the former lost 35 men out of her crew of 350, the latter 58 out of 200. Or, the forces being as 100 to 58, the loss inflicted was as 100 to 60; while the _States'_ force compared to the _Macedonian's_ being as 100 to 66, the loss she inflicted was as 100 to 11. British ships, moreover, had often conquered against odds as great;

as, for instance, when the _Sea Horse_ captured the great Turkish frigate _Badere-Zaffer_; when the _Astrea_ captured the French frigate _Gloire_, which threw at a broadside 286 pounds of shot, while she threw but 174; and when, most glorious of all, Lord Dundonald, in the gallant little _Speedy_, actually captured the Spanish xebec _Gamo_ of over five times her own force!

Similarly, the corvette _Comus_ captured the Danish frigate _Fredrickscoarn_, the brig _Onyx_ captured the Dutch sloop _Manly_, the little cutter _Thorn_ captured the French _Courier-National_, and the _Pasly_ the Spanish _Virgin_; while there had been many instances of drawn battles between English 12-pound frigates and French or Spanish 18-pounders.

Captain Hull having resigned the command of the _Constitution_, she was given to Captain Bainbridge, of the _Constellation_, who was also entrusted with the command of the _Essex_ and _Hornet_.

The latter ship was in the port of Boston with the _Constitution_, under the command of Captain Lawrence.

The _Essex_ was in the Delaware, and accordingly orders were sent to Captain Porter to rendezvous at the Island of San Jago; if that failed several other places were appointed, and if, after a certain time, he did not fall in with his commodore he was to act at his own discretion.

[Illustration: Captain William Bainbridge: a portrait by John Wesley Jarvis, circa 1814. (Courtesy U. S.

Naval Academy Museum)] On October 26th the _Constitution_ and _Hornet_ sailed, touched at the different rendezvous, and on December 13th arrived off San Salvador, where Captain Lawrence found the _Bonne Citoyenne_, 18, Captain Pitt Barnaby Greene.

The _Bonne Citoyenne_ was armed with 18 32-pound carronades and 2 long nines, and her crew of 150 men was exactly equal in number to that of the _Hornet_; the latter's short weight in metal made her antagonist superior to her in about the same proportion that she herself was subsequently superior to the _Penguin_, or, in other words, the ships were practically equal.

Captain Lawrence now challenged Captain Greene to single fight, giving the usual pledges that the _Constitution_ should not interfere.

The challenge was not accepted for a variety of reasons;

among others the _Bonne Citoyenne_ was carrying home half a million pounds in specie.

[Footnote: Brenton and James both deny that Captain Greene was blockaded by the _Hornet_, and claim that he feared the _Constitution_.

James says (p. 275) that the occurrence was one which "the characteristic cunning of Americans turned greatly to their advantage"; and adds that Lawrence only sent the challenge because "it could not be accepted," and so he would "suffer no personal risk."

He states that the reason it was sent, as well as the reason that it was refused, was because the _Constitution_ was going to remain in the offing and capture the British ship if she proved conqueror.

It is somewhat surprising that even James should have had the temerity to advance such arguments.

According to his own account (p. 277) the _Constitution_ left for Boston on Jan.

6th, and the _Hornet_ remained blockading the _Bonne Citoyenne_ till the 24th, when the _Montagu_, 74, arrived.

During these eighteen days there could have been no possible chance of the _Constitution_ or any other ship interfering, and it is ridiculous to suppose that any such fear kept Captain Greene from sailing out to attack his foe.

No doubt Captain Greene's course was perfectly justifiable, but it is curious that with all the assertions made by James as to the cowardice of the Americans, this is the only instance throughout the war in which a ship of either party declined a contest with an antagonist of equal force (the cases of Commodore Rodgers and Sir George Collier being evidently due simply to an overestimate of the opposing ships.

)] Leaving the _Hornet_ to blockade her, Commodore Bainbridge ran off to the southward, keeping the land in view.

At 9 A. M.

, Dec.

29, 1812, while the _Constitution_ was running along the coast of Brazil, about thirty miles offshore in latitude 13° 6' S.

, and longitude 31° W. , two strange sail were made, [Footnote: Official letter of Commodore Bainbridge, Jan.

3, 1813. ] inshore and to windward.

These were H. B.

M.

frigate _Java_, Captain Lambert, forty-eight days out of Spithead, England, with the captured ship _William_ in company.

Directing the latter to make for San Salvador, the _Java_ bore down in chase of the _Constitution_.

[Footnote: Official letter of Lieutenant Chads, Dec.

31, 1812. ] The wind was blowing light from the N. N.

E.

, and there was very little sea on.

At 10 the _Java_ made the private signals, English, Spanish, and Portuguese in succession, none being answered; meanwhile the _Constitution_ was standing up toward the _Java_ on the starboard tack; a little after 11 she hoisted her private signal, and then, being satisfied that the strange sail was an enemy, she wore and stood off toward the S. E.

, to draw her antagonist away from the land, [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_.

] which was plainly visible.

The _Java_ hauled up, and made sail in a parallel course, the _Constitution_ bearing about three points on her lee bow.

The _Java_ gained rapidly, being much the swifter.

At 1. 30 the _Constitution_ luffed up, shortened her canvas to top-sails, top-gallant sails, jib, and spanker, and ran easily off on the port tack, heading toward the southeast; she carried her commodore's pendant at the main, national ensigns at the mizzenpeak and main top-gallant mast-head, and a Jack at the fore.

The _Java_ also had taken in the main-sail and royals, and came down in a lasking course on her adversary's weather-quarter, [Footnote: Lieutenant Chads' Address to the Court-martial, April 23, 1813. ] hoisting her ensign at the mizzen-peak, a union Jack at the mizzen top-gallant mast-head, and another lashed to the main-rigging.

At 2 P.

M.

, the _Constitution_ fired a shot ahead of her, following it quickly by a broadside, [Footnote: Commodore Bainbridge's letter.

] and the two ships began at long bowls, the English firing the lee or starboard battery while the Americans replied with their port guns.

The cannonade was very spirited on both sides, the ships suffering about equally.

The first broadside of the _Java_ was very destructive, killing and wounding several of the _Constitution's_ crew.

The _Java_ kept edging down, and the action continued, with grape and musketry in addition; the swifter British ship soon forereached and kept away, intending to wear across her slower antagonist's bow and rake her; but the latter wore in the smoke, and the two combatants ran off to the westward, the Englishman still a-weather and steering freer than the _Constitution_, which had luffed to close.

[Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_.

] The action went on at pistol-shot distance.

In a few minutes, however, the _Java_ again forged ahead, out of the weight of her adversary's fire, and then kept off, as before, to cross her bows; and, as before, the _Constitution_ avoided this by wearing, both ships again coming round with their heads to the east, the American still to leeward.

The Java kept the weather-gage tenaciously, forereaching a little, and whenever the _Constitution_ luffed up to close, [Footnote: Log of _Constitution_.

] the former tried to rake her.

But her gunnery was now poor, little damage being done by it; most of the loss the Americans suffered was early in the action.

By setting her foresail and main-sail the _Constitution_ got up close on the enemy's lee beam, her fire being very heavy and carrying away the end of the _Java's_ bowsprit and her jib-boom.

[Footnote: Lieutenant Chads' letter.

] The _Constitution_ forged ahead and repeated her former manoeuvre, wearing in the smoke.

The _Java_ at once hove in stays, but owing to the loss of head-sail fell off very slowly, and the American frigate poured a heavy raking broadside into her stern, at about two cables' length distance.

The _Java_ replied with her port guns as she fell off.

[Footnote: Lieutenant Chads' letter.

] Both vessels then bore up and ran off free, with the wind on the port quarter; the _Java_ being abreast and to windward of her antagonist, both with their heads a little east of south.

The ships were less than a cable's length apart, and the _Constitution_ inflicted great damage while suffering very little herself.

The British lost many men by the musketry of the American topmen, and suffered still more from the round and grape, especially on the forecastle, [Footnote: Testimony of Christopher Speedy, in minutes of the Court-martial on board H. M. S.

_Gladiator_, at Portsmouth, April 23, 1813] many marked instances of valor being shown on both sides.

The _Java's_ masts were wounded and her rigging cut to pieces, and Captain Lambert then ordered her to be laid aboard the enemy, who was on her lee beam.

The helm was put a-weather, and the _Java_ came down for the _Constitution's_ main-chains.

The boarders and marines gathered in the gangways and on the forecastle, the boatswain having been ordered to cheer them up with his pipe that they might make a clean spring.

[Footnote: Testimony of James Humble, in _do.

, do.

_] The Americans, however, raked the British with terrible effect, cutting off their main top-mast above the cap, and their foremast near the cat harpings.

[Footnote: Log of _Constitution_.

] The stump of the _Java's_ bowsprit got caught in the _Constitution's_ mizzen-rigging, and before it got clear the British suffered still more.

[Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Java_: a comptemporary American engraving done under the supervision of a witness to the action.

(Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U. S.

Naval Academy Museum)] Finally the ships separated, the _Java's_ bowsprit passing over the taffrail of the _Constitution_; the latter at once kept away to avoid being raked.

The ships again got nearly abreast, but the _Constitution_, in her turn, forereached; whereupon Commodore Bainbridge wore, passed his antagonist, luffed up under his quarter, raked him with the starboard guns, then wore, and recommenced the action with his port broadside at about 3. 10. Again the vessels were abreast, and the action went on as furiously as ever.

The wreck of the top hamper on the _Java_ lay over her starboard side, so that every discharge of her guns set her on fire, [Footnote: Lieut.

Chads' Address.

] and in a few minutes her able and gallant commander was mortally wounded by a ball fired by one of the American main-top-men.

[Footnote: Surgeon J. C.

Jones' Report.

] The command then devolved on the first lieutenant, Chads, himself painfully wounded.

The slaughter had been terrible, yet the British fought on with stubborn resolution, cheering lustily.

But success was now hopeless, for nothing could stand against the cool precision of the Yankee fire.

The stump of the _Java's_ foremast was carried away by a double-headed shot, the mizzen-mast fell, the gaff and spanker boom were shot away, also the main-yard, and finally the ensign was cut down by a shot, and all her guns absolutely silenced; when at 4. 05 the _Constitution_, thinking her adversary had struck, [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_ (as given in Bainbridge's letter).

] ceased firing, hauled aboard her racks, and passed across her adversary's bows to windward, with her top-sails, jib, and spanker set.

A few minutes afterward the _Java's_ main-mast fell, leaving her a sheer hulk.

The _Constitution_ assumed a weatherly position, and spent an hour in repairing damages and securing her masts; then she wore and stood toward her enemy, whose flag was again flying, but only for bravado, for as soon as the _Constitution_ stood across her forefoot she struck.

At 5. 25 she was taken possession of by Lieutenant Parker, 1st of the _Constitution_, in one of the latter's only two remaining boats.

The American ship had suffered comparatively little.

But a few round shot had struck her hull, one of which carried away the wheel; one 18-pounder went through the mizzen-mast; the fore-mast, main-top-mast, and a few other spars were slightly wounded, and the running rigging and shrouds were a good deal cut; but in an hour she was again in good fighting trim.

Her loss amounted to 8 seamen and 1 marine killed; the 5th lieutenant, John C. Alwyn, and 2 seamen, mortally, Commodore Bainbridge and 12 seamen, severely, and 7 seamen and 2 marines, slightly wounded; in all 12 killed and mortally wounded, and 22 wounded severely and slightly.

[Footnote: Report of Surgeon Amos A. Evans.

] "The _Java_ sustained unequalled injuries beyond the _Constitution_," says the British account.

[Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," xxix.

452. ] These have already been given in detail; she was a riddled and entirely dismasted hulk.

Her loss (for discussion of which see farther on) was 48 killed (including Captain Henry Lambert, who died soon after the close of the action, and five midshipmen), and 102 wounded, among them Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads, Lieutenant of Marines David Davies, Commander John Marshall, Lieut.

James Saunders, the boatswain.

James Humble, master, Batty Robinson, and four midshipmen.

In this action both ships displayed equal gallantry and seamanship.

"The _Java_," says Commodore Bainbridge, "was exceedingly well handled and bravely fought.

Poor Captain Lambert was a distinguished and gallant officer, and a most worthy man, whose death I sincerely regret."

The manoeuvring on both sides was excellent; Captain Lambert used the advantage which his ship possessed in her superior speed most skilfully, always endeavoring to run across his adversary's bows and rake him when he had forereached, and it was only owing to the equal skill which his antagonist displayed that he was foiled, the length of the combat being due to the number of evolutions.

The great superiority of the Americans was in their gunnery.

The fire of the _Java_ was both less rapid and less well directed than that of her antagonist; the difference of force against her was not heavy, being about as ten is to nine, and was by no means enough to account for the almost fivefold greater loss she suffered.

[Illustration: This differs somewhat from the English diagram: the American officers distinctly assert that the Java kept the weather-gage in every position.

] The foregoing is a diagram of the battle.

It differs from both of the official accounts, as these conflict greatly both as to time and as regards some of the evolutions.

I generally take the mean in cases of difference; for example, Commodore Bainbridge's report makes the fight endure but 1 hour and 55 minutes, Lieutenant Chads' 2 hours and 25 minutes: I have made it 2 hours and 10 minutes, etc. , etc. The tonnage and weight of metal of the combatants have already been stated; I will give the complements shortly.

The following is the COMPARATIVE FORCE AND LOSS.

Relative Weight No. Relative Loss Tons.

Metal.

Men.

Loss.

Force.

Inflicted.

_Constitution_ 1576 654 475 34 100 100 _Java_ 1340 576 426 150 89 23 In hardly another action the war do the accounts of the respective forces differ so widely; the official British letter makes their total of men at the beginning of the action 377, of whom Commodore Bainbridge officially reports that he paroled 378!

The British state their loss in killed and mortally wounded at 24; Commodore Bainbridge reports that the dead alone amounted to nearly 60!

Usually I have taken each commander's account of his own force and loss, and I should do so now if it were not that the British accounts differ among themselves, and whenever they relate to the Americans, are flatly contradicted by the affidavits of the latter's officers.

The British first handicap themselves by the statement that the surgeon of the _Constitution_ was an Irishman and lately an assistant surgeon in the British navy ("Naval Chronicle," xxix, 452); which draws from Surgeon Amos A. Evans a solemn statement in the Boston _Gazette_ that he was born in Maryland and was never in the British navy in his life.

Then Surgeon Jones of the _Java_, in his official report, after giving his own killed and mortally wounded at 24, says that the Americans lost in all about 60, and that 4 of their amputations perished under his own eyes; whereupon Surgeon Evans makes the statement (_Niles' Register_, vi, p. 35), backed up by affidavits of his brother officers, that in all he had but five amputations, of whom only one died, and that one, a month after Surgeon Jones had left the ship.

To meet the assertions of Lieutenant Chads that he began action with but 377 men, the _Constitution's_ officers produced the _Java's_ muster-roll, dated Nov.

17th, or five days after she had sailed, which showed 446 persons, of whom 20 had been put on board a prize.

The presence of this large number of supernumeraries on board is explained by the fact that the _Java_ was carrying out Lieutenant-General Hislop, the newly-appointed Governor of Bombay, and his suite, together with part of the crews for the _Cornwallis_, 74, and gun-sloops _Chameleon_ and _Icarus_; she also contained stores for those two ships.

Besides conflicting with the American reports, the British statements contradict one another.

The official published report gives but two midshipmen as killed; while one of the volumes of the "Naval Chronicle" (vol. xxix, p. 452) contains a letter from one of the _Java's_ lieutenants, in which he states that there were five.

Finally, Commodore Bainbridge found on board the _Constitution_, after the prisoners had left, a letter from Lieutenant H. D.

Cornick, dated Jan.

1, 1813, and addressed to Lieutenant Peter V. Wood, 22d Regiment, foot, in which he states that 65 of their men were killed.

James ("Naval Occurrences") gets around this by stating that it was probably a forgery; but, aside from the improbability of Commodore Bainbridge being a forger, this could not be so, for nothing would have been easier than for the British lieutenant to have denied having written it, which he never did.

On the other hand, it would be very likely that in the heat of the action, Commodore Bainbridge and the _Java's_ own officers should overestimate the latter's loss.

[Footnote: For an account of the shameless corruption then existing in the Naval Administration of Great Britain, see Lord Dundonald's "Autobiography of a seaman."

The letters of the commanders were often garbled, as is mentioned by Brenton.

Among numerous cases that he gives, may be mentioned the cutting out of the _Chevrette_, where he distinctly says, "our loss was much greater than was ever acknowledged."

(Vol. i, p. 505, edition of 1837. )] Taking all these facts into consideration, we find 446 men on board the _Java_ by her own muster-list; 378 of these were paroled by Commodore Bainbridge at San Salvador; 24 men were acknowledged by the enemy to be killed or mortally wounded; 20 were absent in a prize, leaving 24 unaccounted for, who were undoubtedly slain.

The British loss was thus 48 men killed and mortally wounded, and 102 wounded severely and slightly.

The _Java_ was better handled and more desperately defended than the _Macedonian_ or even the _Guerrière_.

and the odds against her were much smaller; so she caused her opponent greater loss, though her gunnery was no better than theirs.

Lieutenant Parker, prize-master of the _Java_, removed all the prisoners and baggage to the _Constitution_, and reported the prize to be in a very disabled state; owing partly to this, but more to the long distance from home and the great danger there was of recapture, Commodore Bainbridge destroyed her on the 31st, and then made sail for San Salvador.

"Our gallant enemy," reports Lieutenant Chads, "has treated us most generously"; and Lieutenant-General Hislop presented the Commodore with a very handsome sword as a token of gratitude for the kindness with which he had treated the prisoners.

Partly in consequence of his frigate's injuries, but especially because of her decayed condition, Commodore Bainbridge sailed from San Salvador on Jan.

6, 1813, reaching Boston Feb.

27th, after his four months' cruise.

At San Salvador he left the _Hornet_ still blockading the _Bonne Citoyenne_.

In order "to see ourselves as others see us," I shall again quote from Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, [Footnote "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 284 (Paris, 1881).

] as his opinions are certainly well worthy of attention both as to these first three battles, and as to the lessons they teach.

"When the American Congress declared war on England in 1812," he says, "it seemed as if this unequal conflict would crush her navy in the act of being born; instead, it but fertilized the germ.

It is only since that epoch that the United States has taken rank among maritime powers.

Some combats of frigates, corvettes, and brigs, insignificant without doubt as regards material results, sufficed to break the charm which protected the standard of St. George, and taught Europe what she could have already learned from some of our combats, if the louder noise of our defeats had not drowned the glory, that the only invincibles on the sea are good seamen and good artillerists.

"The English covered the ocean with their cruisers when this unknown navy, composed of six frigates and a few small craft hitherto hardly numbered, dared to establish its cruisers at the mouth of the Channel, in the very centre of the British power.

But already the _Constitution_ had captured the _Guerrière_ and _Java_, the _United States_ had made a prize of the _Macedonian_, the _Wasp_ of the _Frolic_, and the _Hornet_ of the _Peacock_.

The honor of the new flag was established.

England, humiliated, tried to attribute her multiplied reverses to the unusual size of the vessels which Congress had had constructed in 1799, and which did the fighting in 1812. She wished to refuse them the name of frigates, and called them, not without some appearance of reason, disguised line-of-battle ships.

Since then all maritime powers have copied these gigantic models, as the result of the war of 1812 obliged England herself to change her naval material; but if they had employed, instead of frigates, cut-down 74's (vaisseaux rasés), it would still be difficult to explain the prodigious success of the Americans.

* * * "In an engagement which terminated in less than half an hour, the English frigate _Guerrière_, completely dismasted, had fifteen men killed, sixty-three wounded, and more than thirty shot below the water-line.

She sank twelve hours after the combat.

The _Constitution_, on the contrary, had but seven men killed and seven wounded, and did not lose a mast.

As soon as she had replaced a few cut ropes and changed a few sails, she was in condition, even by the testimony of the British historian, to take another _Guerrière_.

The _United States_ took an hour and a half to capture the _Macedonian_, and the same difference made itself felt in the damage suffered by the two ships.

The _Macedonian_ had her masts shattered, two of her main-deck and all her spar-deck guns disabled; more than a hundred shot had penetrated the hull, and over a third of the crew had suffered by the hostile fire.

The American frigate, on the contrary, had to regret but five men killed and seven wounded; her guns had been fired each sixty-six times to the _Macedonian's_ thirty-six.

The combat of the _Constitution_ and the _Java_ lasted two hours, and was the most bloody of these three engagements.

The _Java_ only struck when she had been razed like a sheer hulk; she had twenty-two men killed and one hundred and two wounded.

* * * * * "This war should be studied with unceasing diligence; the pride of two peoples to whom naval affairs are so generally familiar has cleared all the details and laid bare all the episodes, and through the sneers which the victors should have spared, merely out of care for their own glory, at every step can be seen that great truth, that there is only success for those who know how to prepare it.

* * * * * "It belongs to us to judge impartially these marine events, too much exalted perhaps by a national vanity one is tempted to excuse.

The Americans showed, in the War of 1812, a great deal of skill and resolution.

But if, as they have asserted, the chances had always been perfectly equal between them and their adversaries, if they had only owed their triumphs to the intrepidity of Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge, there would be for us but little interest in recalling the struggle.

We need not seek lessons in courage outside of our own history.

On the contrary, what is to be well considered is that the ships of the United States constantly fought with chances in their favor, and it is on this that the American government should found its true title to glory.

* * * The Americans in 1812 had secured to themselves the advantage of a better organization [than the English]."

The fight between the _Constitution_ and the _Java_ illustrates best the proposition, "that there is only success for those who know how to prepare it."

Here the odds in men and metal were only about as 10 to 9 in favor of the victors, and it is safe to say that they might have been reversed without vitally affecting the result.

In the fight Lambert handled his ship as skilfully as Bainbridge did his; and the _Java's_ men proved by their indomitable courage that they were excellent material.

The _Java's_ crew was new shipped for the voyage, and had been at sea but six weeks; in the _Constitution's_ first fight her crew had been aboard of her but _five_ weeks.

So the chances should have been nearly equal, and the difference in fighting capacity that was shown by the enormous disparity in the loss, and still more in the damage inflicted, was due to the fact that the officers of one ship had, and the officers of the other had not, trained their raw crews.

The _Constitution's_ men were not "picked," but simply average American sailors, as the _Java's_ were average British sailors.

The essential difference was in the training.

During the six weeks the _Java_ was at sea her men had fired but six broadsides, of blank cartridges; during the first five weeks the _Constitution_ cruised, her crew were incessantly practised at firing with blank cartridges and also at a target.

[Footnote: In looking through the logs of the _Constitution_, _Hornet_, etc. , we continually find such entries as "beat to quarters, exercised the men at the great guns," "exercised with musketry," "exercised the boarders," "exercised the great guns, blank cartridges, and afterward firing at mark."

] The Java's crew had only been exercised occasionally, even in pointing the guns, and when the captain of a gun was killed the effectiveness of the piece was temporarily ruined, and, moreover, the men did not work together.

The _Constitution's_ crew were exercised till they worked like machines, and yet with enough individuality to render it impossible to cripple a gun by killing one man.

The unpractised British sailors fired at random; the trained Americans took aim.

The British marines had not been taught any thing approximating to skirmishing or sharp-shooting; the Americans had.

The British sailors had not even been trained enough in the ordinary duties of seamen; while the Americans in five weeks had been rendered almost perfect.

The former were at a loss what to do in an emergency at all out of their own line of work; they were helpless when the wreck fell over their guns, when the Americans would have cut it away in a jiffy.

As we learn from Commodore Morris' "Autobiography," each Yankee sailor could, at need, do a little carpentering or sail-mending, and so was more self-reliant.

The crew had been trained to act as if guided by one mind, yet each man retained his own individuality.

The petty officers were better paid than in Great Britain, and so were of a better class of men, thoroughly self-respecting; the Americans soon got their subordinates in order, while the British did not.

To sum up: one ship's crew had been trained practically and thoroughly, while the other crew was not much better off than the day it sailed; and, as far as it goes, this is a good test of the efficiency of the two navies.

The U. S.

brig _Vixen_, 12, Lieutenant George U. Read, had been cruising off the southern coast; on Nov.

22d she fell in with the _Southampton_, 32, Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, and was captured after a short but severe trial of speed.

Both vessels were wrecked soon afterward.

The _Essex_, 32, Captain David Porter, left the Delaware on Oct.

28th, two days after Commodore Bainbridge had left Boston.

She expected to make a very long cruise and so carried with her an unusual quantity of stores and sixty more men than ordinarily, so that her muster-roll contained 319 names.

Being deep in the water she reached San Jago after Bainbridge had left.

Nothing was met with until after the Essex had crossed the equator in longitude 30° W. on Dec.

11th.

On the afternoon of the next day a sail was made out to windward, and chased.

At nine in the evening it was overtaken, and struck after receiving a volley of musketry which killed one man.

The prize proved to be the British packet _Nocton_, of 10 guns and 31 men, with ,000 in specie aboard.

The latter was taken out, and the _Nocton_ sent home with Lieutenant Finch and a prize crew of 17 men, but was recaptured by a British frigate.

The next appointed rendezvous was the Island of Fernando de Noronha, where Captain Porter found a letter from Commodore Bainbridge, informing him that the other vessels were off Cape Frio.

Thither cruised Porter, but his compatriots had left.

On the 29th he captured an English merchant vessel; and he was still cruising when the year closed.

The year 1812, on the ocean, ended as gloriously as it had begun.

In four victorious fights the disparity in loss had been so great as to sink the disparity of force into insignificance.

Our successes had been unaccompanied by any important reverse.

Nor was it alone by the victories, but by the cruises, that the year was noteworthy.

The Yankee men-of-war sailed almost in sight of the British coast and right in the tract of the merchant fleets and their armed protectors.

Our vessels had shown themselves immensely superior to their foes.

The reason of these striking and unexpected successes was that our navy in 1812 was the exact reverse of what our navy is now, in 1882. I am not alluding to the personnel, which still remains excellent;

but, whereas we now have a large number of worthless vessels, standing very low down in their respective classes, we then possessed a few vessels, each unsurpassed by any foreign ship of her class.

To bring up our navy to the condition in which it stood in 1812 it would not be _necessary_ (although in reality both very wise and in the end very economical) to spend any more money than at present; only instead of using it to patch up a hundred antiquated hulks, it should be employed in building half a dozen ships on the most effective model.

If in 1812 our ships had borne the same relation to the British ships that they do now, not all the courage and skill of our sailors would have won us a single success.

As it was, we could only cope with the lower rates, and had no vessels to oppose to the great "liners"; but to-day there is hardly any foreign ship, no matter how low its rate, that is not superior to the corresponding American ones.

It is too much to hope that our political shortsightedness will ever enable us to have a navy that is first-class in point of size; but there certainly seems no reason why what ships we have should not be of the very best quality.

The effect of a victory is two-fold, moral and material.

Had we been as roughly handled on water as we were on land during the first year of the war, such a succession of disasters would have had a most demoralizing effect on the nation at large.

As it was, our victorious seafights, while they did not inflict any material damage upon the colossal sea-might of England, had the most important results in the feelings they produced at home and even abroad.

Of course they were magnified absurdly by most of our writers at the time; but they do not need to be magnified, for as they are any American can look back upon them with the keenest national pride.

For a hundred and thirty years England had had no equal on the sea; and now she suddenly found one in the untried navy of an almost unknown power.

BRITISH VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED IN 1812.

Name.

Guns.

Tonnage.

Remarks.

_Guerrière_ 49 1,340 _Macedonian_ 49 1,325 _Java_ 49 1,340 _Frolic_ 19 477 Recaptured.

_Alert_ 20 323 _____ _______ 186 4,807 19 477 Deducting Frolic.

_____ _______ 167 4,330 AMERICAN VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED.

Name.

Guns.

Tonnage.

_Wasp_ 18 450 _Nautilus_ 14 185 _Vixen_ 14 185 _____ _______ 46 820 VESSELS BUILT IN 1812.

Name.

Rig.

Guns.

Tonnage.

Where Built.

Cost.

_Nonsuch_ Schooner 14 148 Charleston ,000 _Carolina_ Schooner 14 230 " 8,743 _Louisiana_ Ship 16 341 New Orleans 15,500 PRIZES MADE.

[Footnote: These can only be approximately given;

the records are often incomplete or contradictory, especially as regards the small craft.

Most accounts do not give by any means the full number.

] Ship.

No. of Prizes.

_President_ 1 _United States_ 2 _Constitution_ 9 _Congress_ 2 _Chesapeake_ 1 _Essex_ 11 _Wasp_ 2 _Hornet_ 1 _Argus_ 6 _Small Craft_ 5 __ 46 Chapter IV

1812 ON THE LAKES

_PRELIMINARY.

--The combatants starting nearly on an equality--Difficulties of creating a naval force--Difficulty of comparing the force of the rival squadrons--Meagreness of the published accounts--Unreliability of James--ONTARIO--Extraordinary nature of the American squadron--Canadian squadron forming only a kind of water militia--Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by Commodore Earle--Commodore Chauncy bombards York--ERIE--Lieutenant Elliott captures the_ Detroit _and_ Caledonia--_Unsuccessful expedition of Lieutenant Angus.

_