Religion and Science from Galileo to Bergson — Introductory
RELIGION AND SCIENCE
RELIGION AND SCIENCE
FROM GALILEO TO BERGSON
BY
JOHN CHARLTON HARDWICK
"Philosophy will always be hard, and what it promises even in the end is no clear theory nor any complete understanding or vision.
But its certain reward is a continual evidence and a heightened apprehension of the ineffable mystery of life, of life in all its complexity and all its unity and worth."
F.
H.
BRADLEY, _Essays in Truth and Reality_, p. 106. LONDON
SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO.
1920 TO
MY FATHER
PREFACE
The chapters which follow are not intended as even a slight sketch of the history of Thought since the Renaissance.
Their object is more modest, i. e. to illustrate the thesis that mankind, being "incurably religious," insists (however hopeless the enterprise may sometimes seem) upon interpreting the universe spiritually.
Thus it is quite natural that only a few typical names should find their places here: and often no sufficient reason may appear for one being included rather than another.
For instance, in the tenth chapter, T. H.
Green, F. H.
Bradley, and A. J.
Balfour are mentioned, while Martineau and the Cairds are passed over.
Needless to say, there was no doctrinal prejudice here.
Again, in the fourth chapter, Pascal is dealt with at some length, but Boehme, an equally important thinker, is ignored.
And so on.
I should like to acknowledge here my obligation to Dr. Mercer, Canon of Chester, for his advice upon books, especially with regard to material for the final chapters.
Also to the Rev. H.
D. A.
Major, Principal of Ripon Hall, for suggestions about the general plan of the book; and to the Rev. E.
Harvey (a mathematical graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, at present studying medicine) for valuable information about the present position of psychic research.
J.
C. H.
ALTRINGHAM, _March 23rd, 1920_.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY PAGE Religion and Science defined.
"Accurate and systematic knowledge" necessarily affects our "attitude to life."
Can our systematised knowledge sanction a religious attitude?
This the "religious problem."
Religious harmony of Middle Ages.
Will it return?
1 CHAPTER II THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OLD SYNTHESIS
The old World-Scheme described.
Aquinas and Scholasticism.
Cusanus criticises conventional ideas of space.
The New Astronomy of Copernicus.
Bruno and an infinite universe.
Galileo's telescope.
The New Physics and an automatic universe.
The New Logic 8 CHAPTER III GROWTH OF THE MECHANICAL THEORY
The New Science creates a New Philosophy.
Universality of Mechanics.
Importance of Harvey's discovery.
Descartes extends the mechanical theory to cover physiology and psychology.
Hobbes and a naturalistic ethic.
Newton extends the operation of law from the earth to the heavens.
Religious attitude of these thinkers.
Significance of their thought 18 CHAPTER IV SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY REACTIONS
A Law of Thought.
Spinoza.
A Mechanical Universe spiritually interpreted.
_Natura Naturans_, what it means.
The _Ethics_.
Spinoza's mysticism.
His personality.
Leibniz and a philosophy of personality.
His monads.
Pascal.
His significance.
_The Pensees.
_ The eternal protest of religion.
Man defies the universe.
Results 28 CHAPTER V RISE OF AN ANTI-RELIGIOUS SCIENCE
Anti-clericalism in eighteenth-century France.
Voltaire's propaganda.
Diderot and the Encyclopaedists.
Holbach's _System of Nature_.
Laplace's astronomy.
Lavoisier and the New Chemistry.
Dalton's atomic theory.
Results for religion 42 CHAPTER VI RISE OF GERMAN IDEALISM
Importance, for the mechanical view, of Locke's theory of knowledge.
Weakness of speculative philosophy.
Rise of the "critical" philosophy.
Kant.
He seeks to solve the problem: How is knowledge possible?
Kant's view of the mind's function in knowledge.
Mechanism a "form of thought," subjective not objective.
Kant's view of reality.
Can we know reality?
The two worlds 52 CHAPTER VII THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT
Kant clears the ground for a new philosophy.
Significance of Rousseau.
His attitude to culture.
The new philosophy in Germany, its goal.
Fichte.
Hegel a rationalistic-romanticist.
His method.
Hegelianism.
Significance for religious thought of Schleiermacher.
The autonomy of religion and religious experience 62 CHAPTER VIII MECHANISM AND LIFE
Rise of bio-chemistry and bio-physics in Germany.
Significance of these movements.
The Origin of Species.
Lamarck.
The new geology.
Darwin.
Results of his theory 74 CHAPTER IX MATERIALISM AND AGNOSTICISM
Early decline of Romanticism in Germany.
Comte and the "positive" philosophy.
Materialism in Germany.
Darwinism and the "argument from design."
Haeckel.
Spencerian evolutionism.
Spencer's moral idealism.
His philosophy of religion.
Agnosticism.
Rise of philosophic pessimism.
Significance of Nietzsche 84 CHAPTER X REACTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY
German idealism naturalised in England by Coleridge and Carlyle.
These writers described.
_Sartor Resartus.
_ Idealism at Oxford, T. H.
Green.
F.
H.
Bradley.
Balfour's plea for a philosophy of science.
Revival of Idealism in Germany.
Lotze.
His view of "values" and reality 98 CHAPTER XI SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY
A new philosophy of Science.
Mach on "Economy of Thought."
"Abstractness" and artificiality of scientific method.
Boutroux and natural law.
James' view of the mind carried further by Bergson.
His view of the intellect.
What it can, and what it cannot, do for us.
Intuition.
Indeterminism and Pluralism.
Leibniz revived.
Ward's philosophy of personality 110 CHAPTER XII SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN SCIENCE
The "New" Physics.
New theories of matter.
The "New" Biology.
Driesch and neo-vitalism.
The "New" Psychology.
"Spiritualism."
The outlook for the future 125 CHAPTER XIII SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
History of Thought supplies no material for dogmatising.
Yet a progress of ideas is evident.
Permanency of "spiritual" view of reality.
Its continual revival.
Sabatier's saying.
Need of freedom, alike for religion and for science 137 RELIGION AND SCIENCE
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY.
RELIGION AND SCIENCE
Numerous attempts to define religion have made it evident that religion is indefinable.
We may, however, say this much about it, that religion is _an attitude towards life_: a way of looking at existence.
It is true that this definition is too wide, and includes things which are not religion--there are certain attitudes to life which are definitely anti-religious--that of the materialist, for instance.
However, it will serve a purpose, and we can improve upon it as we proceed.
It is a mistake to put too much faith in definitions: at any rate it is better to have our definitions (if have them we must) too wide than too narrow.
Science is, fortunately, much easier to define.
_Accurate and systematic knowledge_ is what we mean by science--knowledge about anything, provided that the facts are (so far as possible) accurately described and systematically classified.
Professor Karl Pearson, the highest authority on the principles of scientific method and theory, writes: "The man who classifies facts of any kind whatever, who sees their mutual relation and describes their sequences, is applying the scientific method and is a man of science.
The facts may belong to the past history of mankind, to the social statistics of our great cities, to the atmosphere of the most distant stars, to the digestive organs of a worm, or to the life of a scarcely visible bacillus.
It is not facts themselves which make science, but the method by which they are dealt with.
The material of science is co-extensive with the whole physical universe, not only that universe as it now exists, but with its past history and the past history of all life therein.
When every fact, every present or past phenomenon of that universe, every phase of present or past life therein, has been classified, and co-ordinated with the rest, then the mission of science will be completed."
[1] Science, then, is systematic and accurate knowledge; and when we have systematic and accurate knowledge about everything there is to be known, the programme of science will be complete.
This is only to say that the task it has set itself is one that will never end.
So much, then, for our definitions.
Religion is "an attitude to life": science is "systematic and accurate knowledge."
How does the one affect the other?
What are the relations between the two?
That is the topic which will occupy our attention during the chapters that follow.
To answer the question properly will involve a certain amount of acquaintance with the history of ideas.
We must first put the preliminary question: How, as a matter of fact, have men's scientific ideas affected their religious ideas (or _vice versa_) in times past?
Having tried to answer this question, we shall be in a better position to approach the religious problem as it presents itself to-day.
Meanwhile a few remarks of a general character will not be out of place.
It is evident that "science" can hardly fail to affect "religion."
Systematised knowledge necessarily affects an individual's (or a society's) attitude to life--either by broadening and elevating that attitude, or by debasing it.
Our knowledge, or what we believe to be such, tends to create certain preconceptions which make our minds hostile to certain beliefs or ideas.
A man reared from his cradle on mechanical science will tend to regard miracles with suspicion; if he be logical (as he generally is not) freedom of the will, even in the most limited sense, will appear chimerical.
Nor will his general attitude to life remain unaffected by his views on these points.
Systematised knowledge may thus conceivably come into conflict with the presuppositions or the ideals of some particular religion.
It is then that a "religious problem" arises.
A religion indissolubly associated with a geocentric conception of the universe would tend to become discredited as soon as that conception had been disposed of by "systematic knowledge."
Science may even tend to produce an attitude to life hostile not only to a particular religion but to _all_ religion.
If materialism should ultimately be found to be consistent with systematic and accurate knowledge, it is difficult to see how any attitude to life which could be appropriately described as "religion" could survive.
The religious problem would then, at any rate, cease to trouble us.
The religious apologists would be free to turn their attention to matters of more moment.
But it is not only with the cessation of religion that the religious problem slumbers.
There are certain happy periods when religion flourishes undisturbed by obstinate questionings.
These classical ages of religion exist when systematised knowledge seems to support the contemporary religious outlook--when science and religion speak with one voice.
Such unanimity seems to us to-day too good to be possible, but that is only because our own age is exceptional--not because those happier ages were exceptional; they, in fact--if we trace history backwards--would seem rather to have been the rule.
Primitive man, it would seem, was troubled by no discords of the kind which disturb our peace.
His systematic knowledge--such as it was--was entirely in accord with his religion, the two were, in fact, in his case practically one.
His science _was_ his religion.
It may not have been very sound science, nor very elevated religion, but it served his purpose admirably.
He was too busy with the struggle for survival to indulge in speculation.
His religion was severely practical, and he was faithful to it because experience seemed to indicate that it paid.
But the Stone Age hardly deserves (in spite of its freedom from religious difficulties) to be described as one of the classical ages of religion; absence of struggle does not necessarily mean richness of life.
There are ages which better deserve that appellation.
There are times when all existing culture--even of a high level--is closely associated with the current religion, endorses its ideals, sanctions its hopes, puts the stamp of finality upon its faith.
Such an age cannot perhaps hope to be permanent; for life means movement, and movement upsets equilibrium, and human knowledge tends to increase faster than the human mind can adapt itself to it or digest it.
But such ages are looked back upon with regret when they are past, they shed a golden radiance over history, their tradition lingers, they even leave behind them monuments of art and literature which are the wonder, and the inimitable models, of succeeding generations.
Such an epoch was that which left to us our Gothic cathedrals.
These are the creation of one of those classic ages "when all existing culture is cast or bent in obedience to the religious idea."
When scientist, scholar and ecclesiastic spoke with one voice and listened to one message; when prince and peasant worshipped together the same divinities; when to be outside the religious community was to be cut off from the brotherhood of mankind.
"The Church" was then co-extensive with civilisation: those without the fold were barbarians, hardly worthy of the name of man.
That time of splendid harmony, however, is now past; no lamentations will restore it.
We have reached another world.
But it need not remain only a memory; it ought also to serve as an inspiration.
The conditions of affairs during the classic ages of religion, however impossible at the moment, must remain our ideal.
Head and heart must some day speak again with one voice, our hopes and beliefs must be consistent with our knowledge.
Science must sanction that attitude towards existence which our highest instincts dictate.
It is only too likely that this consummation is yet distant.
Yet even if our generation has to reconcile itself to spiritual and moral discord, it should never overlook the existence of a happier ideal, and even the possibility of its fulfilment.
Fortunately for the interests of religion, men feel they _must_ effect some kind of a reconciliation between the opposing demands which proceed from different sides of their nature.
Each for himself tries to approximate science and religion, and the struggle to do this creates in each individual spiritual life.
Tension sometimes creates light, and struggle engenders life.
So long as there are men sufficiently _interested_ in religion to ask for a solution of its problems, religion will remain superior to the disintegration towards which all discord, if unchecked, proceeds.
It is sometimes said that the religious harmony of the Middle Ages, of which we have spoken, having been due to imperfect knowledge, is never likely to repeat itself, unless we sink back into the ignorance of barbarism: and (it is urged) we know too much to be at peace.
Having tasted of the fruits of knowledge, the human race is cast forth from its Paradise.
This view is unduly pessimistic.
There is no valid reason for excluding the possibility that our knowledge of reality and those ideal hopes which constitute our religion may actually coincide.
Religion and science, approaching the problem of existence from contrary directions, may independently arrive at an identical solution.
That the two actually do attack the enigma from different sides has led many people to regard the two as hostile forces.
Such is not the case.
Religion and science regard reality from different angles, but it is the same reality that is the object of their vision, and the goal of their search.
Religion looks at existence as a whole, and attempts to determine its meaning and value for mankind.
Religion, we may say, stands at the centre of existence, and regards reality from a central position.
The province of science, on the other hand, is not to take so wide a survey, but to gain knowledge piece-meal: to locate points inductively, and thus to plot out the curve which we believe existence constitutes.
If the _loci_, as they are successively fixed, seem to indicate that the curve is identical with the circle which religion has already intuitively postulated, the problem of existence would have been solved.
Science and religion working by different methods would have described the same circle.
When science has completed its circle, its centre may be found to stand just at the point where religion has always confidently declared it to be.
Knowledge and faith will then, and not till then, be one.
