Montcalm and Wolfe — Chapter 8, Part 1

Chapter 8

1755-1763 Removal of the Acadians By the plan which the Duke of Cumberland had ordained and Braddock had announced in the Council at Alexandria, four blows were to be struck at once to force back the French boundaries, lop off the dependencies of Canada, and reduce her from a vast territory to a petty province.

The first stroke had failed, and had shattered the hand of the striker; it remains to see what fortune awaited the others.

It was long since a project of purging Acadia of French influence had germinated in the fertile mind of Shirley.

We have seen in a former chapter the condition of that afflicted province.

Several thousands of its inhabitants, wrought upon by intriguing agents of the French Government, taught by their priests that fidelity to King Louis was inseparable from fidelity to God, and that to swear allegiance to the British Crown was eternal perdition; threatened with plunder and death at the hands of the savages whom the ferocious missionary, Le Loutre, held over them in terror,--had abandoned, sometimes willingly, but oftener under constraint, the fields which they and their fathers had tilled, and crossing the boundary line of the Missaguash, had placed themselves under the French flag planted on the hill of Beauséjour.

[240] Here, or in the neighborhood, many of them had remained, wretched and half starved; while others had been transported to Cape Breton, Isle St. Jean, or the coasts of the Gulf,--not so far, however, that they could not on occasion be used to aid in an invasion of British Acadia.

[241] Those of their countrymen who still lived under the British flag were chiefly the inhabitants of the district of Mines and of the valley of the River Annapolis, who, with other less important settlements, numbered a little more than nine thousand souls.

We have shown already, by the evidence of the French themselves, that neither they nor their emigrant countrymen had been oppressed or molested in matters temporal or spiritual, but that the English authorities, recognizing their value as an industrious population, had labored to reconcile them to a change of rulers which on the whole was to their advantage.

It has been shown also how, with a heartless perfidy and a reckless disregard of their welfare and safety, the French Government and its agents labored to keep them hostile to the Crown of which it had acknowledged them to be subjects.

The result was, that though they did not, like their emigrant countrymen, abandon their homes, they remained in a state of restless disaffection, refused to supply English garrisons with provisions, except at most exorbitant rates, smuggled their produce to the French across the line, gave them aid and intelligence, and sometimes disguised as Indians, robbed and murdered English settlers.

By the new-fangled construction of the treaty of Utrecht which the French boundary commissioners had devised,[242] more than half the Acadian peninsula, including nearly all the cultivated land and nearly all the population of French descent, was claimed as belonging to France, though England had held possession of it more than forty years.

Hence, according to the political ethics adopted at the time by both nations, it would be lawful for France to reclaim it by force.

England, on her part, it will be remembered, claimed vast tracts beyond the isthmus; and, on the same pretext, held that she might rightfully seize them and capture Beauséjour, with the other French garrisons that guarded them.

[Footnote 240: See _ante_, Chapter 4. ] [Footnote 241: Rameau (_La France aux Colonies_, I. 63), estimates the total emigration from 1748 to 1755 at 8,600 souls,--which number seems much too large.

This writer, though vehemently anti-English, gives the following passage from a letter of a high French official: "que les Acadiens émigrés et en grande misère comptaient se retirer à Québec et demander des terres, mais il conviendrait mieux qu'ils restent où ils sont, afin d'avoir le voisinage de l'Acadie bien peuplé et défriché, pour approvisionner l'Isle Royale [_Cape Breton_] et tomber en cas de guerre sur l'Acadie."

Rameau, I. 133. ] [Footnote 242: _Supra_, p. 102. ] On the part of France, an invasion of the Acadian peninsula seemed more than likely.

Honor demanded of her that, having incited the Acadians to disaffection, and so brought on them the indignation of the English authorities, she should intervene to save them from the consequences.

Moreover the loss of the Acadian peninsula had been gall and wormwood to her; and in losing it she had lost great material advantages.

Its possession was necessary to connect Canada with the Island of Cape Breton and the fortress of Louisbourg.

Its fertile fields and agricultural people would furnish subsistence to the troops and garrisons in the French maritime provinces, now dependent on supplies illicitly brought by New England traders, and liable to be cut off in time of war when they were needed most.

The harbors of Acadia, too, would be invaluable as naval stations from which to curb and threaten the northern English colonies.

Hence the intrigues so assiduously practised to keep the Acadians French at heart, and ready to throw off British rule at any favorable moment.

British officers believed that should a French squadron with a sufficient force of troops on board appear in the Bay of Fundy, the whole population on the Basin of Mines and along the Annapolis would rise in arms, and that the emigrants beyond the isthmus, armed and trained by French officers, would come to their aid.

This emigrant population, famishing in exile, looked back with regret to the farms they had abandoned; and, prevented as they were by Le Loutre and his colleagues from making their peace with the English, they would, if confident of success, have gladly joined an invading force to regain their homes by reconquering Acadia for Louis XV.

In other parts of the continent it was the interest of France to put off hostilities; if Acadia alone had been in question, it would have been her interest to precipitate them.

Her chances of success were good.

The French could at any time send troops from Louisbourg or Quebec to join those maintained upon the isthmus; and they had on their side of the lines a force of militia and Indians amounting to about two thousand, while the Acadians within the peninsula had about an equal number of fighting men who, while calling themselves neutrals, might be counted on to join the invaders.

The English were in no condition to withstand such an attack.

Their regular troops were scattered far and wide through the province, and were nowhere more than equal to the local requirement; while of militia, except those of Halifax, they had few or none whom they dared to trust.

Their fort at Annapolis was weak and dilapidated, and their other posts were mere stockades.

The strongest place in Acadia was the French fort of Beauséjour, in which the English saw a continual menace.

Their apprehensions were well grounded.

Duquesne, governor of Canada, wrote to Le Loutre, who virtually shared the control of Beauséjour with Vergor, its commandant: "I invite both yourself and M. Vergor to devise a plausible pretext for attacking them [_the English_] vigorously."

[243] Three weeks after this letter was written, Lawrence, governor of Nova Scotia, wrote to Shirley from Halifax: "Being well informed that the French have designs of encroaching still farther upon His Majesty's rights in this province, and that they propose, the moment they have repaired the fortifications of Louisbourg, to attack our fort at Chignecto [_Fort Lawrence_], I think it high time to make some effort to drive them from the north side of the Bay of Fundy."

[244] This letter was brought to Boston by Lieutenant-Colonel Monckton, who was charged by Lawrence to propose to Shirley the raising of two thousand men in New England for the attack of Beauséjour and its dependent forts.

Almost at the moment when Lawrence was writing these proposals to Shirley, Shirley was writing with the same object to Lawrence, enclosing a letter from Sir Thomas Robinson, concerning which he said: "I construe the contents to be orders to us to act in concert for taking _any_ advantages to drive the French of Canada out of Nova Scotia.

If that is your sense of them, and your honor will be pleased to let me know whether you want any and what assistance to enable you to execute the orders, I will endeavor to send you such assistance from this province as you shall want."

[245] [Footnote 243: _Duquesne à Le Loutre, 15 Oct.

1754_; extract in _Public Documents of Nova Scotia_, 239. ] [Footnote 244: _Lawrence to Shirley, 5 Nov.

1754. Instructions of Lawrence to Monckton, 1 Nov.

1754_.

] [Footnote 245: _Shirley to Lawrence, 7 Nov.

1754_.

] The letter of Sir Thomas Robinson, of which a duplicate had already been sent to Lawrence, was written in answer to one of Shirley informing the Minister that the Indians of Nova Scotia, prompted by the French, were about to make an attack on all the English settlements east of the Kennebec; whereupon Robinson wrote: "You will without doubt have given immediate intelligence thereof to Colonel Lawrence, and will have concerted the properest measures with him for taking all possible advantage in Nova Scotia itself from the absence of those Indians, in case Mr. Lawrence shall have force enough to attack the forts erected by the French in those parts, without exposing the English settlements; and I am particularly to acquaint you that if you have not already entered into such a concert with Colonel Lawrence, it is His Majesty's pleasure that you should immediately proceed thereupon."

[246] [Footnote 246: _Robinson to Shirley, 5 July, 1754_.

] The Indian raid did not take place; but not the less did Shirley and Lawrence find in the Minister's letter their authorization for the attack of Beauséjour.

Shirley wrote to Robinson that the expulsion of the French from the forts on the isthmus was a necessary measure of self-defence; that they meant to seize the whole country as far as Mines Basin, and probably as far as Annapolis, to supply their Acadian rebels with land; that of these they had, without reckoning Indians, fourteen hundred fighting men on or near the isthmus, and two hundred and fifty more on the St. John, with whom, aided by the garrison of Beauséjour, they could easily take Fort Lawrence; that should they succeed in this, the whole Acadian population would rise in arms, and the King would lose Nova Scotia.

We should anticipate them, concludes Shirley, and strike the first blow.

[247] [Footnote 247: _Shirley to Robinson, 8 Dec.

1754. Ibid.

, 24 Jan.

1755_.

The Record Office contains numerous other letters of Shirley on the subject.

"I am obliged to your Honor for communicating to me the French Mémoire, which, with other reasons, puts it out of doubt that the French are determined to begin an offensive war on the peninsula as soon as ever they shall think themselves strengthened enough to venture up it, and that they have thoughts of attempting it in the ensuing spring.

I

enclose your Honor extracts from two letters from Annapolis Royal, which show that the French inhabitants are in expectation of its being begun in the spring."

_Shirley to Lawrence, 6 Jan.

1755_.

] He opened his plans to his Assembly in secret session, and found them of one mind with himself.

Preparation was nearly complete, and the men raised for the expedition, before the Council at Alexandria, recognized it as a part of a plan of the summer campaign.

The French fort of Beauséjour, mounted on its hill between the marshes of Missaguash and Tantemar, was a regular work, pentagonal in form, with solid earthern ramparts, bomb-proofs, and an armament of twenty-four cannon and one mortar.

The commandant, Duchambon de Vergor, a captain in the colony regulars, was a dull man of no education, of stuttering speech, unpleasing countenance, and doubtful character.

He owed his place to the notorious Intendant, Bigot, who it is said, was in his debt for disreputable service in an affair of gallantry, and who had ample means of enabling his friends to enrich themselves by defrauding the King.

Beauséjour was one of those plague-spots of official corruption which dotted the whole surface of New France.

Bigot, sailing for Europe in the summer of 1754, wrote thus to his confederate: "Profit by your place, my dear Vergor; clip and cut--you are free to do what you please--so that you can come soon to join me in France and buy an estate near me."

[248] Vergor did not neglect his opportunities.

Supplies in great quantities were sent from Quebec for the garrison and the emigrant Acadians.

These last got but a small part of them.

Vergor and his confederates sent the rest back to Quebec, or else to Louisbourg, and sold them for their own profit to the King's agents there, who were also in collusion with him.

[Footnote 248: _Mémoires sur le Canada, 1749-1760_.

This letter is also mentioned in another contemporary document, _Mémoire sur les Fraudes commises dans la Colonie_.

] Vergor, however, did not reign alone.

Le Loutre, by force of energy, capacity, and passionate vehemence, held him in some awe, and divided his authority.

The priest could count on the support of Duquesne, who had found, says a contemporary, that "he promised more than he could perform, and that he was a knave," but who nevertheless felt compelled to rely upon him for keeping the Acadians on the side of France.

There was another person in the fort worthy of notice.

This was Thomas Pichon, commissary of stores, a man of education and intelligence, born in France of an English mother.

He was now acting the part of a traitor, carrying on a secret correspondence with the commandant of Fort Lawrence, and acquainting him with all that passed at Beauséjour.

It was partly from this source that the hostile designs of the French became known to the authorities of Halifax, and more especially the proceedings of "Moses," by which name Pichon always designated Le Loutre, because he pretended to have led the Acadians from the land of bondage.

[249] [Footnote 249: Pichon, called also Tyrrell from the name of his mother, was author of _Genuine Letters and Memoirs relating to Cape Breton_,--a book of some value.

His papers are preserved at Halifax, and some of them are printed in the _Public Documents of Nova Scotia_.

] These exiles, who cannot be called self-exiled, in view of the outrageous means used to force most of them from their homes, were in a deplorable condition.

They lived in constant dread of Le Loutre, backed by Vergor and his soldiers.

The savage missionary, bad as he was, had in him an ingredient of honest fanaticism, both national and religious;

though hatred of the English held a large share in it.

He would gladly, if he could, have forced the Acadians into a permanent settlement on the French side of the line, not out of love for them, but in the interest of the cause with which he had identified his own ambition.

His efforts had failed.

There was not land enough for their subsistence and that of the older settlers; and the suffering emigrants pined more and more for their deserted farms.

Thither he was resolved that they should not return.

"If you go," he told them, "you will have neither priests nor sacraments, but will die like miserable wretches."

[250] The assertion was false.

Priests and sacraments had never been denied them.

It is true that Daudin, priest of Pisiquid, had lately been sent to Halifax for using insolent language to the commandant, threatening him with an insurrection of the inhabitants, and exciting them to sedition; but on his promise to change conduct, he was sent back to his parishioners.

[251] Vergor sustained Le Loutre, and threatened to put in irons any of the exiles who talked of going back to the English.

Some of them bethought themselves of an appeal to Duquesne, and drew up a petition asking leave to return home.

Le Loutre told the signers that if they did not efface their marks from the paper they should have neither sacraments in this life nor heaven in the next.

He nevertheless allowed two of them to go to Quebec as deputies, writing at the same time to the Governor, that his mind might be duly prepared.

Duquesne replied: "I think that the two rascals of deputies whom you sent me will not soon recover from the fright I gave them, notwithstanding the emollient I administered after my reprimand; and since I told them that they were indebted to you for not being allowed to rot in a dungeon, they have promised me to comply with your wishes."

[252] [Footnote 250: _Pichon to Captain Scott, 14 Oct.

1754_, in _Public Documents of Nova Scotia_, 229. ] [Footnote 251: _Public Documents of Nova Scotia_, 223, 224, 226, 227, 238. ] [Footnote 252: _Public Documents of Nova Scotia_, 239. ] An entire heartlessness marked the dealings of the French authorities with the Acadians.

They were treated as mere tools of policy, to be used, broken, and flung away.

Yet, in using them, the sole condition of their efficiency was neglected.

The French Government, cheated of enormous sums by its own ravenous agents, grudged the cost of sending a single regiment to the Acadian border.

Thus unsupported, the Acadians remained in fear and vacillation, aiding the French but feebly, though a ceaseless annoyance and menace to the English.

This was the state of affairs at Beauséjour while Shirley and Lawrence were planning its destruction.

Lawrence had empowered his agent, Monckton, to draw without limit on two Boston merchants, Apthorp and Hancock.

Shirley, as commander-in-chief of the province of Massachusetts, commissioned John Winslow to raise two thousand volunteers.

Winslow was sprung from the early governors of Plymouth colony; but, though well-born, he was ill-educated, which did not prevent him from being both popular and influential.

He had strong military inclinations, had led a company of his own raising in the luckless attack on Carthagena, had commanded the force sent in the preceding summer to occupy the Kennebec, and on various other occasions had left his Marshfield farm to serve his country.

The men enlisted readily at his call, and were formed into a regiment, of which Shirley made himself the nominal colonel.

It had two battalions, of which Winslow, as lieutenant-colonel, commanded the first, and George Scott the second, both under the orders of Monckton.

Country villages far and near, from the western borders of the Connecticut to uttermost Cape Cod, lent soldiers to the new regiment.

The muster-rolls preserve their names, vocations, birthplaces, and abode.

Obadiah, Nehemiah, Jedediah, Jonathan, Ebenezer, Joshua, and the like Old Testament names abound upon the list.

Some are set down as "farmers," "yeomen," or "husbandmen;"

others as "shopkeepers," others as "fishermen," and many as "laborers;"

while a great number were handicraftsmen of various trades, from blacksmiths to wig-makers.

They mustered at Boston early in April, where clothing, haversacks, and blankets were served out to them at the charge of the King; and the crooked streets of the New England capital were filled with staring young rustics.

On the next Saturday the following mandate went forth: "The men will behave very orderly on the Sabbath Day, and either stay on board their transports, or else go to church, and not stroll up and down the streets."

The transports, consisting of about forty sloops and schooners, lay at Long Wharf; and here on Monday a grand review took place,--to the gratification, no doubt, of a populace whose amusements were few.

All was ready except the muskets, which were expected from England, but did not come.

Hence the delay of a month, threatening to ruin the enterprise.

When Shirley returned from Alexandria he found, to his disgust, that the transports still lay at the wharf where he had left them on his departure.

[253] The muskets arrived at length, and the fleet sailed on the twenty-second of May.

Three small frigates, the "Success," the "Mermaid," and the "Siren," commanded by the ex-privateersman, Captain Rous, acted as convoy; and on the twenty-sixth the whole force safely reached Annapolis.

Thence after some delay they sailed up the Bay of Fundy, and at sunset on the first of June anchored within five miles of the hill of Beauséjour.